# 1NC

## Off

### 1NC – T

#### Topical affirmatives must advocate a policy whereby the United States federal government expands the scope of one or more of its core antitrust laws.

#### Resolved means to enact a policy by law.

Words & Phrases ’64 [Words and Phrases; 1964; Permanent Edition]

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### The United States federal government is the national government in DC.

Black’s Law ‘4 [Black’s Law Dictionary; 6/1/4; 8th Edition, p. 716]

Federal government. 1. A national government that exercises some degree of control over smaller political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national politics matters – Also termed (in federal states) central government. 2. the U.S. government – Also termed national government. [Cases: United States -1 C.J.S. United States - - 2-3]

#### Should means mandating something be done.

Nieto ‘9 [Judge Henry Nieto, Colorado Court of Appeals, 8-20-2009 People v. Munoz, 240 P.3d 311 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009)]

"Should" is "used . . . to express duty, obligation, propriety, or expediency." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2104 (2002). Courts [\*\*15] interpreting the word in various contexts have drawn conflicting conclusions, although the weight of authority appears to favor interpreting "should" in an imperative, obligatory sense. HN7A number of courts, confronted with the question of whether using the word "should" in jury instructions conforms with the Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections governing the reasonable doubt standard, have upheld instructions using the word. In the courts of other states in which a defendant has argued that the word "should" in the reasonable doubt instruction does not sufficiently inform the jury that it is bound to find the defendant not guilty if insufficient proof is submitted at trial, the courts have squarely rejected the argument. They reasoned that the word "conveys a sense of duty and obligation and could not be misunderstood by a jury." See State v. McCloud, 257 Kan. 1, 891 P.2d 324, 335 (Kan. 1995); see also Tyson v. State, 217 Ga. App. 428, 457 S.E.2d 690, 691-92 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (finding argument that "should" is directional but not instructional to be without merit); Commonwealth v. Hammond, 350 Pa. Super. 477, 504 A.2d 940, 941-42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). Notably, courts interpreting the word "should" in other types of jury instructions [\*\*16] have also found that the word conveys to the jury a sense of duty or obligation and not discretion. In Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312, 324 (Ark. 1977), the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the word "should" in an instruction on circumstantial evidence as synonymous with the word "must" and rejected the defendant's argument that the jury may have been misled by the court's use of the word in the instruction. Similarly, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected a defendant's argument that the court erred by not using the word "should" in an instruction on witness credibility which used the word "must" because the two words have the same meaning. State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958). [\*318] In applying a child support statute, the Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that a legislature's or commission's use of the word "should" is meant to convey duty or obligation. McNutt v. McNutt, 203 Ariz. 28, 49 P.3d 300, 306 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (finding a statute stating that child support expenditures "should" be allocated for the purpose of parents' federal tax exemption to be mandatory).

#### Prohibitions are legal restrictions against certain conduct.

DLD ‘ND [Duhaime's Law Dictionary; “Prohibition Definition”; http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/P/Prohibition.aspx; AS]

A legal restriction against the use of something or against certain conduct.

#### The core antitrust laws are the Sherman, FTC, and Clayton Acts.

CoC ‘ND [Chamber of Commerce; “Antitrust Laws”; https://www.uschamber.com/antitrust-laws; AS]

America’s Antitrust Laws Protect Competition and Benefit Consumers

Antitrust laws ensure competition in a free and open market economy, which is the foundation of any vibrant economy. And healthy competition among sellers in an open marketplace gives consumers the benefits of lower prices, higher quality products and services, more choices, and greater innovation.

The core of U.S. antitrust law was created by three pieces of legislation: the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Clayton Antitrust Act. These laws have evolved along with the market, vigilantly guarding against anti-competitive harm that arises from abuse of dominance, bid rigging, price fixing, and customer allocation.

#### Debate is a game and we’re both here to win – this means procedural questions like T come first. The role of the ballot is to vote for whoever does the better debating over the resolutional question.

#### Vote neg:

#### First is procedural fairness – their interpretation eviscerates predictable limits – all negative strategy is premised off a stable reading of the resolution. The lack of a stable mechanism lets them radically re-contextualize their aff and erase neg ground via perms. Including their advocacy authorizes any methodology or orientation tangentially related to the topic, which renders research burdens untenable. That outweighs and precedes their offense – debate is a game that we’ve all chosen to participate in and requires effective negation. It makes no sense to skew a competitive activity in favor of one side.

#### Second is clash – you should privilege rigorous debate over different political paradigms over endorsing any one political paradigm. Unflinching commitments ignore the complexity and partiality of any political theory. Promoting clash is key to interrogate complex issues, problematize solutions, and actualize any benefits of debate.

### 1NC – Repressive Hypothesis K

#### The reduction of race to the binary of enslaved black female flesh and the white rival is a master narrative produced by the retroactive reading of 19th century biological racism as an inescapable transhistorical force.

Rey **CHOW** Andrew W. Mellon Distinguished Professor in the Humanities @ Duke **’21** *A Face Drawn in Sand* p. 88-92

Foucauldian Discourse and Its Postcolonial Inflection

In his critique of European imperialism, Edward Said, greatly influenced by Foucault’s early work on discourse, performs the trend-setting task of mapping the systemic and structural correlations between textual formations and economic-political formations. In the classic study Orientalism, Said argues that these correlations constitute a kind of material history based as much on representational traditions as it is on physical invasions and annexations. “The things to look at are style, figures of speech, setting, narrative devices, historical and social circumstances, not the correctness of the representation nor its fidelity to some great original. The exteriority of the representation is always governed by some version of the truism that if the Orient could represent itself, it would; since it cannot, the representation does the job, for the West, and faute de mieux, for the poor Orient,” Said writes,' laying down the methodological blueprint for critiquing a history that, according to him, has contributed to the concerted Western construction of the Orient as a distinct and inferior entity. Even so, from the standpoint of race, Foucault’s imprints on Said’s seminal work are per- haps less a matter of the empirical objects of study chosen (the texts and artworks that make condescending references to oriental identities and cultures) than of a new, reflexive method of conceptualizing the colonial situation and its aftermath. By positioning the East and the West as clusters of discourses rather than as ontological fixities, and by showing that the East as such is constituted through the collaborative criss-crossings of different branches of Western knowledge (such as history, art, literature, philosophy, geography, economics, politics, and so forth), Said inaugurated a secular theoretical model of scholarship that has proven resiliently adoptable and adaptable and that remains current in many academic and journalistic investigations of (post)colonial histories and cultures.

Similarly, in his book Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object, Johannes Fabian interrogates the philosophical, theological, and historical foundations of Western anthropological thinking along the lines introduced by Foucault in his early work such as The Order of Things. Writing in the wake of Said’s antiorientalist critique, Fabian goes further (than Foucault) in underscoring a basic unevenness embedded in ethnographic practice—that is, in the com- munication loop through which Western anthropologists routinely report their observations and findings about non-Western cultures back to audiences in the West. In an ingenious stroke, Fabian defines this unevenness in terms of a geopolitics of time: whereas Western researchers write about other cultures to Western readers in the forward-looking present, the cultures being studied are, or so his argument goes, typically objectified in such ways as to seem frozen in some other temporality, one that is, moreover, implicitly deemed primitive, backward, and unchanging.) In Fabian’s account, as in Said’s, using the Foucauldian notion of discourse—an ever-shifting, textual-cum-social grid of articulations spread over the course of time—means fore- grounding not only an open-ended multiplicity of constituents and players but also a persistent relation of closure, of inequality between cultures. If Western researchers’ work is predicated on mobility and freedom, their habits and privileges of travel being constitutive of their techniques of producing knowledge, the peoples they study, by contrast, are epistemologically confined in a standstill to their culture gardens.\*

As in the case of the transatlantic slave trade in the context of the United States, the political and economic aspects of European empire building of the past few centuries have definitively molded the under- standing of race in the global postcolonial context, in which race is more or less irrevocably marked by this relation of inequality and its egregious consequences. As Roxann Wheeler puts it, “Too often race has been treated only as a subset of slavery and colonialism, an emphasis that has reinforced the fallacious belief that race is primarily about blackness or African origins.” Drawing on a scrupulous study of the more elastically articulated categories of human variety in eighteenth- century British culture, Wheeler observes that most contemporary colonial and critical theorists tend to “silently base their assumptions about race on the mid-nineteenth-century heritage of biological racism,” which is predominantly characterized by “an anxiety about cultural and racial purity, pervasive white supremacism, the white man’s burden of civilizing native populations, and an interventionary political rule.”+ Wheeler’s observations corroborate Foucault’s in Discipline and Punish. In discussing the emergence of delinquency as a punishable personality trait, Foucault describes the early nineteenth century as “a time when the perception of another form of life was being articulated upon that of another class and another human species. A zoology of social sub-species and an ethnology of the civilizations of malefactors, with their own rites and language, was [sic] beginning to emerge in a parody form.”,

Given the powerful influence of this nineteenth-century heritage, in what Nikolas Rose has termed “a concerted biologization of race,”- we can see how, even when not explicitly invoked, the infrastructural relations between colonizer and colonized—much like the infrastructural relations between slave traders/owners and slaves— have largely determined the stakes in contemporary debates about race and modern Western thought.. In these debates, race remains understood mainly in terms of the immutability of skin color and other biomedically deterministic (molar) rather than probabilistic (molecular) classifications,/ and racism is understood as practices of exploitation and discrimination by those historically on the side of the victors (associated with political success and economic privilege) against those historically on the side of the victims (deemed linguistically, culturally, and institutionally inferior and unfairly deprived of opportunities for social mobility and advancement).0

In the ready (and understandable) reification of race and racism in these anachronic terms, an important and arguably more critical contribution made by Foucault is often elided. The Foucauldian notion of discourse has exerted such an impact through its Saidian inflection, it would seem, not necessarily simply because of Said’s pioneering, paradigm-setting politicization of Western representations of the East. In a manner that is quite worthy of Foucauldian analytics are, we should note, Said’s own rhetorical moves: not only has Said brought what are actually divergent (and usually discontinuous) series of historical events into coherent alignment with one another, but he has also strategically halted their multidirectional, uncoordinated movements by conjoining them at a particular nexus. That is to say, if there are no intrinsic or essential connections between colonial territorial conquests, military occupations, and economic exploitations, on the one hand, and linguistic, textual, and visual representations, on the other, Said’s deployment of discourse, together with the postcolonial studies that follows its lead, has powerfully interpellated audiences by insisting and reiterating that such connections are an incontrovertible certitude.

In some ways, the controversies of race as they continue to be generated in the Anglo-American academy today are an outcome of such strategic halting and binding—one might say essentializing—of the fluid transitions among contingent events into a continuous, subterranean master narrative. This is one reason some scholars have, for instance, disputed the origins (or causes) of orientalism as advanced by Said and his followers, citing the major counterexample of German orientalism, in which the seeming contiguity between empire and orientalist textual studies is not necessarily self-evident or consistent and in which older religious, spiritual, and philosophical preoccupations rather than chronologically more recent political- economic conquests assumed a pivotal role in modern Europe’s encounters with the East.'1 Although this point will need to be substantiated by a consideration of the vertiginously multilingual deliberations of different orientalist traditions, my point is simply that in the context of contemporary critical race studies Foucault’s contribution to the politics of discourse demands to be carefully revisited and reevaluated. If our current understanding of race—in particular within the English-speaking academy—has been preemptively shaped by postcolonial studies’ articulation of the dialectic between colonizer and colonized, it behooves us to ask, after Foucault: What are the factors that make that preemptive shaping possible? Could it have been otherwise? Were there other evental series in operation that could have led to different configurations of race and racism?

#### The repressive hypothesis is the motor that governs the regime of a romantic notion of blackness as a force necessarily disobedient to power. Reifying blackness as a void repressed by whiteness naturalizes and normalizes the multifaceted power relations at play in any construction of race.

Rey **CHOW** Andrew W. Mellon Distinguished Professor in the Humanities @ Duke **’21** *A Face Drawn in Sand* p. 92-95

Race Studies’ Repressive Hypothesis?

The suturing of race to the hierarchical colonizer–colonized relation has been so institutionally generative that any attempt to conceptualize race differently would seem counterintuitive. To this extent, post- Saidian postcolonial studies has been instrumental in enabling, indeed empowering, representations of those who are historically dis- advantaged, peripheralized, or silenced, even as cautionary reflections of what it means to let the subaltern speak have long been present.'' As an increasingly hegemonic trend in spotlighting victimhood reproduces itself across the studies of intergroup and intercultural encounters, postcolonial studies’ more positivistic and less-elastic version of race can seem at times to resonate a little too neatly with the popularized Freudian paradigm of sexual repression. Along these lines, race is commonly equated with oppression based on anatomy (that is, skin complexion), which is in turn deemed intractable rather than as one factor among a range of factors.') Such intractability is then further discoursed in terms of loss, grief, melancholia, precarity, and other naturalized—that is to say, normativized—psychoanalytic coordinates.

Foucault’s critique of popularized Freudian repression is too well known to warrant repeating in full, though the salient aspects of his argument remain noteworthy. As a mechanism that animates discourse, repression functions not merely as a means to articulate sexual differentiations from within an individual but also, according to Foucault, as the motor of an entire regime of thought, rendering our sense of self in the binarized states of imprisonment and liberation (or secrecy and transparency or darkness and light). This collaboration between a negative referent, repressed (that is, injured and obstructed) sexuality, and the positive significatory potency of discourse is what Foucault intends by the phrase “the repressive hypothesis.” Unlike Freud, Foucault is not exactly interested in asking why or how we are repressed, but rather in how we come to believe that we are. His oft- cited remarks to this effect go as follows in The History of Sexuality, volume 2: “The question I would like to pose is not, Why are we repressed? But rather, Why do we say, with so much passion and so much resentment against our most recent past, against our present, and against ourselves, that we are repressed? By what spiral did we come to affirm that sex is negated? What led us to show, ostentatiously, that sex is something we hide, to say it is something we silence?”'\*

For Foucault, writing in the mid–twentieth century, sexuality is not exactly “a stubborn drive, by nature alien and of necessity disobedient to a power which exhausts itself trying to subdue it and often fails to control it entirely.” Instead of this romanticist approach, he proposes thinking of sexuality as “an especially dense transfer point for relations of power”—one that is, moreover, “endowed with the greatest instrumentality” (HS, 2:245).

If Foucault’s critique succeeds in challenging the ingrained beliefs in injury and obstruction that underpin the popular narratives of sexual repression, it meanwhile acknowledges how effectively the repressive hypothesis works as an incitement to discourse. Indeed, Foucault’s notion of discourse’s power is in part based on his grasp of how incessant talk about sexual repression—as instigated and encouraged by Freudian clinical custom and its commercial, mass-media, and self- help industry spinoffs—has activated an explosion of discourses and practices.

Might not Foucault’s critique of the repressive hypothesis also be instructive for thinking about race?

Consider the monumental figure of Frantz Fanon, whose work speaks to colonial oppression as psychic repression. For Fanon, writing in the 1940s as a colonial émigré from French Martinique educated in the metropole, race connotes above all the psychic wounding that the black subject endures at the hands of his white oppressors. As identification with the white oppressor is both required and impossible, self- alienation or psychic disability becomes the defining limit for black identity formation. According to Fanon, such internal fragmentation is reinforced by denigrating interactions in the metropolis, in which the black subject is regularly reduced to his skin color and hailed as resolutely other, so much so that the fragmentation tends to gravitate outward, creating psychic schisms within the colonized population as a whole. Notably, the unforgettable street scene of racial hailing as described by Fanon is no less constitutive of the self-identification of the white child who cries out, “Look! A Negro!,” at the sight of the black man.'+ For this child, race means subjecting the other to exoticism, a type of recognition based in the aesthetics of shock and wonderment as well as in stigmatization.

In Fanon’s descriptions, not only is race soldered to the entanglement between colonizer and colonized, but it is also theorized in (Freudian) Oedipal terms. The white man occupies the position of the authoritative father who must be removed in order for his reign of tyranny to end and for the angry son, the black man, to gain a positive sense of his own identity. Injury seems counterable only with injury, as violent overthrow is the only means by which the black man can externally compensate for his internal bereavement, repossess what was taken from him, and assume a renewed sense of wholeness. Race (which in this instance equals racism), as experienced by the black male subject, seems symptomatic of the repressive logic that characterizes the paternalistic functioning of power. Above all, race (or racism) heralds the sign of damage, a perpetually internalized state of negation that can be ameliorated only through periodic eruptions of revolutionary violence.',

#### Racism is not an end in itself that indicates the satisfaction of repressed libidinal desires. Race marks productive techniques of power to shape the species.

Rey **CHOW** Andrew W. Mellon Distinguished Professor in the Humanities @ Duke **’21** *A Face Drawn in Sand* p. 103-106

To consider Foucault’s relevance to the debates on race, it would therefore be necessary to see his major works—from The History of Madness and The Order of Things to The Birth of the Clinic, Discipline and Punish, The History of Sexuality, and the Collège de France lectures—as a continual series of critical commentaries on life’s entry into history. This entry has to do not only with masses as individuated bodies but also with the methods and mechanisms by which masses are handled in abstraction—that is, systematically produced in the form of a calculable and manageable aggregate, a social body (or what Foucault in an interview calls “the great fantasy . . . of a social body constituted by the universality of wills”)0). As he puts it in one of the lectures collected in “Society Must Be Defended,” a technology of power newly emerging in the second half of the eighteenth century applied “not to man-as-body but . . . to man-as-species**”** (“Society,” 878). This technology is addressed to a multiplicity of men “to the extent that they form . . . a global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on” (“Society,” 878– 75).\*1 Foucault names this technology of power “a ‘biopolitics’ of the human race” (“Society,” 875). In using the word race, he clearly intends something akin to group, class, type, or speciation. As in his efforts to historicize how madness becomes legible through institutional compartmentalization and segregation in Western society, or how different fields of knowledge come into existence through gradual rearrangements of established boundaries and their fault lines, what fascinates him is how the will to know seems invariably, in the modern period, to devolve into computational moves (of dividing and multi- plying) that in turn become enterprises of enclosure, partitioning, specification, and infinitization. It is in this process of random groups of human persons (or human traits) being amassed as aggregates of incorporeal a3nities and, in that manner, correlated for purposes of statist management, that race, in tandem with sex, materializes as a relation of force.

Foucault’s understanding of race may be glimpsed in a number of clarifying statements he makes in the Collège de France lectures gathered under the title “Society Must Be Defended.” He writes that “the war that is going on beneath order and peace, the war that undermines our society and divides it in a binary mode is, basically, a race war” (#6– ;4). “The social body is basically articulated around two races,” he adds. “It is this idea that this clash between two races runs through society from top to bottom which we see being formulated as early as the seventeenth century” (;4). He goes on to distinguish between a biological transcription of race war (in the form of evolutionism, such as that manifested in European policies of colonization) and a social transcription of race war (in the form of a class struggle) (;4). He indicates his own attempt to trace this “biologico-social racism,” with the important reminder that “the other race” is not from elsewhere but a race “that is permanently, ceaselessly infiltrating the social body, or which is, rather, constantly being re-created in and by the social fabric” (;2, emphasis added). Finally, Foucault holds that the function of racism is twofold: “to fragment, to create caesuras within the biological continuum addressed by biopower,” and “to allow the establishment of a positive relation of this type:. . . ‘The very fact that you let more die will allow you to live more’ ” (8##, emphasis added).\*'

In sum, Foucault’s ongoing intellectual project has to do with the historical expansion of life, what he calls the “I—as species rather than as individual” (“Society,” 8##), in the form of an ideality, a transcendent generality in whose name empirical practices flourish and proliferate. The endless endeavors to know life, involving ever more complicated mechanisms of measurement, surveying/surveillance, analysis, fore- cast, and projection, are part and parcel of the modern state’s I-as- species mission. Seeing race primarily in these terms—that is, as part and parcel of a regime of growth,\*) dedicated to the normalization of the living and to the sanctification of humans, who are abstractly imagined as an integrated whole—raises a fundamental question: “How can a power such as this kill, if it is true that its basic function is to improve life, to prolong its duration, to improve its chances, to avoid accidents, and to compensate for failings?. . . Given that this power’s objective is essentially to make live, how can it let die? How can the power of death, the function of death, be exercised in a political system centered upon biopower?” (“Society,” 8#7).

This is the juncture at which he introduces the remarks, given as the last epigraph at the beginning of this chapter, about racism as the state’s way of introducing a break in the domain of life. Rather than understanding racism by way of tensions and antagonisms derived from positive markers such as skin color and geographical location, Foucault characteristically describes it as a relation of power (together with the historical discourses that revolve around such a relation). More specifically, racism is a means to an end rather than an end in itself; it is a technique of power that may be adopted whenever and wherever populations need to be brought under control in the state’s biopolitical warfare. This is why, in a rather controversial gesture for the mid-1970s, he suggests that even socialism is marked by racism insofar as the socialist state can rationalize the murder of its enemies for purposes of advancing the class struggle (“Society,” 8;2, 8;8). In an astute discussion of the massive data-ification of the contemporary global environment, Patricia Ticineto Clough, writing along the grain of Foucault’s arguments, proposes the term population racism to under- score the actuarialism that, as she argues, goes well beyond the state:

With population racism, the calculations and measures of population in a variety of contexts—territory, class, ethnicity, gender, race—all are put in terms of an analysis of biological activity. Of course, this is a biology (and now neuroscience) that is infused with technicity or technicality—the technicity of measuring, for starters. In turning all contexts of populations into a biotechnicity of calculation, quantification, and measure, population racism makes way for the health or lack thereof of populations to be part of a global market, beyond national boundedness, beyond the boundaries of the body as organism.\*\*

Whereas our current understanding of racism tends to see it more or less psychically, as a form of prejudice and hatred or as mutual contempt, with all the subjective and subjectivizing connotations these words conjure, in Foucault’s work racism is not simply a malicious frame of mind or, for that matter, a form of pathology. It is instead a systemic and regulatory capacity—a wedge that can be driven productively between groups in order to instigate a warlike struggle between those who can live (who can perpetuate and justify their lifestyles) and those who must die. As a technique of power, racism is eminently enabling—“the indispensable precondition that allows someone to be killed, that allows others to be killed. Once the State functions in the biopower mode, racism alone can justify the murderous function of the State” (“Society,” 8#;, emphases added), and the idea that “society must be defended” against the other (sub)races is thus “the internal racism of permanent purification,” one of the basic dimensions of social normalization under state racism (“Society,” ;2–;8). For these reasons, it would be insufficient simply to ask who is being racialized. Far more critical for Foucault is the question of what institutional purposes such acts of racialization—negative or positive—serve to norm. (See the introduction in part I for a discussion of norming in Foucault’s thinking.) Conversely, as an abstract category unsubstantiated by scientific definition yet thoroughly steeped in the historical power effects of racism, race cannot simply be claimed in the form of an identity politics in resistance to power. Under some circumstances, indeed, embracing the idea of race would be tantamount to being racist.\*+

#### Biopolitical rationalities of policing underly a global race war.

Rey **CHOW** Andrew W. Mellon Distinguished Professor in the Humanities @ Duke **’21** *A Face Drawn in Sand* p. 108-112

In the rest of this remarkable essay, through a discussion of various seventeen- and eighteenth-century European authors such as Louis Turquet de Mayerne, N. De Lamare, Huhenthal, J. P. Willebrand, and in particular Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, Foucault sketches an intellectual history in which the police emerges as the culminating instance of what he calls the reason of state—that is, as an apparatus with a palpably identified object. “Proceeding through the eighteenth century, and especially in Germany, we see that what is de!ned as the object of the police is population, that is, a group of beings living in a given area” (“ ‘Omnes,’ ” 844, emphasis added).\*0 This new object of the police, he states elsewhere, marked “a historical change in the relations between power and individuals . . . not only according to their juridical status but as men, as working, trading, living beings.”+1

Taking the cue from Foucault’s various remarks about a “gigantic thirst” for the state “that could not be tamed,” a “desire for the State,” and “a will to the State,” Joseph Vogl offers a carefully considered account of the historical developments in Germany since the late seventeenth century.+' According to Vogl, this modern and at the time new perspective on the state saw the police’s function in terms of an optimization of social potential by way of positive intervention in a population’s living conditions, conditions that were saturated with concrete variations, contingencies, and accidents. As he explains,

The application of the term “police” tends to be unlimited and now takes on the task of positive intervention within the political govern- ment. . . . [T]he term “police” is concerned with the living conditions of the people (Volk), the forms of societal cohabitation, and the areas of the body politic. The police views these areas from the perspective of social relations and interaction, and renders—in a slightly paradoxical fashion—the development of the individual and common welfare into a general strengthening of the state. In this manner, the police encompasses the “realization” of how a given condition of the community can be preserved and improved. . . .

The police is . . . simultaneously a means of recognition, an instrument of governing, and a program of intervention. . . . [T]he police fantasies of the eighteenth century . . . gain their theoretical and systematic meaning precisely because they orient their patterns of intervention toward concrete factors and the “Nature of Things,” and because they initially interrogate the regulation of contingent incidents. Be it in the branches of medicine, vocations, trade, personal property, public morality, internal security, or the politics of the population—a new perspective now conceives of the state as an institution of providence, prevention, and insurance vis-à-vis possible (mis)chance and accident.+)

As the state kept an eye, so to speak, on how a complex mass of people went about their daily business and invented new means of securing the well-being and comfort of all, it became intimately and often unnoticeably present in all aspects of social relations and interactions. In this manner, to follow Foucault’s suggestion, a modern political framework of governing can be seen as genealogically affined to a pastoral principle and technology, transposing the Judeo-Christian idea of the good shepherd caring for his flock into a utopian form of political rationalism, led and guarded by a good police force.

As in Foucault’s thinking on sexuality and race, his decidedly Nietzschean reflections on Christianity should be contextualized within his sustained critique of Western political rationality. Two important features stand out in these admittedly intense reflections. On the one hand is the tremendous moral impact Christianity has exerted over the individual and over what may be called the individuation of the soul by way of pastoral techniques such as the ritual of confession. (A more extended discussion of confession is given in chapter #.) On the other hand, the armed influence of the police is wielded as the supreme objectification of the reason of state. These two intimately linked anchorage points of Foucault’s dissection of Western political rationality make his work freshly germane to the study of race and racism in the twenty-first century.

Unlike the postcolonial inflection of his notion of discourse, the relevant alignment Foucault proposes here is less a matter of suturing cultural forms to geopolitical or economic-political aggressions (as in Said’s Orientalism) than a matter of tracing cultural practices to lingering religious dominance. Rather than featuring the couples such as master/slave, colonizer/colonized, and their variants, Foucault’s analysis of political rationality foregrounds another type of twosome: shepherd/sheep; priest/confessant; police/citizen (alongside doctor/patient in "e Birth of the Clinic and prison guard/inmate in Discipline and Punish). Absent here is the Manichaean logic of treating the two par- ties involved as absolute moral opposites. Instead, the couples—and their coupling—are epistemically and historically enmeshed through entrenched mechanisms of inculcating obedience and subordination to a higher, ineffable authority, mechanisms that have been passed down through Bible-based religion and its secular avatars. By spot- lighting the police as the exemplary icon of government, and by placing this icon in a modern global situation still by and large dominated by residual Christian techniques of power—think of the widespread celebration of Christmas and Easter as public holidays, the common use of the Bible for swearing in officials of state, the prison protocol of having a Christian chaplain present at state executions, and the acceptability of wearing the cross as an item of jewelry—Foucault pre- pares the grounds for our early twenty-first-century confrontation with the phenomenon of police racism: racism as a type of combat gear the police routinely puts on in the service of law and order. I am refer- ring to the random police murders of black people, including unarmed women and youth, that occur repeatedly in contemporary U.S. cities, murders that seem, in the context of the present discussion, quite logical mutations of Western political rationality as Foucault dissects it, with police officers being an extreme incarnation—and an absurd theatricalizaion—of the shepherd king.+\*

Furthermore, if the police is the core of the reason of state, the nations that take it upon themselves to safeguard the entire globe will perhaps need to be redefined as transnationalism’s versions of the Christian pastorate, with its firm mandate to protect the flock that is the world population. As Klaus Mladek clarifies,

The police as we know it today develops with the Polizeistaat of the eighteenth-century into one of the supreme concepts of bourgeois society; the new liberal sanctification of law and security, the rise of the state and the emancipation of the liberal subject are ensnarled in the institutions of police. The original thrust of the police function has remained intact up to today. New modes of police intervention and concepts of administrative order increasingly move across borders towards a planetary order, where a dense transnational framework of institutions and agencies forms what could be called a global police force.++

The guardianship exercised by this global police force—led in late capitalism by nations such as the United States, France, Britain, Germany, Australia, and Japan—together with the salvational bind it seeks to establish between itself and the ordinary citizen around the world, suggests that a new kind of race war is solidifying as a cross-cultural or, as Mladek calls it, planetary strategy and reality.

Since September 11, 2001, those associated with Islam have increasingly come to occupy the place of the subrace (those others who have to die in order for us to live, according to Foucault’s formulation of racism). One instance of this new racism deployed by the global police force from within the new global order is the stigma of delinquency—a presumed propensity toward “terrorist” acts—now borne by Muslims (or, in a stereotyping fashion, by those with Muslim-sounding names or Muslim-seeming appearances). This new race war rests much less on a division of cultures in the form of mutual suspicion or contempt than on a multinational consensus to govern—that is, to legitimize and monopolize the terms or rationales of governing—the world by ostracizing specific groups of people. Although arrest, incarceration, torture, coerced confession, denial of legal representation, and execution are involved as governing techniques, this consensus is typically promulgated in the pastoral rhetoric of peace and order, tolerance, benevolent leadership, respect for diversity, and the well-being of the entire flock+,—the rhetoric of how, to use Foucault’s phrase, our “society must be defended” against the infidels, those who are not like us.

It is to these struggles in the current transnational setting that Foucault’s work makes its singularly trenchant contributions today. Instead of discourses reifying “black,” “brown,” “yellow,” and “white” in kneejerk or opportunistic fashions, his writings provoke us to ask: What if racialization is aligned instead with our democratic state institutions, our genteel social practices, and our well-intentioned conscience productions, all of which continue to be galvanized by Christian techniques of power? What if race becomes linked to controversies over embodied (including sartorial) religious conduct in an avowedly secular society? Finally, what if struggles against racism were to be waged alongside a rigorous historical analysis of vestiges of the Christian hermeneutics of the self+-—including the self that, in our neoliberal present, is constantly led to embrace race as well as sexuality as a way of discovering, disclosing, and inventing itself?+.

#### Our alterative - reflexive and comparative work on the colonial practices that produced connections between race, sexuality, gender, and class. Attending to practice rather than taxonomy and origin helps resist biopolitics.

Ann Laura **STOLER** Willy Brandt Distinguished University Professor of Anthropology and Historical Studies @ New School ’10 *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* 2nd Edition p. xi-xv

If in most of Carnal Knowledge comparison remained a tool of analysis, over the decade of its writing comparison emerged increasingly as one of my objects of study. Colonial officials, like colonial scholars after them, often treated comparison as a strategy. Thus my own unruly practices paralleled, and perhaps unknowingly were prompted by, those in colonial documents themselves. In the Indies, comparison was a strategic affair: certain commensurabilities condoned policies and pointedly undermined others. Scales too changed. When Dutch officials compared social welfare programs for "poor whites" in Java to those in Australia or South Asia, or the "mixed- blood problem" in the Indies to metissage in French Indochina, these efforts did different kinds of work. With attention to these differences in object and use, comparison itself took on a different cast. Comparisons in the hands of colonial officialdom were also conceptual assessments and grounded interventions. Colonial agents disagreed over what constituted comparable con­ texts, often sharply aware that these choices had potent political effects that could redirect the limited or expanded expectations of state responsibilities for social welfare, orphanages, and social reform—and determine who would be excluded from them.

More starkly, the changing criteria of comparison underscored the anxious labor that went into forging a viable epistemology of race. Comparison was an instrument for the moral measurements of social kinds, predicated on epistemic choices about how racial membership could be known and assessed. The assignations of specific sensibilities (for "motherly love," "sexual promiscuity," or "insolence") to particular social kinds were never fixed. Colonial architects would quickly set aside contextual differences as irrelevant—or, in turn, elevate them to the crucial—as they brought commensurable racial categories into viable cross-imperial conversations and into crisper taxonomic order with finer calibrations.

As such, comparison was also an artifact of the unstable predicates of colonial common sense. In recent work, I have sought to look more closely at those moments in which that common sense proved inadequate to its task.6 Readily usable assumptions about what tied carnal proclivities and affective attachments to political dissent were elements in a wider racial force field where perceptible, patent actions indexed latent sensibilities.7How those actions were imagined to do so was unstable and subject to change. Rather than assuming a shared common sense, I have sought instead to pause at those moments when what had been considered obvious by colonial officials was no longer self-evident, when those who were racially labeled refused the appellations assigned to them—when commonsense rubrics of racial differentiation failed to work. Nowhere was this more evident than in assumptions of the successive colonial state commissions in the late nineteenth century about what divided "poor whites" and "needy Europeans" both from their mixed-blood compatriots and from the stolid European colonial middle class. Racial "clarity" in the service of social welfare was the object of the commissions, but it was invasive surveys about domestic and sexual lives that provoked the rage of the respondents, the refusal of some to answer the questions, and the wrath of an emergent Indo-European press.8

Carnal Knowledge may be credited with pointing to this intensified surveillance of the intimate in ways that colonial historiography had long ignored, but the insight belongs to those who governed and those subject to their scrutiny. No one needed to tell those "wavering classes" on the border­ lines of colonial categories that management of home, sex, and sentiment was at the forefront of governance. It was they, in critiques of such intrusions, who referred to the Indies administration as an "inquisitional state."9

The question of comparison underlies another theme that reappears throughout Carnal Knowledge: namely, the task of realigning metropolitan and colonial histories in a conjoined analytic frame. Frederick Cooper and I had raised this issue in Tensions of Empire, as had I in Race and the Edu­ cation of Desire.10 But how to track decoupled, severed histories often proved harder than asserting an analytic commitment to pursue their convergence and relationality. The scholarly pursuit of how social reform initiatives in mid-nineteenth-century Europe were called upon or rejected to craft welfare policies in colonized regions has given way to histories that track how colonial and metropolitan policies colluded and collided—and when social experiments in "modern" management of populations came from the colonies rather than the other way around.

This attention to a broader view of imperial practice does not merely underscore that social reform and racism went hand in hand, or that nineteenth- century liberalism and empire were complementary projects, as Uday Mehta and I each insisted early on. The humanitarian "good works" of empire were part of its very durable architecture—with exacting exclusions and inequities structured through them.11

Reworking the imperial genealogies of the European modern has also opened new spaces for thinking the present, prompting deeper genealogies that course between imperial moralizing missions and contemporary humanitarian interventions— and the distribution of compassion from North to South in the world today. Detention centers for unwanted immigrants in France, refugee camps for Palestinians displaced by the Israeli stale, and barb-wired and fenced reserves for Native Americans and Australia's indigenous population have been reconnected to imperial practices and their spatial logic. In using "natural" landscapes and sophisticated architectural design to limit access to resources, to intensify vulnerabilities, and to cordon off subject populations in the name of protection and welfare, they re­ hearse as they elaborate upon practices long in imperial use. Compassion and sympathy are braided through the politics of security and the intimate violences condoned in the name of what Michel Foucault once called the imperative "to defend society" from its internal and external enemies and to annihilate specific populations in the name of order and social peace.12 Martin Thomas makes the case that the field of "military intelligence" and the security regimes it has fostered grew out of a "scientific modernism" developed in the early twentieth century for imperial imperatives in Palestine, the Maghreb, and what was the Levant.13

THE POLITICS OF OTHER COMPARISONS

Thus comparison is historiographically and methodologically problematic.14 But the epistemology of comparison is also charged politically. What I have elsewhere called the politics of comparison conceptually points to comparing as an "active political verb."15 If choices of comparison were consequential to the strategies of governance, they remain equally so to the implicit conceptual arguments of, and the kinds of questions raised or dismissed by, those who study them. Such choices are rarely benign. As discussed below, comparison is at the center of current debates about what empires did and do and what can be claimed about their common properties. What gets to be named and to count as a "colonial situation" remains as vividly contested as does the question of 'what structured inequities are inscribed in the "post­ colony" today.16These are not solely academic questions. Here alternative "countercomparisons"—those that confront the comparative choices of colonial regimes—have a political vitality of their own. In the contest over what is excluded from the national histories of France, Israel, Belgium, Japan, China, and the United States, and over what cannot but be included in the histories of Algeria, Palestine, Jordan, the Belgian Congo, Korea, Tibet, and polities throughout the Middle East, at issue is neither "blame," redemption, nor a settling of scores, but rather a recognition that specific colonial histories have shaped who now makes up their populations and who has been dispersed, dislocated, and segregated within and outside their borders.

When Foucault urged us "to think the unthought" with respect to our knowledge production, he directed us to explore the "landscape of shadow" in which what we choose to think is located and by which it is framed.17 With respect to the intimate frontiers of empire, a pursuit of that "land­ scape of shadow" stretched me at a moment when students of U.S. history were turning with new vigor to reexamine the history of U.S. imperial practice, a focus long sequestered in U.S. scholarship to its left-wing margins. In 2000 I was invited to be part of that renewed conversation. It was an opportunity to turn back to work by U.S. historians on the sexually charged racisms, the miscegenation laws, and "the problem of poor whites" that had been formative in my own thinking when I first began researching Sumatra's plantation history in the late 1970s, before "postcolonial" scholarship achieved its prominence.18As importantly, this conversation was an occasion to remember that Edward Said's interventions, which had animated such careful study of European empires, were as forcefully aimed at U.S. empire as at its British and French variants.19

In what became a collective enterprise, and ultimately the edited volume Haunted by Empire: Geographies of the Intimate in North American History, a number of U.S. historians joined me to ask a hard set of questions: What constituted a viable comparison between U.S. empire and other imperial forms ? Why did certain comparisons seem appropriate, and why did some seem more "counterintuitive" than others? Some of us trained our sights on contexts where the intimate coordinates of empire were obvious and easily accessible in documents. Some looked to contexts in which we had previously worked but where imperial imperatives were framed in analytic terms by scholars—or in vernacular terms by historical actors— that rendered their effects hard to track. Some shared a notion of what the intimate was and what analytic traction it offered: from examination of the unwanted "caresses" of a slave manager in eighteenth-century New Orleans to study of the U.S. state's scrutiny of conjugal and homosexual relations between South Asian immigrants in the late nineteenth-century American Southwest. Others treated domains of the intimate very differently, to define a "spatial proximity or adjacent connection" or to suggest that a comparative study of intimacies could not adequately attend to the "actual ways that historical actors compared, contrasted, and connected their own and other societies." And another contributor unraveled "the sinews of empire" to show how they wrapped themselves obliquely around the career trajectories of husbands, fathers, and sons in the antebellum United States and around the labor of those women and household employees who served them.20

Confronted with these elusive relations between the imperial circuits through which people, produce, and policy decisions moved and the inti­ mate lives of those whose choices and constraints were shaped by those movements, we turned to practices rather than rubrics**,** to the effects of policies rather than how they were named. In comparing the visions that guided the late nineteenth-century establishment of Native American boarding schools in the U.S. Southwest and those in the Netherlands Indies, hygienic projects in the Philippines and Australia, or the multiple imperial authorities that wrestled with the status of "half-castes" in Samoa, we rooted our own comparisons in both the local analytics of race-making and the moral imaginaries of colonial policies themselves. Children mattered—how they were fed, schooled, and raised. Hetero- and homosexual alliances mattered—who slept with whom, where and when. Governing agents targeted the cultural, domestic, and sexual proximities that they saw as reliable in­ dices of personhoods and political inclinations. Specific practices (such as parenting styles) were singled out as critical markers of dangerous interior sensibilities in the arts of governance and as measures of what was inaccessible—people's affective and moral states.

### 1NC – Labor Frame K

#### Ontologizing blackness as the schema for liberal pursuit of slavery, settler colonialism, and indentured labor denies the potential solidarities between those oppressed by liberalism.

Lisa **LOWE** Distinguished Professor of English and Humanities, a faculty member of the Consortium of Studies in Race, Colonialism, and Diaspora, and Director of the Center for the Humanities at Tufts University **’15** *The Intimacies of Four Continents* p. 34-39

I wish to emphasize, finally, an emergent meaning of the "intimacies of four continents:' An emergent social or cultural formation does not necessarily require completely "new" subjectivities or constituencies but can comprise elements of residual ongoing conditions like settler colonialism, colonial slavery, and trade, yet rearticulated in other ways through new practices. In this sense, we could consider one emergent formation of the intimacies of four continents as the variety of contacts among slaves, indentured, and mixed peoples living, working, and surviving together in the Americas. In the British colonial archive, such intimacies between contracted emigrants, indigenous people, slaves, and slave-descendant peoples are referenced by negative means, in cautionary rhetorics and statements of prohibition with respect to possible contacts between colonized groups, all implying the fear and anxiety of racial proximity in a context of mixture and unstable boundaries. For example, White's 1851 letter to the Governor of British Guiana warned: "The Chinese are essentially a social and a gregarious people and must be located in masses together, not scattered throughout the colony. They must be kept in the first instance distant and separate from the Negroes, not only at their work, but also in their dwellings:'110

The repeated injunctions that different groups must be divided and boundaries kept distinct indicate that colonial administrators imagined as dangerous the sexual, laboring, and intellectual contacts among enslaved and indentured nonwhite peoples. The racial classifications in the archive arise, thus, in this context of the colonial need to prevent these unspoken "intimacies" among the colonized. m Reading the archive, one notes explicit descriptions and enumerations, as well as the rhetorical peculiarities of the documents, the places where particular figures, tropes, or circumlocutions are repeated to cover gaps or tensions; these rhetorical ellipses point to illogic in the archive, as well. So, while this emergent sense of intimacies-the varieties of contacts between laboring peoples-is not explicitly named in the documents, it is, paradoxically, everywhere present in the archive in the presence of such detours. This emergent idea of "intimacies;' then, can be said to include the range of laboring contacts that are necessary for the production of bourgeois domesticity, as well as the intimacies of captured workers surviving together, the proximity and affinity that gives rise to political, sexual, intellectual collaborations, subaltern revolts and uprisings, such as the Haitian Revolution, the Louisiana cane workers strike of 1887, or the cross-racial alliances that underlay the Cuban struggles for independence in 1895-98.'12

These imminent, potential alliances among subjugated people are referenced negatively in policies and prohibitions against contacts, and are legible as apprehension and anxiety in the unwritten, blank spaces of the colonial archive. These alliances appear later, in the work of twentiethcentury anticolonial and antislavery thinkers such as Frederick Douglass, W. E. B. Du Bois, C. L. R. James, Walter Rodney, Fernando Ortiz, Cedric Robinson, Sylvia Wynter, and others, who allude to connections between slavery-based settler colonies, Chinese and Indian labor, and the prosperity of Europe. Douglass, for example, linked African slavery to a global system that used Chinese and Indian "coolie" labor and wrote in 1871: "the rights of the coolie in California, in Peru, in Jamaica, in Trinidad, and on board the vessels bearing them to these countries are scarcely more guarded than were those of the Negro slaves brought to our shores a century ago:' 113 Du Bois described "that dark and vast sea of human labor in China and India, the South Seas and all Africa, in the West Indies and Central America and in the United States" and called for "the emancipation of that basic majority of workers who are yellow, brown, and black:'114 In his history of the colonial division of labor in Guyana that separated Blacks and Asians and permitted the postemandpation exploitation of those divisions, Walter Rodney imagined the "definite historical achievement" that would have been possible if Black and Asian workers, the descendants of slaves and indentured laborers, could have forged solidarity across the residues of colonial division.U5 These "flashes" of the intimacies of four continents critically frame the more restricted dominant meaning of intimacy as the interiority and private property of the European and North American individual.

Interpreting the multivalence of "intimacy" is a means to understand the process through which the "intimacies of four continents" were rationalized and sublated by a more restricted notion of "intimacy" as the property of the possessive individual. Reading the colonial archive, I observe how colonized populations were differentially racialized through their proximities from normative ideas of family reproduction that became central to early nineteenth-century liberalism. Reading literature, autobiography, political philosophy, political economy, and cultural genres of liberalism, I observe likewise how the racialized distributions of freedom and humanity were equally a part of this legacy. Modern hierarchies of race appear to have emerged in the contradiction between liberal aspirations to universality and the needs of modern colonial regimes to manage work, reproduction, and the social organization of the colonized. Racial governance was underwritten by liberal philosophies that at once disavowed the violence of settler colonialism and narrated modernity as the progress from slavery to freedom. The "intimacies of four continents" may be the "political unconscious" of this modern fiction of progress and redemption. However, these "intimacies" remain almost entirely illegible in the historiography of modern freedom, making the naming and interpretation of this global conjunction a problem of knowledge itself. It has been estimated that between 1451 and 1870, 11,569,000 African slaves were brought to the "new world;'116 and that after the sixteenth century, out of eighty million native peoples in the Americas, there remained ten.117 Between 1834 and the end of the century, a reported half a million Asian immigrants made their way to the British West Indies, in the context of tens of millions more going to Latin America, North America, Australia, New Zealand, and Southeast Asia.U8 But, while these numbers powerfully convey the labor of working peoples in the building of the "new world;' I am less concerned to pursue the significance ih demographic terms, and more concerned to inquire into the politics of knowledge with respect to connections between Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas that were critical to the imbrication of liberal freedom with the rise of a global capitalist system. We still seek new methods, not only to understand settler colonialism as the condition for African slavery in the Americas, but also to examine how the liberal narratives that symbolize freedom in the abolition of that slavery erase this connection and further impede our access to indigenous and slave histories. We require new archives and readings to link the introduction of Chinese and Indian indentured laborers to the Americas with the abolition of the slave trade, and moreover, to reckon with how the figure of Asian labor was used to buttress promises of freedom that remained out of reach for enslaved and indentured peoples alike, even following abolition. We require new ways to interpret India Office, Colonial Office, Foreign Office, and Parliamentary Papers together with literature and culture, as we elaborate the convergence of liberal abolition with new imperial experiments, linking older methods of territorial colonialism with new forms of sovereignty enacted through the governance of trade and movement, in treaty ports and across the seas.

What we know of these links and intimacies is shaped by existing fields and by our methods of disciplinary study. Europe is rarely studied in relation to the Caribbean or Latin America, and U.S. history is more often separated from studies of the larger Americas. Work on comparative U.S. racial formation is still at odds with American history, which disconnects the study of slavery from immigration studies of Asians and Latinos; the histories of gender, sexuality, and women is often separated from the study of race. Native Caribbeans have been rendered invisible by both the histories that tell of their extermination in the sixteenth cen - tury, and the subsequent racial classifications in which their survival is occluded. 119 While anthropological studies have focused on ethnic mixings of Asian and African peoples in the Caribbean, historians are just beginning to explore the braided relations of indenture, slavery, and independence among these groups.120 Scholars of the Black diaspora have undertaken the histories of both forcible and voluntary African dispersion as means for understanding the longer global past of new world modernity. Eric Williams, Walter Rodney, C. L. R. James, W E. B. Du Bois, and Cedric Robinson all observed the centrality of Black labor to the development of modern global capitalism, which exactly depended on the resources of African slaves just as Europeans moved from agrarian to factory work. Later studies like Paul Gilroy's Black Atlantic illuminated the encounter between Europe and the "new world"; others bring to light the circuits and connections among Yoroban Africans, Afro-Caribbeans, and African Americans.121 Robin D. G. Kelley emphasizes that the significance of Black diaspora projects to the field of U.S. history may be precisely their capacity to chart more than Black identities and political movements, what he calls "other streams of internationalism not limited to the black world:' 122

Robin Kelley's call to investigate "other streams of internationalism not limited to the black world" is suggestive with respect to imagining a global past in which Asia and Asian labor signifies both within and independently of Anglo-American empire built on settler colonialism and African slavery. Like "the intimacies of four continents;' Kelley's "other streams of internationalism" require new investigations that uncover and interpret connections and relation, but it also means that we must reckon with how the selection of a single historical actor may be precisely a modality of "forgetting" these crucial connections. While we might suspect that Chinese indentured labor in the early Americas has been "lost" because of indenture's ambiguous status with respect to freedom and slavery, dialectical terms central to narratives of modernity, it is important not to treat this as the particular exclusion of the Chinese. Rather, this "forgetting" attests to the more extensive erasure of colonial connections that include but are not limited to indentureship: that implicate the dispossession of indigenous peoples and the settler logics of appropriation, forced removal, and assimilation that are repeated in contemporary land seizures, militarized counter-insurgency at home and abroad, and varieties of nationalism in our present moment; that allude to the ubiquitous transnational migrations within neoliberal globalization of which Chinese emigrant labor is but one instance. Moreover, the forgetting reveals the politics of memory itself, and is a reminder that the constitution of knowledge often obscures the conditions of its own making. 123 In this sense, my interest in Chinese emigrant labor is not to pursue a single, particularist cultural identity, not to fill in a gap or add on another transoceanic group, but to explain the politics of our lack of knowledge, and to be more specific about what I would term the economy of affirmation and forgetting that characterizes liberal humanist understanding.

#### Bridging anti-racist and anti-capitalist politics is the only way to cope with capitalism as a mechanism of racial subordination.

Nikhil Pal **SINGH** Professor of Social and Cultural Analysis and History. Faculty Director NYU Prison Eduction Program **’17** *Race and America’s Long War* p. 76-78

The main problem of this approach is that it discounts contemporaneous modes of economic expansion, particularly slavery and the slave trade. 2 It also supports a wider tendency in Marxist thought to think of slavery as an antecedent to capitalism-a historical stage -thereby glossing over the startling fact, affirmed in much recent historiography, that the chattel slave was a new kind of laboring being and a new species of property born with capitalism. 3 As Sven Beckert writes, slavery, especially on North America's "cotton frontier," was not only a labor regime but also a means of allocating capital that was "tightly linked to the intensity and profits of industrial capitalism" that largely dispensed with the direct coercion of producers (i.e., laborers).4 Marx's oeuvre, which often compares the labor of workers with that of slaves during this time, exemplifies the problem, on the one hand affirming what W. E. B. Du Bois once called the "slavery character" of capitalism in its Anglo-American ascendancy, yet on the other contributing to a problematic relegation of African slavery to a secondary role in capitalism's development that has haunted radical politics ever since.

An effect of this relegation has been the separation of race, sex, and gender domination from capitalist exploitation, conceptually and in the determination of strategic priorities for working-class unification and struggle. Ironically, this way of constituting anticapitalist struggle not only impedes the kind of solidarity required in a world characterized by "intimate and plural relationships to capital" (in the words of Dipesh Chakrabarty), 5 but it also forfeits a powerful analytic, discernible within Marx's oeuvre, that conceives capitalism as a machine whose productive expansion depends on increasing degrees of appropriation and dispossession. 6 Marx not only describes capitalism as "veiled slavery" but also takes "slave management in slave-trade countries" as a reference point for thinking about capitalism's seizure of vital life processes, including what he calls the wage worker's "premature exhaustion and death. " 7 As subsequent anti-Marxist critics have argued, slavery in this register is paradoxically indispensable for thinking about capitalism and as such "unthinkable." Sometimes slavery seems "closer to capitalism's primal desire ... than wage [labor]," while at other times it seems to have been superseded by an order of oppression whose power rests on a supposed ability to dispense with violent dominion. 8 Strictly distinguishing between the worker's exploitation and the slave's "social death" -a common move in an important strand of contemporary black critical theorizing known as Afro-pessimism-offers no better answers to this conundrum but merely a kind of inversion in which slavery and the antiblackness that proceeds from it are the excluded ground of politics as such. This approach further alienates an understanding of slavery tied to the development of capitalism, and with it any impulse to overcome the problematic severing of racial domination and class subordination. To bridge this analytical and political divide, we might instead examine how the production of racial stigma that arises in support of chattel slavery has helped to foster the material, ideological, and affective infrastructures of appropriation and dispossession that have been indispensable to the rise of capitalism over a much longer period.

A key origin of race concepts was the differential ethical and material valuation of human subjects in slavery. Slave status was explicitly linked to race, gender, and sex within the planation household, upheld by private violence, and formally backed by state power. Wage labor (and even indentured servitude), by contrast, was increasingly nationalized and linked to a realm of public, social standing and limited state protection. As Jennifer Morgan and other historians have argued, the main legal innovation of chattel slavery in seventeenth-century North America was the assignment of hereditary force, by which captive Africans could only ever give birth to future slaves.9 The unpaid labor of slaves (like that of all workers) rested on another crucial layer of unpaid work: social and biological reproduction conducted by women. The process of conception and reproduction under slavery, however, was violently coerced and attached to the creation of a new species of human capital, "sustained," in the words of Frederick Douglass, "by the auctioneer's block."10 This biocapitalist innovation was in turn married to the slaveholder's power over life and death, expanding the ambit and varieties of corporeal violence that could be visited upon the bodies of slaves, up to and including homicide.11

[INSERT FOOTNOTE 11]

11. What Wilderson has termed "gratuitous violence" retained an instrumental value as exem plary violence, a deterrent to much-feared resistance and revolt. More recently, Edward Baptist has made a compelling case for the relationship between bodily torture and surplus extraction under slavery. Edward Baptist, The Half that Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 2015).

[END FOOTNOTE 11]

The rise of the commodity form, as Marx tells us, advanced broader ideas about universal exchangeability, formal equality, and general abstraction from the particular properties of persons and things. The legal and government procedures and material processes that produced these effects, however, operated in a world of human beings who were themselves commodities (as well as instruments of credit and capital investment), and on the basis of communally articulated differences and divisions that were in turn recast under forms of abstract thinking, most notably racial science, whose lineage contaminated the development of the human sciences more generally. In this view, racial subordination might be thought of as something that materialized with the production and governance of normative class differentiation. It represents a kind of superordinate class inequality that has been structured into (certain variants of) capitalist social formation through an association of whiteness with property, citizenship, wages, and credit, along with the renewal of surplus or superexploited subjectivities and collectivities at the openly coercive, lawless, and law-defining edge of capitalist accumulation by dispossession.12

#### Alternative: Analyze Black slavery as labor. Otherwise, we deny the intimacy and continuity with other forms of racial-colonial capitalism.

Lisa **LOWE** Distinguished Professor of English and Humanities, a faculty member of the Consortium of Studies in Race, Colonialism, and Diaspora, and Director of the Center for the Humanities at Tufts University **’15** *The Intimacies of Four Continents* p.148-150

For Black anticolonial thinkers like James and Du Bois, as well as Frantz Fanon, Walter Rodney, Orlando Patterson, Cedric Robinson, and others, it has been urgent and necessary to address the exclusion of Blacks and Africans from Hegel's understanding of world history, and to rework Marxism to envision an emancipatory politics that would address the contradictions of colonialism and slavery. Although Hegel's denial of history and humanity to Africa is not explicitly stated by Marx, Western Marxism has contributed to a European historical model that opposes capitalism to slavery, and that cannot recognize Black slaves and colonized subjects as actors in history and historical change. For the critique of capitalist political economy that focuses on wage labor as the site of alienation, and on the capital-wage labor relation as the full development of commodity production that structures capitalism and announces the capitalist era, slavery is situated as "precapitalist;' rather than specifically embedded in colonial capitalism, or coterminous and interdependent with a spectrum of other labors. By positioning slavery as external or prior to capitalism, not integral to it, the Marxist critique of capitalism is unable to grasp the complex combination of both waged and unwaged labor that makes up relations of production in modern capitalism. When privileging industrialized Europe and North America as the sites of mature capitalism, Marxism not only fails to recognize slave labor as labor, but it denies the role of slavery as the formative condition for wage labor and industrialization, over against which "free labor" was posed. As Cedric Robinson observes in Black Marxism, ''At its epistemological substratum, Marxism is a Western construction-a c􀁦:mceptualization of human affairs and historical development that is emergent from the historical experiences of European peoples mediated, in turn, through their civilization, their social orders, and their cultures:' 39 In his work on the Black radical tradition, Cedric Robinson built upon James, Du Bois, Frantz Fanon, Walter Rodney and others to observe the significance of Black labor in the history of industrial capitalism, when African slavery provided the necessary agricultural labor just as Europeans moved to factory work. In Robinson's analysis, capitalism has been always "racial capitalism"; that is, the organization, expansion, and ideology of capitalist society was expressed through race, racial subjection, and racial differences.

The term racial capitalism captures the sense that actually existing capitalism exploits through culturally and socially constructed differences such as race, gender, region, and nationality, and is lived through those uneven formations; it refuses the idea of a "pure" capitalism external to, or extrinsic from, the racial formation of collectivities and populations, or that capitalism's tendency to treat labor as abstract equivalent units does not contravene its precisely calibrated exploitation of social differences and particularities. 40 Robinson states: "I use the term racial capitalism to refer to this development and to the subsequent structure as historical agency. From its very foundations capitalism had never beenany more than Europe-a closed system:'41 What Robinson elaborates as "racial capitalism'' includes the settler colonial dispossession of land and removal of indigenous peoples, the colonial slavery that extracted labor from people to whom it denied human being, and the racialized exploitation of immigrants from around the world-making the political sphere of human rights and representation the precise location that permits and sustains the violent inequality issuing from the longer history of slavery, colonial settlement and occupation, and capitalist exploitation. 42 Furthermore, racial capitalism suggests that capitalism expands not through rendering all labor, resources, and markets across the world identical, but by precisely seizing upon colonial divisions, identifying particular regions for production and others for neglect, certain populations for exploitation and still others for disposal.

## Case

### 1NC – AT: Case

#### Neg on presumption:

#### Voting aff cannot resolve any of the desires nor relationships that the affirmative has identified as parasitic to black women’s flesh – ballots only signal the winner and loser, it’s not a referendum on what beliefs, feelings or relationships individuals in debate needs to change.

#### Voting aff is a performative contradiction because they’ve staked their wins or losses in this RR on the complete abjection of black women’s flesh – reject this historically patriarchal trope of domination

#### They do not defend a change from the status quo – affirming “black women should not hold themselves responsible for meeting the world’s expectations” is a truism, not a prescriptive change.

#### There is no single symbolic order. Lacanian theory of language is hopelessly ahistorical, psychologistic, and biological deterministic.

Nancy **FRASER** Louise Loeb Professor of Political and Social Science and professor of philosophy at The New School **’13** *Fortunes of Feminism* p. 140-149

1. W H A T DOFEMIN ISTS W AN T IN A D ISCO U R SE TH EO RY?

Let me begin by posing two questions: What might a theory of discourse contribute to feminism? And what, therefore, should feminists look for in a theory of discourse? I suggest that a conception of discourse can help us understand at least four things, all of which are interrelated. First, it can help us understand how people’s social identities are fashioned and altered over time. Second, it can help us understand how, under conditions of inequality, social groups in the sense of collective agents are formed and unformed. Third, a conception of discourse can illuminate how the cultural hegemony of dominant groups in society is secured and contested. Fourth and finally, it can shed light on the prospects for emancipatory social change and political practice. Let me elaborate.

First, consider the uses of a conception of discourse for understanding social identities. The basic idea here is that people s social identities are complexes of meanings, networks of interpretation. To have a social identity, to be a woman or a man, for example, just is to live and to act under a set of descriptions. These descriptions, of course, are not simply secreted by peoples’s bodies; nor are they simply exuded by people s psyches. Rather, they are drawn from the fund of interpretive possibilities available to agents in specific societies. It follows that, in order to understand the gender dimension of social identity, it does not suffice to study biology or psychology. Instead, one must study the historically specific social practices through which cultural descriptions of gender are produced and circulated.3

Moreover, social identities are exceedingly complex. They are knitted together from a plurality of different descriptions arising from a plurality of different signifying practices. Thus, no one is simply a woman; one is rather, for example, a white, Jewish, middle-class woman, a philosopher, a lesbian, a socialist, and a mother.4 Because everyone acts in a plurality of social contexts, moreover, the different descriptions comprising any individuals social identity fade in and out of focus. Thus, one is not always a woman in the same degree; in some contexts, ones womanhood figures centrally in the set of descriptions under which one acts; in others, it is peripheral or latent.5 Finally, it is not the case that peoples social identities are constructed once and for all and definitively fixed. Rather, they alter over time, shifting with shifts in agents’ practices and affiliations. Even the way in which one is a woman will shift— as it does, to take a dramatic example-, when one becomes a feminist. In short, social identities are discursively constructed in historically specific social contexts; they are complex and plural; and they shift over time. One use of a conception of discourse for feminist theorizing, then, is in understanding social identities in their full socio-cultural complexity, thus in demystifying static, single variable, essentialist views of gender identity.

A second use of a conception of discourse for feminist theorizing is in understanding the formation of social groups. How does it happen, under conditions of domination, that people come together, arrange themselves under the banner of collective identities, and constitute themselves as collective social agents? How do class formation and, by analogy, gender formation occur?

Clearly, group formation involves shifts in people s social identities and therefore also in their relation to social discourse. One thing that happens here is that pre-existing strands of identities acquire a new sort of salience and centrality. These strands, previously submerged among many others, are reinscribed as the nub of new self-definitions and affiliations.6 For example, in the current wave of feminist ferment, many of us who had previously been “ women” in some taken-for-granted way have now become “ women” in the very different sense of a discursively self-constituted political collectivity. In the process, we have remade entire regions of social discourse. We have invented new terms for describing social reality— for example, “ sexism,” “ sexual harassment,” “ marital, date, and acquaintance rape,” “ labor force sex-segregation,” “ the double shift,” and “ wife-battery.” We have also invented new language games such as consciousness raising and new, institutionalized public spheres such as the Society for Women in Philosophy.7 The point is that the formation of social groups proceeds by struggles over social discourse. Thus, a conception of discourse is useful here, both for understanding group formation and for coming to grips with the closely related issue of socio-cultural hegemony.

“ Hegemony” is the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci s term for the discursive face of power. It is the power to establish the “ common sense” or “ doxa” of a society, the fund of self-evident descriptions of social reality that normally go without saying.8 This includes the power to establish authoritative definitions of social situations and social needs, the power to define the universe of legitimate disagreement, and the power to shape the political agenda. Hegemony, then, expresses the advantaged position of dominant social groups with respect to discourse. It is a concept that allows us to recast the issues of social identity and social groups in the light of societal inequality. How do pervasive axes of dominance and subordination affect the production and circulation of social meanings? How does stratification along lines of gender, “ race,” and class affect the discursive construction of social identities and the formation of social groups? T h e notion of hegemony points to the intersection of power, inequality, and discourse. However, it does not entail that the ensemble of descriptions that circulate in society comprise a monolithic and seamless web, nor that dominant groups exercise an absolute, topdown control of meaning. On the contrary, “ hegemony” designates a process wherein cultural authority is negotiated and contested. It presupposes that societies contain a plurality of discourses and discursive sites, a plurality of positions and perspectives from which to speak. Of course, not all of these have equal authority. Yet conflict and contestation are part of the story. Thus, one use of a conception of discourse for feminist theorizing is to shed light on the processes by which the socio-cultural hegemony of dominant groups is achieved and contested. What are the processes by which definitions and interpretations inimical to w om en s interests acquire cultural authority? What are the prospects for mobilizing counter-hegemonic feminist definitions and interpretations to create broad oppositional groups and alliances?

The link between these questions and emancipatory political practice is, I believe, fairly obvious. A conception of discourse that lets us examine identities, groups, and hegemony in the ways I have been describing would be of considerable use to feminist practice. It would valorize the empowering dimensions of discursive struggles without leading to “culturalist” retreats from political engagement.9 In addition, the right kind of conception would counter the disabling assumption that women are just passive victims of male dominance. That assumption over-totalizes male dominance, treating men as the only social agents- and rendering inconceivable our own existence as feminist theorists and activists. In contrast, the sort of conception I have been proposing would help us understand how, even under conditions of subordination, women participate in the making of culture.

2. LACANIANISM AND THE LIMITS OF STRU CTU RA LISM

In light of the foregoing, what sort of conception of discourse will be useful for feminist theorizing? What sort of conception best illuminates social identities, group formation, hegemony, and emancipatory practice?

In the postwar period, two approaches to theorizing language became influential among political theorists. The first is the structuralist model, which studies language as a symbolic system or code. Derived from Saussure, this model is presupposed in the version of Lacanian theory I shall be concerned with here; in addition, it is abstractly negated but not entirely superseded in deconstruction and in related forms of French “ womens writing.” The second influential approach to theorizing language may be called the pragmatics model, which studies language at the level of discourses, as historically specific social practices of communication. Espoused by such thinkers as Mikhail Bakhtin, Michel Foucault, and Pierre Bourdieu, this model is operative in some but not all dimensions of the work of Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray. In the present section of this chapter, I shall argue that the first, structuralist model is of only limited usefulness for feminist theorizing.

Let me begin by noting that there are good prima facie reasons for feminists to be suspicious of the structuralist model. This model constructs its object of study by abstracting from exactly what we need to focus on, namely, the social practice and social context of communication. Indeed, the abstraction from practice and context are among the founding gestures of Saussurean linguistics. Saussure began by splitting signification into langue, the symbolic system or code, and parole, speakers’ uses of language in communicative practice or speech. He then made the first of these, langue, the proper object of the new science of linguistics, and relegated the second, parole, to the status of a devalued remainder.10 At the same time, Saussure insisted that the study of langue be synchronic rather than diachronic; he thereby posited his object of study as static and atemporal, abstracting it from historical change. Finally, the founder of structuralist linguistics posited that langue was indeed a single system; he made its unity and systematicity consist in the putative fact that every signifier, every material, signifying element of the code, derives its meaning positionally through its difference from all of the others.

Together, these founding operations render the structuralist approach of limited utility for feminist purposes." Because it abstracts from parole, the structuralist model brackets questions of practice, agency, and the speaking subject. Thus, it cannot shed light on the discursive practices through which social identities and social groups are formed. Because this approach brackets the diachronic, moreover, it will not tell us anything about shifts in identities and affiliations over time. Similarly, because it abstracts from the social context of communication, the model brackets issues of power and inequality. Thus, it cannot illuminate the processes by which cultural hegemony is secured and contested. Finally, because the model theorizes the fund of available linguistic meanings as a single symbolic system, it lends itself to a monolithic v iew of signification that denies tensions and contradictions among social meanings. In short, by reducing discourse to a “ symbolic system," the structuralist model evacuates social agency, social conflict, and social practice.12

Let me now try to illustrate these problems by means of a brief discussion of Lacanianism. B y “ Lacanianism," I do not mean the actual thought of Jacques Lacan, which is far too complex to tackle here. I mean, rather, an ideal-typical neo-structuralist reading of Lacan that is widely credited among English-speaking feminists.'5 In discussing “ Lacanianism,” I shall bracket the question of the fidelity of this reading, which could be faulted for overemphasizing the influence of Saussure at the expense of other, countervailing influences, such as Hegel.'4 For my purposes, however, this ideal-typical, Saussurean reading of Lacan is useful precisely because it evinces with unusual clarity the difficulties that beset many conceptions of discourse that are widely considered “ poststructuralist” but that remain wedded in important respects to structuralism. Because their attempts to break free of structuralism remain abstract, such conceptions tend finally to recycle it. Lacanianism, as discussed here, is a paradigm case of “ neostructuralism.” '5

At first sight, neo-structuralist Lacanianism seems to promise some advantages for feminist theorizing. B y conjoining the Freudian problematic of the construction of gendered subjectivity to the Saussurean model of structural linguistics, it seems to provide each with its needed corrective. The introduction of the Freudian problematic promises to supply the speaking subject that is missing in Saussure and thereby to reopen the excluded questions about identity, speech, and social practice. Conversely, the use of the Saussurean model promises to remedy some of Freuds deficiencies. By insisting that gender identity is discursively constructed, Lacanianism appears to eliminate lingering vestiges of biologism in Freud, to treat gender as sociocultural all the way down, and to render it in principle more open to change.

Upon closer inspection, however, the promised advantages fail to materialize. Instead, Lacanianism begins to look viciously circular. On the one hand, it purports to describe the process by which individuals acquire gendered subjectivity through their painful conscription as young children into a pre-existing phallocentric symbolic order. Here the structure of the symbolic order is presumed to determine the character of individual subjectivity. But, on the other hand, the theory also purports to show that the symbolic order must necessarily be phallocentric since the attainment of subjectivity requires submission to “ the Father s Law.” Here, conversely, the nature of individual subjectivity, as dictated by an autonomous psychology, is presumed to determine the character of the symbolic order.

One result of this circularity is an apparently ironclad determinism. As Dorothy Leland has noted, the theory casts the developments it describes as necessary, invariant, and unalterable.16 Phallocentrism, womans disadvantaged place in the symbolic order, the encoding of cultural authority as masculine, the impossibility of describing a nonphallic sexuality— in short, any number of historically contingent trappings of male dominance— now appear as invariable features of the human condition. Womens subordination, then, is inscribed as the inevitable destiny of civilization.

I can spot several spurious steps in this reasoning, some of which have their roots in the presupposition of the structuralist model. First, to the degree Lacanianism has succeeded in eliminating biologism— and that is dubious for reasons I shall not go into here17 — it has replaced it with psychologism, the untenable view that autonomous psychological imperatives given independently of culture and history can dictate the way they are interpreted and acted on within culture and history.

FOOTNOTE 17 INSERTED

17 Here I believe one can properly speak of Lacan. Lacans claim to have overcome biologism rests on his insistence that the phallus is not the penis. However, many feminist critics have shown that he fails to prevent the collapse of the symbolic signifier into the organ. The clearest indication of this failure is his claim, in The Meaning of the Phallus,” that the phallus becomes the master signifier because of its “ turgidity” which suggests “ the transmission of vital flow” in copulation. See Jacques Lacan, “ T h e Meaning of the Phallus,” in Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the ecole freudienne, eds. Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose, N ew York: W.W. N orton & Company, 1982.

END FOOTNOTE 17

Lacanianism falls prey to psychologism to the extent that it claims that the phallocentricity of the symbolic order is required by the demands of an enculturation process that is itself independent of culture.18

I f one h a lf of Lacanianism s circular argument is vitiated by psychologism, then the other half is vitiated by what I shall call symbolicism. B y symbolicism I mean, first, the homogenizing reification of diverse signifying practices into a monolithic and all-pervasive “ symbolic order,” and second, the endowing of that order with an exclusive and unlimited causal power tofix people s subjectivities once and for all. Symbolicism, then, is an operation whereby the structuralist abstraction langue is troped into a quasi-divinity, a normative “ symbolic order” whose power to shape identities dwarfs to the point of extinction that of mere historical institutions and practices.

Actually, as Deborah Cameron has noted, Lacan himself equivocates on the expression “ the symbolic order.” '9 Sometimes he uses this expression relatively narrowly to refer to Saussurean langue, the structure of language as a system of signs. In this narrow usage, Lacanianism would be committed to the implausible view that the sign system itself determines individuals’ subjectivities independently of the social context and social practice of its uses. At other times, Lacan uses the expression “ the symbolic order” far more broadly to refer to an amalgam that includes not only linguistic structures, but also cultural traditions and kinship structures, the latter mistakenly equated with social structure in general.20 In this broad usage, Lacanianism would conflate the ahistorical structural abstraction langue with variable historical phenomena like family forms and childrearing practices; cultural representations of love and authority in art, literature, and philosophy; the gender division of labor; forms of political organization and of other institutional sources of power and status. The result would be a conception of “ the symbolic order” that essentializes and homogenizes contingent historical practices and traditions, erasing tensions, contradictions, and possibilities for change. This would be a conception, moreover, that is so broad that the claim that it determines the structure of subjectivity risks collapsing into an empty tautology.21

The combination of psychologism and symbolicism in Lacanianism results in a conception of discourse that is of limited usefulness for feminist theorizing. To be sure, this conception offers an account of the discursive construction of social identity. However, it is not an account that can make sense of the complexity and multiplicity of social identities, the ways they are woven from a plurality of discursive strands. Granted, Lacanianism stresses that the apparent unity and simplicity of ego identity is imaginary, that the subject is irreparably split both by language and drives. B ut this insistence on fracture does not lead to an appreciation of the diversity of the socio-cultural discursive practices from which identities are woven. It leads, rather, to a unitary v iew of the human condition as inherently tragic. In fact, Lacanianism differentiates identities only in binary terms, along the single axis of having or lacking the phallus. As Luce Irigaray has shown, this phallic conception of sexual difference is not an adequate basis for understanding femininity22— nor, I would add, masculinity. Still less, then, is it able to shed light on other dimensions of social identities, including ethnicity, color, and social class. Nor could the theory be emended to incorporate these manifestly historical phenomena, given its postulation of an ahistorical, tension-free “ symbolic order” equated with kinship.23

Moreover, Lacanianism’s account of identity construction cannot account for identity shifts over time. It is committed to the general psychoanalytic proposition that gender identity (the only kind of identity it considers) is basically fixed once and for all with the resolution of the Oedipus complex. Lacanianism equates this resolution with the child’s entry into a fixed, monolithic, and all-powerful symbolic order. Thus, it actually increases the degree of identity fixity found in classical Freudian theory. It is true, as Jacqueline R o se points out, that the theory stresses that gender identity is always precarious, that its apparent unity and stability are always threatened by repressed libidinal drives.24 B ut this emphasis on precariousness is not an opening onto genuine historical thinking about shifts in peoples social identities. On the contrary, it is an insistence on a permanent, ahistorical condition, since for Lacanianism the only alternative to fixed gender identity is psychosis.

I f Lacanianism cannot provide an account of social identity that is useful for feminist theorizing, then it is unlikely to help us understand the formation of social groups. For Lacanianism, affiliation falls under the rubric of the imaginary. To affiliate with others, to align oneself with others in a social movement, would be tofall prey to the illusions of the imaginary ego. It would be to deny loss and lack, to seek an impossible unification and fulfillment. Thus, from the perspective of Lacanianism, collective movements would by definition be vehicles of delusion; they could not even in principle be emancipatory.25

Moreover, insofar as group formation depends on linguistic innovation, it is untheorizable from the perspective of Lacanianism. Because Lacanianism posits a fixed, monolithic symbolic system and a speaker who is wholly subjected to it, it is inconceivable that there could ever be any linguistic innovation. Speaking subjects could only ever reproduce the existing symbolic order; they could not possibly alter it. From this perspective, the question of cultural hegemony is blocked from view. There can be no question as to how the cultural authority of dominant groups in society is established and contested, no question of unequal negotiations between different social groups occupying different discursive positions. For Lacanianism, on the contrary, there is simply “ f/ie symbolic order,” a single universe of discourse that is so systematic, so all-pervasive, so monolithic that one cannot even conceive of such things as alternative perspectives, multiple discursive sites, struggles over social meanings, contests between hegemonic and counterhegemonic definitions of social situations, conflicts of interpretation of social needs. One cannot even conceive, really, of a plurality of different speakers.

With the way blocked to a political understanding of identities, groups, and cultural hegemony, the way is also blocked to an understanding of political practice. For one thing, there is no conceivable agent of such practice. Lacanianism posits a view of the person as a non-sutured congeries of three moments, none of which can qualify as a political agent. The speaking subject is simply the grammatical “ I,” a shifter wholly subjected to the symbolic order; it can only and forever reproduce that order. The ego is an imaginary projection, deluded about its own stability and self-possession, hooked on an impossible narcissistic desire for unity and self-completion; it therefore can only and forever tilt at windmills. Finally, there is the ambiguous unconscious, sometimes an ensemble of repressed libidinal drives, sometimes the face of language as Other, but never anything that could count as a social agent.

1. **The black Atlantic critical tradition demonstrates the possibilities of reclaiming humanism. Treating notions of *universalism* and *humanism* as endemic to Man cedes the terrain to imperialist scholarship. Supposedly European categories of political modernity belong as much to the African and Caribbean actors who coproduced them.**

Gary **WILDER**, Associate Professor of Anthropology at The Graduate Center of the City University of New York **’16**, Here/Hear Now Aimé Césaire! The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 115, No. 3, July 2016, p. 585-604

These key terms illuminate crucial aspects of what made Césaire a distinctive thinker whose critical voice may continue to resonate for us today. But in order to attend to Césaire as he did his predecessors—as a contemporary— we should recognize how his intellectual orientation and insights brush against the grain of many current theoretical tendencies. In both critical theory and postcolonial studies, the standard operation is to unmask purportedly universal categories as socially constructed, culturally particular, and implicated in practices, systems, and logics of domination. These are indispensable critical moves. But this approach often **devolves into a hunt for** traces of universalism or **humanism**, whether in textual artifacts or political projects, in order to reveal the regressive or oppressive essence of the object. This “aha” moment thus becomes the **punch line of the discussion** rather than the **starting point for analysis**. Such fears of complicity with power do not only belie a longing for intellectual and political purity. They also make it difficult to think dialectically, to identify aspects of given arrangements that may **point beyond their actually existing forms**.

The current insistence on negative critique also makes scholars reluctant to identify desirable alternatives and **specify** the kind of world they might want to create. But **what do we concede** if we are unable or unwilling to risk affirming more just, more human, ways of being to which we can say “yes”? It is not easy for radical thinkers to reconcile a **nonprescriptive orientation** to a radically open future with the imperative to envision more desirable arrangements (Coronil 2011). But ignoring or deferring the challenge does not make it disappear. Following anticolonial thinkers like Césaire, especially those located within the black Atlantic critical tradition, may remind us **not to forfeit categories** such as freedom, justice, democracy, solidarity, and humanity to the dominant actors who have **instrumentalized and degraded them**.

Given this dilemma, the attention paid to Vivek Chibber’s recent polemic against subaltern studies is not surprising. Such attention, however, seems to be less about the merits of his universalist Marxism than about a sense of some of the limitations and impasses into which certain currents of postcolonial thinking have led (Chibber 2013).7 Partha Chatterjee himself has recently written, “The task, as it now stands, cannot . . . be taken forward within the framework of the concepts and methods mobilized in Subaltern Studies . . . what is needed are new projects” (2012a: 44). He suggests that such projects should probably focus on “cultural history” and “popular culture” with a renewed focus on visual materials and embodied practices rather than written texts and on ethnography rather than intellectual history. Moreover, he links this invitation to study “the ethnographic, the practical, the everyday and the local” to a focus on subnational “regional formations” and “minority cultures” and languages whose specificities, he observes, had not been sufficiently engaged by earlier subaltern studies research on “India,” “Pakistan,” or “Bangladesh” (47–49). Valuable as such studies would surely be, it is not clear how a renewed focus on locality, with place-based assumptions about territory, consciousness, and categories, could do the kind of critical work necessary to grasp the deep shifts in political logics, structures, and practices that characterize the world-historical present. On the contrary, such approaches risk reproducing precisely the culturalist and territorialist assumptions about political identification and affiliation that need to be rethought in light of contemporary conditions.8

Chatterjee’s surprising emphasis on local ethnography seems consistent with one trend in postcolonial thinking that risks reviving the types of civilizational thinking, and associated assumptions about origins and authenticity, that it had earlier set out to dismantle (Chakrabarty 2007; Mah- mood 2005; Mignolo 2011). Consider the important ways that Talal Asad has invited us to rethink liberal assumptions about “tradition,” with respect to liberal and nonliberal forms of life. In dialogue with Ludwig Wittgenstein and Alasdair MacIntyre, Asad (1986) has developed a powerful critique of liberal secularism—and the secularist logic that subtends many modern liberal states—from the standpoint of embodied and discursive traditions. On the one hand, he reminds us that “Islamic tradition” is neither singular nor unchanging; it is a structured and dynamic space for reasoned argument. On the other hand, he reminds us that despite liberalism’s claims to post- traditional neutrality, it too constitutes a particular tradition (albeit one that defines itself in opposition to inherited, embodied, and practice-oriented forms of tradition-based reasoning).

Asad’s genealogical insights have rightly informed recent critiques of Western liberal ideologies, states, and politics especially regarding their arrogant, condescending, and violent responses to tradition-rooted practices and practitioners, whether outside or inside the West. But his interventions, however unintentionally, have also led scholars to establish dubious chains of equivalence

between modernity, the West, and liberalism. Such operations seem to disregard Asad’s important invitation to understand traditions as capacious, heterogeneous, and dynamic spaces of inquiry, disputation, and revision, **not simply** as a set of rigid behavioral scripts, unchanging cultural formulas, or dogmatic ideological precepts. This reduction of political modernity to a **one-dimensional liberalism obscures**, for example, the many currents of progressive antiliberalism within the tradition of modern Western political thought. It fails to recognize the significant number of non-European colonial intellectuals engaged in anti-imperial struggles who were **active participants** in such “traditions within traditions.” It also disregards the **contradictions within and redeemable fragments** of even liberal political thinking, fragments that, if realized, might **point far beyond**, and possibly **explode, liberalism itself**.

To reify modern or Western politics into a static and stereotypical liberalism is to risk practicing an unfortunate form of “Occidentalism” that would reinforce archaic civilizational assumptions about **incommensurable** and unrelated worlds (and worldviews) and **disregard the actual history** and open possibilities for practices of cross-cultural solidarity whereby anti-imperial actors outside Europe could **enter into dialogue** or affiliate with, or even discover ways that they are **already situated** within, counterhegemonic “Western” political traditions. Critics have rightly mobilized singularity, incommensurability, or untranslatability against liberal attempts to discover an abstract humanity and thereby discount situated and embodied forms of life. But the question is whether we treat incommensurability or untranslatability as an epistemological or political limit or as an always imperfect starting point for practices of dialogue, coordination, affiliation, reciprocity, solidarity. For isn’t the impossibility of full transparency or undifferentiated unity simply the unavoidable condition within which all communication, sociality, and politics must be attempted?9

My point is not to congratulate dissident currents within the West, let alone to recuperate liberalism. It is rather to approach radical and emancipatory politics from a place of not-already-knowing, of not presuming to know a priori which aspects of a tradition are irredeemable, which traditions may become allies or habitations, what the boundaries of (thoroughly plastic) traditions must be. This **nondogmatic and experimental orientation to politics**, traditions, and concepts is one of the most precious and timely gifts that Césaire may offer to us now. He practiced a concrete cosmopolitan relationship to modern traditions of philosophy, aesthetics, and politics, one that was highly developed by the robust tradition of black Atlantic criticism within which he was firmly rooted along with predecessors (e.g., Toussaint and W. E. B. DuBois), contemporaries (e.g., C. L. R. James, James Baldwin, Suzanne Césaire, Senghor), and descendants (e.g., Fanon, Edouard Glissant, Stuart Hall, Paul Gilroy, Achille Mbembe, David Scott).

Understandable concerns about totalizing explanation and Eurocentric evaluation have led a generation of scholars to insist on the incommensurable alterity of non-European forms of thought. But perhaps we should be concerned less exclusively with unmasking universalisms as covert European particularism than with **also challenging** the assumption that the universal is **European property**. I read Césaire not in order to provincialize European concepts but to deprovincialize Antillean thinking. Césaire’s critical reworkings remind us that the supposedly European categories of political modernity properly **belong as much to the African and Caribbean actors who coproduced them** as to the inhabitants of continental Europe. Similarly, African and Caribbean thinkers, no less than their continental counterparts, produced abstract and general propositions about “humanity,” “history,” and “the world.” In contrast to invocations of multiple modernities, Césaire never granted to Europe possession of a modernity or universality or humanity that was **always already translocal and fundamentally Caribbean**. He never treated self-determination, emancipation, freedom, equality, or justice as essentially European and foreign. Césaire’s intellectual and political interventions radically challenged reductive territorialist approaches to social thought. He refused to concede that “France” was an ethnic or continental entity, that Martinique was not in some real way internal to “French” society and politics, or that he was situated outside of modern critical traditions. Thus his ongoing and unapologetic engagements with Hegel, Marx, Proudhon, Nietzsche, Lautréamont, Rimbaud, Mallarmé, Bergson, Freud, Breton, Frobenius, and Lenin, alongside his many African, Antillean, and African American interlocutors.

The sonic blurring between “here” and “hear” in the title of this essay is meant to signal not only the contemporaneity of Césaire’s thought for us here now but the imperative that we open ourselves to his presence and recognize his actuality across the epochal divide by hearing what he actually said. This gesture builds on Walter Benjamin’s insight that every now is a “now of recognizability” whereby “what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation” through which past epochs become newly legible (1999: 462). I also follow Césaire himself, who engaged in dialogue with predecessors as if they were contemporaries and who addressed future interlocutors directly as if they were already present. Like Benjamin, Césaire practiced a form of **radical remembrance** that connected outmoded pasts to **charged presents**. This attention to vital histories was bound up with a poetic politics that identified transformative possibilities **dwelling within existing arrangements** and a proleptic politics that anticipated seemingly impossible futures by trying to enact them concretely in the here and now. But Césaire can only speak to us now if we listen rather than presume to know what someone like him in his situation must have, or should have, been saying.

Until very recently, scholarship on his work has been overdetermined by methodological nationalism (that puzzles over his refusal to pursue state sovereignty), identitarian culturalism (that debates how adequately Césaire expressed Antillean lived experience and whether or not he was an essentialist), and a disciplinary division of labor (that too often splits his poetry, criticism, and politics into separate domains). Generally, Cold War scholarship was shaped by a need to evaluate him in relation to canonical anticolonial nationalists and fit him into a narrative of decolonization-as-national-independence. This has made it difficult to recognize the epochal character, world-making ambition, and global sensibility of his political reflections.

Faced with the promise of decolonization, Césaire conjugated concrete acts with political imagination in ways that displaced conventional oppositions between aesthetics and politics, realism and utopia, pragmatism and principle. Such efforts were animated by what I have been calling radical literalism and utopian realism and which he called inflection and poetic knowledge. He regarded freedom as a problem whose institutional solution was not self-evident and could only be situational. His interventions demonstrated the nonnecessary relationship between colonial emancipation, popular sovereignty, and self-determination, on the one hand, and territorial state sovereignty and national liberation, on the other. He pursued cosmopolitan aims concretely through transcultural practices and by attempting to invent new political forms through which to ground plural and postnational democratic arrangements.

We should recognize that Césaire formulated a critique not of Western civilization from the standpoint of African or Antillean culture but of modern Western racism, imperialism, and capitalism from the standpoint of Antillean and African historical situations and experiences. More generally, it was a critique of an alienated and alienating modernity from the standpoint of embodied and poetic ways of being, knowing, and relating (to self, others, and world). Above all, Césaire recognized residues of, and resources for, more just, human, and integrated ways of living together within Antillean, African, and European texts, traditions, forms, histories, and conditions. In his view, Antilleans—as culturally particular actors, imperial subjects, New World denizens, moderns, and humans—were their rightful heirs. He was concerned less with defining culturally authentic concepts, spaces, and arrangements for Antilleans (apart from Europe or uncontaminated by modernity) than with overcoming imperialism, in solidarity with other struggling peoples, in order to establish less alienated forms of human life globally.

Remembering Césaire’s insistence that modern currents of radicalism were shared legacies and common property may help us to **rethink inherited assumptions** about the relation between territory, ethnicity, consciousness, and interest (Buck-Morss 2009, 2010). They invite us to deterritorialize social thought and to decolonize intellectual history. This is a matter not of valorizing non-European forms of knowledge, as important as such a move certainly is, but of questioning the presumptive boundaries of “Europe” itself—by recognizing the larger scales on which modern social thought was forged and of appreciating that colonial societies produced self-reflexive thinkers concerned with large-scale processes and future prospects. We can thereby recognize Césaire as a situated postwar thinker of the postwar world, one of whose primary aims was to place into question the very categories “France,” “Europe,” and “the West” by way of an immanent critique of late imperial politics. He envisioned postnational arrangements through which humanity could attempt to overcome the alienating antinomies that had impoverished the quality of life in overseas colonies and European metropoles. His **situated humanism and concrete cosmopolitanism** should thus be placed in a **constellation of modern emancipatory thinking** oriented toward **worldwide human freedom** that included antiracist, anti-imperial, internationalist, and socialist thinkers from a range of traditions: black Atlantic, First Internationalist, global anarchist, Western Marxist, Marxist humanist, Third Worldist.

Césaire believed that the future of humanity depended in some sense on its recovering a lost poetic relation to “the throbbing newness of the world.” Why not regard Césaire’s “humanism made to the measure of the world” as a starting point for our critical thinking about the contemporary situation and the kind of world we would like to create. Césaire, like Toussaint before him, addressed future interlocutors directly. At the same time, his thinking about future possibilities was refracted through dialogue with predecessors like Toussaint. This is how I understand what one of his heirs, Glissant, means by “a prophetic vision of the past” based on “the identification of a painful notion of time and its full projection forward into the future” (1989: 64; see also Glissant 2005: 15, 16). Césaire once wrote of Schoelcher, the socialist republican architect of the 1848 abolition of slavery in France, that it would be “useless to commemorate him if we had not decided to imitate his politics” (1948a: 28). In this spirit I hope that the recent resurgence of interest in Césaire is not only treated as an occasion to honor his memory but is seized as an opportunity to hear his transgenerational address. We can thus think with Césaire about the relation between existing theoretical frameworks, the world we are confronting, and urgent political desires— especially with regard to the history of empire and the role of colonial intellectuals as modern thinkers of global processes.

#### Black feminist thought is compatible with discussion of institutions — the law is a crucial avenue for interrupting the subordination of black women

Hill Collins, PhD, 8 (Patricia, Distinguished University Professor of Sociology @University of Maryland, College Park, *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment*, Routledge, Pgs. 277-280)

The structural domain of power encompasses how social institutions are organized to reproduce Black women’s subordination over time. One characteristic feature of this domain is its emphasis on large-scale, interlocking social institutions. An impressive array of U.S. social institutions lies at the heart of the structural domain of power. Historically, in the United States, the policies and procedures of the U.S. legal system, labor markets, schools, the housing industry, banking, insurance, the news media, and other social institutions as interdependent entities have worked to disadvantage African-American women. For example, Black women’s long-standing exclusion from the best jobs, schools, health care, and housing illustrates the broad array of social policies designed to exclude Black women from full citizenship rights. These interlocking social institutions have relied on multiple forms of segregation—by race, class, and gender—to produce these unjust results. For AfricanAmerican women, racial segregation has been paramount. Racial segregation rested on the “separate but equal” doctrine established under the 1896 ruling of Plessy v. Ferguson where the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of segregation of groups. This ruling paved the way for a rhetoric of color-blindness (Crenshaw 1997). Under the “separate but equal” doctrine, Blacks and Whites as groups could be segregated as long as the law was color-blind in affording each group equal treatment. Despite the supposed formal equality promised by “separate but equal,” subsequent treatment certainly was separate, but it was anything but equal. As a result, policies and procedures with housing, education, industry, government, the media, and other major social institutions have worked together to exclude Black women from exercising full citizenship rights. Whether this social exclusion has taken the form of relegating Black women to inner-city neighborhoods poorly served by social services, to poorly funded and racially segregated public schools, or to a narrow cluster of jobs in the labor market, the intent was to exclude. Within the structural domain of power, **empowerment cannot accrue to individuals and groups without transforming U.S. social institutions that foster this exclusion**. Because this domain is large-scale, systemwide, and has operated over a long period of time via interconnected social institutions, segregation of this magnitude cannot be changed overnight. Structural forms of injustice that permeate the entire society yield only grudgingly to change. Since they do so in part when confronted with wide-scale social movements, wars, and revolutions that threaten the social order overall, African-American women’s rights have not been gained solely by gradual reformism. A civil war preceded the abolition of slavery when all efforts to negotiate a settlement failed. Southern states routinely ignored the citizenship rights of Blacks, and even when confronted with the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court decision that outlawed racial segregation, many dug in their heels and refused to uphold the law. Massive demonstrations, media exposure, and federal troops all were deployed to implement this fundamental policy change. The reemergence of White supremacist organizations in the 1990s, many of which recirculate troubling racist ideologies of prior eras, speaks to the deep-seated resentment attached to Black women, among others, working toward a more just U.S. society. Events such as these indicate how deeply woven into the very fabric of American society ideas about Black women’s subordination appear to be. In the United States, visible social protest of this magnitude, while often required to bring about change, remains more the exception than the rule. For U.S. Black women, social change has more often been gradual and reformist, punctuated by episodes of systemwide upheaval. Trying to change the policies and procedures themselves, typically through social reforms, constitutes an important cluster of strategies within the structural domain. Because the U.S. context contains a commitment to reformist change by changing the laws, Black women have used the legal system in their struggles for structural transformation. African-American women have aimed to challenge the laws that legitimate racial segregation. As Chapter 9’s discussion of Black women’s activism suggests, African-American women have used various strategies to get laws changed. Grassroots organizations**,** forming national advocacy organizations**,** and event-specific social protestsuch as boycottsand sit-inshave all been used**,** yet changing the laws and the terms of their implementation have formed the focus of change. Even the development of parallel social institutions such as Black churches and schools have aimed to prepare African-Americans for full participation in U.S. society when the laws were changed. African-American women have experienced considerable success not only in getting laws changed, but in stimulating government action to redress past wrongs. The Voting Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1965, and other important federal, state, and local legislation have outlawed discrimination by race, sex, national origin, age, or disability status. This changed legal climate granted African-American women some protection from the widespread discrimination that we faced in the past. At the same time, class-action lawsuits against discriminatory housing, educational, and employment policies have resulted in tangible benefits for many Black women. While necessary, these legal victories may not be enough. Ironically, the same laws designed to protect African-American women from social exclusion have increasingly become used against Black women. In describing new models for equal treatment under the law, Black feminist legal scholar Kimberle Crenshaw argues that the rhetoric of color-blindness was not unseated by the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education ruling. Instead, the rhetoric of color-blindness was reformulated to refer to the equal treatment of individuals by not discriminating among them. Under this new rhetoric of color-blindness, equality meant treating all individuals the same, regardless of differences they brought with them due to the effects of past discrimination or even discrimination in other venues. “Having determined, then, that everyone was equal in the sense that everyone had a skin color,” observes Crenshaw, “symmetrical treatment was satisfied by a general rule that nobody’s skin color should be taken into account in governmental decision-making” (Crenshaw 1997, 284). Within this logic, the path to equality lies in ignoring race, gender, and other markers of historical discrimination that might account for any differences that individuals bring to schools and the workplace. As a new rule that maintains long-standing hierarchies of race, class, and gender while appearing to provide equal treatment, this rhetoric of color-blindness has had some noteworthy effects. For one, observes Black feminist legal scholar Patricia Williams (1995), it fosters a certain kind of race thinking among Whites: Because the legal system has now formally equalized individual access to housing, schooling, and jobs, any unequal group results, such as those that characterize gaps between Blacks and Whites, must somehow lie within the individuals themselves or their culture. When joined to its twin of gender neutrality, one claiming that no significant differences distinguish men from women, the rhetoric of color-blindness works to unseat one important strategy of Black women’s resistance within the structural domain. Black women who make claims of discrimination and who demand that policies and procedures may not be as fair as they seem can more easily be dismissed as complainers who want special, unearned favors. Moreover, within a rhetoric of color-blindness that defends the theme of no inherent differences among races, or of gender-neutrality that claims no differences among genders, it becomes difficult to talk of racial and gender differences that stem from discriminatory treatment. The assumption is that the U.S. matrix of domination now provides equal treatment because where it once overtly discriminated by race and gender, it now seemingly ignores them. Beliefs such as these thus allow Whites and men to support a host of punitive policies that reinscribe social heirarchies of race and gender. In her discussion of how racism now relies on encoded language Angela Davis identifies how this rhetoric of color-blindness can operate as a form of “camouflaged racism”: Because race is ostracized from some of the most impassioned political debates of this period, their racialized character becomes increasingly difficult to identify, especially by those who are unable—or do not want— to decipher the encoded language. This means that hidden racist arguments can be mobilized readily across racial boundaries and political alignments. Political positions once easily defined as conservative, liberal, and sometimes even radical therefore have a tendency to lose their dis tinctiveness in the face of the seductions of this camouflaged racism (Davis 1997, 264). Americans can talk of “street crime” and “welfare mothers,” all the while claiming that they are not discussing race at all. Despite the new challenges raised by the rhetoric of color-blindness and gender neutrality, it is important to remember that **legal strategies have yielded and most probably will continue to produce victories for African-American women.** Historically, much of Black women’s resistance to the policies and procedures of the structural domain of power occurred outside powerful social institutions. Currently, however, African-American women are more often included in these same social institutions that long excluded us. Increasing numbers of African-American women have gained access to higher education, now hold good jobs, and might be considered middle-class if not elite. These women often occupy positions of authority inside schools, corporations, and government agencies. Achieving these results required changing U.S. laws.

#### Empathy produces moral learning over time – distances between social positions do not prevent moral imagination.

Lori **GRUEN** William Griffin Professor of Philosophy, and Professor of Feminist, Gender and Sexuality Studies and Science in Society @ Wesleyan **’17** “Expressing Entangled Empathy: A Reply” *Hypatia* 32 (2) p. Wiley

I distinguish entangled empathy from sympathy to help clarify some of what I understand the process of entangled empathy to be. Entangled empathy is a process of perspective-taking that may draw on affections that build up over time—Cherry's habitual sympathies—but it need not. I think it is generally true that we are better at taking the perspective of someone whom we have developed intimacy with over a period of time. Indeed, we are often in a better position to understand what is going on with someone to whom we have a deep or historical connection. But we are not unable to imagine the perspectives of different others, although it isn't easy or simple, just because they are not close to us spatially, emotionally, and/or physically. Chris Cuomo and I argue that it is within close relationships that we may build up the imaginative skills of perspective-taking across distance (Cuomo and Gruen 1998). Building on those initial thoughts, I argue that entangled empathy is not limited to those who are nearest and dearest. Unlike Hume's and Smith's sympathy, which tends to focus on more immediate others, as Cherry rightly points out, given that entangled empathy is a reflective and caring process, one can use one's capacities to feel and judge over spatial and contextual differences, to empathize with distant others.

This process will more often than not incorporate sympathies as feeling-along-with, the phenomenon that Meyers raises, but it is never simply that. That is just one feature that is neither necessary nor sufficient for entangled empathy. As Meyers herself points out, feeling-with can often be problematic when someone, for example, is feeling distraught about an event that does not warrant that feeling, as when someone expresses that they feel disgust at same-sex affection, for example. Too many of us have witnessed that misguided reaction, and it does not warrant sympathy (although pity may be more appropriate). Sadly, such visceral prejudices have become more noticeable of late, and they are not the sorts of feelings that one should empathize with. Empathy helps reveal the experience of the interiority of the other, what Meyers describes as a “poignancy” and Martha Nussbaum describes as “a vicarious visualization that causes these circumstances to come alive in the theater of my mind” (Nussbaum 2001, 331), but entangled empathy contextualizes and expands on these perceptions.

Empathy directs us to focus on and seek to understand the circumstances of the other. This understanding may not be complete and often is in need of significant revisions; however, the goal is to try to take in as much about another's situation and perspective as possible. Importantly, entangled empathy does not involve abandoning one's own attitudes, perspectives, and value commitments. It provides an important reference point from which to assess the features of a situation and to ask appropriate normative questions. Cherry suggests that the process I am describing can be the site for the development and nurturing of other emotions, and I would add it can also be a site for the correction of some emotions too. I agree that entangled empathy can “activate” other emotions. In combination with thoughts, observations, sensitivities, and emotional responsiveness, entangled empathy marshals our perceptions toward action. Entangled empathy goes beyond feeling what others feel, as the process is to develop a caring perception—a recognition that we are in both obvious and more distant relationships with others and are responsible in these relationships. It is an experiential process that is a blend of emotion and cognition.

We can go wrong, and this is another way in which entangled empathy differs from sympathy when the latter is understood as a feeling. If we understand empathy as being like sympathy, then some of the loud criticisms of empathy, like those of Paul Bloom, for example, would be of greater concern. Bloom writes, “By empathy, I mean, ‘Putting yourself in another's shoes, feeling what they feel’” (Bloom 2014). This is not an uncommon understanding of empathy, one he calls “emotional empathy.” That label presupposes a particular understanding of emotion, and it is helpful to unpack it.

There are different ways to understand what emotions are, and whereas Bloom seems to be thinking of emotion as sensation or feeling, others have, in my view, convincingly argued that where bodily sensations are understood through biological or psychological explanations that are not subject to reason, emotions can be explained by the reasons that give rise to them and can be altered in light of those reasons. I would go further and point out that some emotional states can also alter reasons. Emotions are the sorts of things that we can be taught or conditioned to feel or not feel, and reasons can be changed based on our affect. To reiterate, entangled empathy is not itself an emotion, but a process of engaging caring moral perception.The Role of Empathy in Ethical Theory and Practice

Much of the development of my view of entangled empathy was inspired by Iris Murdoch's critique of traditional ethical theories (Murdoch 1970). Murdoch was worried about the way standard approaches require that a moral agent submit herself to the authority of external forces, like principles or rules, and in doing this, she is detaching herself from her experiences, commitments, personality, or as Murdoch put it, her “vision of life.”

As I discuss in the book, following Murdoch, in traditional ethical theories, the moral agent is conceived as someone who already has a handle on any given situation, who knows what he is doing, whose thoughts and intentions are “directed towards definite overt issues” (Murdoch 1970, 7), and whose responsibility is a function of impersonal knowledge. I love the irony in Murdoch's comparison of this sort of moral action with shopping: the agent enters the shop “in a condition of totally responsible freedom” and surveys the products and chooses to purchase one product or another. But there really is only so much that one sees of that “inner life” through outer behavior; it is an anemic view of our inner life, if it provides anything at all. That we perform behaviors that are meant to project meaning very different from what we internally experience is a good part of what therapy and other efforts at self-reflection start with. These outward behaviors become the focal point of ethical choice and action; the inner life of the agent remains mysterious or, when accessible, beside the point of ethical theorizing.

In order to provide a more meaningful account of what moral choice involves—an account that would include what goes on between choices and attends to the fixation and elevation of “choice”—a more robust and nuanced picture of both the inner workings of the agent AND the outer “structures of value round about us” must be painted. That is what entangled empathy is, in part, trying to provide: an embedded and embodied process of moral perception.

But it isn't just the first-person perspective, just our own moral perception, that entangled empathy is interested in improving. I see entangled empathy as requiring the movement from the first-person to the third-person point of view. To meaningfully attend to the particularities of another being's interests, desires, sensitivities, aspirations, and so on as they occur in particular contexts, under certain norms, within social relations of all sorts, and to avoid projecting one's own states of mind on others, this movement from me to you and back, through these shifting perspectives, is key. Entangled empathy helps an agent understand herself and her situation better and thus helps her to discern what is relevant and what is not in her own choice context. Moreover, it helps us see what is relevant to the choice situations of others (or what is preventing choices) in particular, by drawing attention to the wellbeing of another, whatever state it may be. Entangled empathy isn't just a form of ethical attention, but a particular form: caring or loving attention, attention that is directed toward another's flourishing.

Meyers argues that this presupposes a fairly significant “cultural understanding.” She notes “as far as I can tell, empathetic experience is not the source of the conceptions of values and disvalues that are needed to interpret another individual's subjective experience. Rather, empathy mobilizes a culturally transmitted, normative conceptual repertoire that underwrites the empathizer's appreciation of the moral significance of others’ needs, frustrations, sensitivities, and so forth” ($$). I see Debes's worry about “fullness” as related to this concern. Debes raises this as particularly worrisome for my project of understanding very different others, such as nonhuman animals: “Our interpretations are so saturated in human concepts, theory, and ideology that it seems wild to say nonhuman animals could fathom them. So how can they confirm what we mean by our interpretations of their perspectives?” ($$).

I agree that we often stumble when we fail to grasp human, cultural understandings of the values and disvalues that are presupposed by empathetic experience. I take it that evaluating those presuppositions is one of the tasks necessary for getting empathy right. An empathetic agent's evaluations, deliberations, and choices are shaped, at least in part, by the social context in which she lives. Various social institutions and norms affect expectations. Empathetic engagement will often involve examining the conditions under which both the empathizer's and the one with whom she is empathizing's choice sets are formulated, and considering both the internal and external factors that helped shape deliberative capacities and the objects to which choices are directed. Entangled empathizers will be attuned to the distribution, both just and unjust, of hermeneutical resources that have an impact on choice and action. An astute empathizer will thus try to answer a host of questions, including: What psychological predispositions do I have and does she have and how do they affect our different levels of confidence in choosing? How do cultural understandings of value affect our sense of our worth as deliberators and the worth of our choices? Were certain deliberative paths closed to me or to her by familial, educational, social, political, racial, gendered, economic, or religious barriers or prohibitions? How successful do I think I will be in my empathizing with her and what do I need to do and know to be more successful? Will my success or failure depend on the social position I occupy? The social position she occupies? Do people like me culturally or historically have less chance of empathetically succeeding and of “making a difference”?

We can develop a slightly different set of questions when the relationship is between a human empathizer and a nonhuman toward whom one's ethical attention is directed. For example, what were the early rearing conditions this animal experienced and how did that shape her current experiences? What sort of species-typical behaviors does a creature of this kind usually engage in and does she have opportunities to engage in those behaviors? What sorts of social relationships are important, whether they be with conspecifics or animals from other species, including humans? Is this animal able to be alone, if she chooses? Is she able to make choices about who to spend time with, where to be, what and when to eat? Are these the sort of choices that are meaningful to this particular animal?

Answers to these questions and others will help us develop better skills at perceiving and noticing the complexity of moral experience in the world and navigating the “values round about us” as richly and fully as we can. When we work at it, our entangled empathetic responses will be more apt.

Why Care?

Debes wonders why we need moral perception to be caring or why another's wellbeing or flourishing is what we attend to, and I think my response to the oft-cited, though somewhat far-fetched, example of the so-called “empathetic” torturer provides part of an answer. The successful torturer would need to know what really causes anguish, and thus will be a very good behavior-reader, in order to produce the most pain. But one would be hard-pressed to articulate what is ethical, as opposed to simply efficient, about the torturer's capacity to accurately determine what causes his victim pain. What the torturer cares about is the result of his own actions, not the state that result produces in his victim. Entangled empathy not only has us attend to the pain the torture victim is experiencing and the way this torture harms her, but also the values, or in this case disvalues, that motivate the action that leads to the harm. Caring about these things would not condone these actions. Entangled empathy is intended to provide an alternative approach to arriving at a judgment about why such action wouldn't be condoned. Wellbeing is the value theory that informs moral perception that structures ethical engagement. Of course, there are different conceptions of wellbeing, and I intentionally leave that notion open, but whatever the torturer is allegedly “empathetically” doing, it isn't entangled empathy. Through entangled empathy we see not only whom we ought to attend to and what their situation evokes, but also whether and how we should respond in ways that help to preserve and promote their wellbeing.

One of the most serious ways we go wrong, where “we” is humanity quite broadly, is to not engage our empathy at all. Too many people just don't care. Or maybe they have limited energy for empathetic attention, and when they do expend that energy it is directed to those nearest and dearest. Most of us are busy and absorbed in our own problems, projects, and plans. Many of us also have the luxury of not thinking about the problems that so many people around the world and most other animals are confronted with, in one form or another, almost every day.

This brings me to questions of moral motivation that all of my critics have raised. There are at least three levels of motivation to discuss. The first is meta-level motivation: why care about ethical action in the first instance? I haven't been fully convinced by any answer to this question, and I don't think I have provided one. I am interested in trying to improve my moral perception and act well in my dealings with others, human and non, near and far, friends and strangers. The approach I'm offering is directed at those who, like me, are already interested in figuring out what would constitute ethical perception and action, not those who don't really care about ethics at all.

The second motivational question involves attending to others’ wellbeing: why should I care about others, why should I be moved to attend to them from an ethical perspective? Why should their wellbeing, however understood, matter to me? Traditional views have us focus on others insofar as they are vessels of happiness, suffering, or utility; or they are members of a kingdom of ends, instantiations of our shared humanity who deserve respect; or because behind the veil of ignorance I don't know if I'm me or them, and the impartial perspective urges us to think of our own wellbeing, in the abstract, as being as valuable as their wellbeing. My view is different from these views in that I think we must focus on others because they co-constitute our very agency.

This is the entanglement part of entangled empathy. As Meyers notes, I have a relational conception of the self, but it is a rather robust relational ontology; not the simplistic notion that we are all “related” nor the idea that my personal relationships shape who I am. I argue that our agency is co-constituted by our social and material entanglements. I don't think it is a reductive account, as she suggests. Indeed, I wouldn't even know how to make it so considering that our entanglements are so complex. Social entanglements often extend beyond the human and far beyond our geographical location. By material entanglements, I have the old sense of materialism in mind, that is, our socioeconomic opportunities and limitations and our consumer choices, for example. I also am invoking the new sense of materialism, which would include our entanglement with the food we have access to, the safety of our physical environment (for example, water, air, particulate matter, toxic exposure), the nature of our microbiome, and a host of other relations. These entanglements are quite complex, and include our relations to the child slaves who harvest cocoa for chocolate; the orangutans who are on the brink of extinction due to our consumptions of palm oil and palm products; those working in sweatshops who provide cheap clothing; our greenhouse-gas-emitting activities that are creating climate refugees. All of these relations, in part, constitute who we are. Our identities are not simply “socially constructed”; rather, we are who we are at any particular time as an expression of entanglements in multiple relations across space, species, and substance. I take this notion of entanglement from feminist philosopher of physics Karen Barad, who is thinking of it in Bohrian terms. Here is what Barad has said about entanglement, ethics, and action:

Matters of fact, matters of concern, and matters of care are shot through with one another … . All bodies, including but not limited to human bodies, come to matter through the world's iterative intra-activity … . differentiating is not about Othering, separating, but on the contrary, about making connections and commitments. So the very nature of materiality itself is an entanglement … . Ethics is therefore not about right responses to a radically exteriorized other, but about responsibility and accountability for the lively relationalities of becoming, of which we are a part. Ethics is about mattering, about taking account of the entangled materializations of which we are part, including new configurations, new subjectivities, new possibilities … . Responsibility, then, is a matter of the ability to respond. Listening for the response of the other and an obligation to be responsive to the other, who is not entirely separate from what we call the self. (Barad 2012, 69)

As I understand Barad, and as I am thinking about it, we care about others because they are fundamentally part of our own agency. They don't simply “influence” or “shape” us, they co-constitute us. My failure to respond to others is not just a failure of my responsibility, but represents a rupture in my very moral agency.

Returning to Meyers's earlier concern about cultural norms and inspired by Cherry's political examples, consider how responsibility is understood in communities where norms of restorative justice and community service are strong. Rather than viewing certain activities as supererogatory, people in communities with strong social norms of collectivecare usually see community activities as their responsibility. Rather than calling the police if there is a problem, for example, we might see violent activity as a problem that we as a community should be responsive to. Social-psychological studies have identified what is called “social loafing” or “the bystander effect,” the phenomenon of failing to take action to prevent harm in conditions in which others are expected to do so. Presumably, bystanders believe that preventing a harm from occurring, or aiding one in need, is not their responsibility. I'm suggesting that this belief structure is shaped by a narrow conception of the self, a conception that can be effectively altered by seeing the ways in which our agency is co-constituted by others and our responsiveness to those others. And fortunately, there is some evidence that when these failures of responsiveness are pointed out, many people's self-concept is negatively affected and they work to change.

The psychological literature is also replete with discussions of empathy as coupled with a motivational state in order for helping action or pro-social behavior to occur.1 Generally, these “psychological” motivational states fall into two mutually exclusive general categories: self-interested motivation and altruistic motivation. If the self is understood as deeply relational, the distinction between these motivational states breaks down. And this is the third sense of motivation I want to mention. Attuned moral perception moves me to act on behalf of the wellbeing of others who co-constitute my agency. Directing one's empathetic attention toward others is also shaped largely by whether one is so motivated, so while entangled empathizing moves us to action, we can alter our empathetic focus by acts of will. The process of being moved by entangled empathetic attention and being moved to refine our empathy are part of the dynamic process of developing our moral perception.

When one is made aware of a shortcoming in her responsiveness or a failure of her empathetic attention, when she is able, in other words, to see that she is in a “bad” relationship, as I put it—by which I mean one of instrumentalization, exploitation, or violence, for example—she cannot maintain that relationship and hold onto the belief that she is engaged in loving or caring attention. That sort of attention is part of what it means to be a moral agent, I suggest, so one is at least going to be moved to change one's conception, and I would hope, that will also lead to behavioral changes.

But there is a deeper resonance to the question “why care?” that addresses a danger that has been mentioned to me on a number of occasions and that all of my critics discuss. That is a worry about the possibility of ever really, truly understanding and empathizing with another. In the book, I discuss a case worth repeating briefly here. Two wealthy black parents who raised their children to be cautious in white society were devastated in the aftermath of an incident in which their son, who was walking near the boarding school he attended in Connecticut, was called the “N” word. The son became scared and angry, and felt vulnerable. This incident had a negative impact on his schoolwork and his confidence. When the father, Mr. Graham, tried to get the attention of the administration at his son's school, he received little response. This led him to realize that he was no better able to understand the perspective of the white people to whom he reported the incident than of those who called his son the “N” word (Graham 2014).

In many ways Mr. Graham is right. White people in a culture of anti-black racism cannot understand the burden of racism. And if white people can't understand Black people, what hope is there to understand a chimpanzee in entertainment, a dairy cow, or a lab rat? Perhaps entangled empathy is simply too optimistic to think any sort of meaningful moral perception is possible.

Recently, I was asked by Frank Wilderson, whose work I much admire, why do I care? I got a better sense of the force of his question after reading his paper “‘Raw Life’ and the Ruse of Empathy.”2 In it Wilderson interrogates “an optimism that assumes relationality within and between all sentient beings.” His analysis is that there are some beings who are beyond relationality. “The explanatory powers of empathy and analysis are scandalized when confronted with the Black position, a paradigmatic location synonymous with slavery” (Wilderson 2013, 184). Following on the definition of slavery provided by Orlando Patterson as a permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored persons (Patterson 1988), Wilderson sees Blackness as a form of social death, a state of being deprived of relationality. So “even perceived moments of empathic identification with the Slave are ruses” (Wilderson 2013, 189), as one cannot empathize with objects or beings that are not in the relation. Further, he argues that if empathy is meant to facilitate and produce “civic relation and if anti-Blackness is the generative mechanism of this mode of production, then it becomes understandable how and why” (201) empathy is problematic.

There are two concerns here; the latter is not unlike the worry that Debes raises about epistemic injustice, although in a different register. Debes says “dominant social groups trade on existing, ‘collectively’ shared—perhaps we should say, mainstream—forms of social understanding to reach self- and interpersonal understanding. And disempowered groups are pressed to conform to these normalized, mainstream social understandings” ($$). If these normalized understandings require, as Wilderson says, the social death of Black people, and these understandings are what entangled empathy is relying on, then it looks like entangled empathy is in the service of anti-Blackness and should thus be rejected. Debes is right insofar as this form of understanding is meant to be full understanding, and he is also onto something if the understanding required for entangled empathy inescapably emerges from mainstream “narrative tropes.” But I'm not sure why either needs to be the case. Trying to fully understand is not the same as actually achieving full understanding. Understanding among those on the margins happens all the time. Indeed, following the insights of Black feminists, often those on the margins understand more than those at the center, as they have opportunities for understanding both.

What I take us to be doing when we are engaged in entangled empathetic moral attention is working through complicated processes of understanding one another and other animals in situations of differential social, political, and species-based power. Usually what we “get” is just a glimpse. We never really “know,” but too many people use the idea that we can't really know as an excuse to opt out of working at it. I take this to be a failure of both imagination and moral agency.

The second worry will be something I continue to work out, and that is a more robust description of relationality. On the relational ontology I envisage, there is no place beyond relations; anti-Blackness or speciesism, for example, are political and ethical relations that view whites and humans as justified in regarding Blacks and animals as fungible, disposable, and perhaps paradoxically, outside of relationality. But as I've suggested, the relations we are in are not always, perhaps not even often, the sorts of things we choose. Some relations I am forced into, some I seek to develop, some are unjust, some are harmful, some may even seek to forever deprive me of my subjectivity. And since we are constituted in various ways by these relations, when some relations make it hard to see ourselves and others, entangled empathy will seem almost impossible. But that these relationships are part of us means that we can, indeed must, work with them and try to change them for the better.

#### Liberalism is not a monolith – radicalizing it challenges unjust hierarchies of domination.

Charles W. **MILLS** Professor of Philosophy @ CUNY **’12** “Occupy Liberalism,” Chapter 2 in *Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism* [h](https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190245412.001.0001/acprof-9780190245412-chapter-2)

The “Occupy Wall Street!” movement stimulated a long listing of other candidates for radical “occupation.” This chapter proposes as a target for radical occupation the somewhat unusual candidate of liberalism itself. It argues for a constructive engagement of radicals with liberalism in order to retrieve it for a radical egalitarian agenda. The premise is that the foundational values of liberalism have a radical potential that has not historically been realized, given the way the dominant varieties of liberalism have developed. Ten reasons standardly given as to why such a retrieval cannot be carried out are examined and argued to be fallacious.

The “Occupy!” movement, which has made headlines around the country, has raised the hopes of young American radicals new to political engagement and revived the hopes of an older generation of radicals still clinging to nostalgic dreams of the glorious ’60s. If the original and still most salient target was Wall Street, a long list of other candidates for “occupation” has since been put forward. In this chapter, I want to propose as a target for radical occupation the somewhat unusual candidate of liberalism itself. But contrary to the conventional wisdom prevailing within radical circles, I am going to argue for the heretical thesis that liberalism should not be contemptuously rejected by radicals but retrieved for a radical agenda. Summarized in bullet-point form, my argument is as follows:

• The “Occupy Wall Street” movement provides an opportunity unprecedented in decades to build a broad democratic movement to challenge plutocracy, patriarchy, and white supremacy in the United States.

• Such a movement is more likely to be successful if it appeals to principles and values most Americans already endorse.

• Liberalism has always been the dominant ideology in the United States.

• Liberalism in the United States has historically been complicit with plutocracy, patriarchy, and white supremacy, but this complicity is a contingent function of dominant group interests rather than the result of an immanent conceptual logic.

• Therefore, progressives in philosophy (and elsewhere) should try to retrieve liberalism for a radical democratic agenda rather than rejecting it, thereby positioning themselves in the ideological mainstream of the country and seeking its transformation.

Let me now try to make this argument plausible for an audience likely to be aprioristically convinced of its obvious unsoundness.

Preliminary Clarification of Terms

First we need to clarify the key terms of “radicalism” and “liberalism.” While of course a radicalism of the right exists, here I refer to radicals who are progressives. But “progressive” cannot just denote the left of the political spectrum, since the whole point of the “new social movements” of the 1960s onward was that the traditional left-right political spectrum, predicated on varying positions on the question of public versus private ownership of the means of production, did not exhaust the topography of the political. Issues of gender and racial domination were to a significant extent “orthogonal” to this one-dimensional trope. So I will use “radicalism” broadly, though still in the zone of progressive politics, to refer generally to ideas/concepts/principles/values endorsing pro-egalitarian structural change to reduce or eliminate unjust hierarchies of domination.

“Liberalism” may denote both a political philosophy and the institutions and practices characteristically tied to that political philosophy. My focus will be on the former. The issue of how bureaucratic logics may prove refractory to reformist agendas is undeniably an important one, but it does not really fall into the purview of philosophy proper. My aim is to challenge the radical shibboleth that radical ideas/concepts/principles/values are incompatible with liberalism. Given the deep entrenchment of this assumption in the worldview of most radicals, refuting it would still be an accomplishment, even if working out practical details of operationalization are delegated to other hands.

In the United States, of course, “liberalism” in public parlance and everyday political discourse is used in such a way that it really denotes left-liberalism specifically (“left” by the standards of a country whose political center of gravity has shifted right in recent decades). In this vocabulary, right-liberals are then categorized as “conservatives”—in the market sense, as against the Burkean sense. On the other hand, some on the right would insist that only they, the heirs to the classic liberalism of John Locke and Adam Smith, are really entitled to the “liberal” designation. Later welfarist theorists are fraudulent pretenders to be exposed as socialist intruders unworthy of the title. Rejecting both of these usages, I will be employing “liberalism” in the expanded sense typical of political philosophy, which links both ends of this spectrum. “Liberalism” then refers broadly to the (p.12) anti-feudal ideology of individualism, equal rights, and moral egalitarianism that arises in Western Europe in the seventeenth-eighteenth centuries to challenge the ideas and values inherited from the old medieval order, and which is subsequently taken up and developed by others elsewhere, including many who would have been explicitly excluded by the original conception of the ideology. Left-wing social democrats and right-wing market conservatives, fans of John Rawls on the one hand and Robert Nozick on the other, are thus both liberals.1

From this perspective, it will be appreciated that liberalism is not a monolith but an umbrella term for a variety of positions. Here are some examples—some familiar, some perhaps less so:

Varieties of Liberalism

Left-wing (social democratic) vs. Right-wing (market conservative)

Kantian vs. Lockean

Contractarian vs. Utilitarian

Corporate vs. Democratic

Social vs. Individualist

Comprehensive vs. Political

Ideal-theory vs. Non-ideal-theory

Patriarchal vs. Feminist

Imperial vs. Anti-imperial

Racial vs. Anti-racial

Color-blind vs. Color-conscious

Etc.2

It is not the case, of course, that these different species of liberalism have been equally represented in the ideational sphere or equally implemented in the institutional sphere. On the contrary, some have been dominant while others have been subordinate, and some have never, at least in the full sense, been implemented at all. But nonetheless, I suggest they all count as liberalisms and as such they are all supposed to have certain elements in common, even those characterized by gender and racial exclusions. (My motivation for making these last varieties of liberalism rather than deviations from liberalism is precisely to challenge liberalism’s self-congratulatory history, which holds an idealized liberalism aloft, untainted by its actual record of complicity with oppressive social systems.) So the initial question we should always ask people making generalizations about “liberalism” is this: What particular variety of liberalism do you mean? And are your generalizations really true about all the possible kinds of liberalism, or only a subset? (p.13)

Here is a characterization of liberalism from a very respectable source, the British political theorist, John Gray:

Common to all variants of the liberal tradition is a definite conception, distinctively modern in character, of man and society… . It is individualist, in that it asserts the moral primacy of the person against the claims of any social collectivity; egalitarian, inasmuch as it confers on all men the same moral status and denies the relevance to legal or political order of differences in moral worth among human beings; universalist, affirming the moral unity of the human species and according a secondary importance to specific historic associations and cultural forms; and meliorist in its affirmation of the corrigibility and improvability of all social institutions and political arrangements. It is this conception of man and society which gives liberalism a definite identity which transcends its vast internal variety and complexity.3

What generate the different varieties of liberalism are different concepts of individualism, different claims about how egalitarianism should be construed or realized, more or less inclusionary readings of universalism (Gray’s characterization sanitizes liberalism’s actual sexist and racist history), different views of what count as desirable improvements, conflicting normative balancings of liberal values (freedom, equality) and competing theoretical prognoses about how best they can be realized in the light of (contested) socio-historical facts. The huge potential for disagreement about all of these explains how a common liberal core can produce such a wide range of variants. Moreover, we need to take into account not merely the spectrum of actual liberalisms but also hypothetical liberalisms that could be generated through novel framings of some or all of the above. So one would need to differentiate dominant versions of liberalism from oppositional versions, and actual from possible variants.

Once the breadth of the range of liberalisms is appreciated—dominant and subordinate, actual and potential—the obvious question then raised is this: even if actual dominant liberalisms have been conservative in various ways (corporate, patriarchal, racist) why does this rule out the development of emancipatory, radical liberalisms?

One kind of answer is the following (call this the internalist answer): because there is an immanent conceptual/normative logic to liberalism as a political ideology that precludes any emancipatory development of it.

Another kind of answer is the following (call this the externalist answer): it doesn’t. The historic domination of conservative exclusionary liberalisms is the result of group interests, group power, and successful group political projects. Apparent internal conceptual/normative barriers to an emancipatory liberalism can be successfully negotiated by drawing (p.14) on the conceptual/normative resources of liberalism itself, in conjunction with a revisionist socio-historical picture of modernity.

Most self-described radicals would endorse—indeed, reflexively, as an obvious truth—the first answer. But as indicated from the beginning, I think the second answer is actually the correct one. The obstacles to developing a “radical liberalism” are, in my opinion, primarily externalist in nature: material group interests, and the way they have shaped hegemonic varieties of liberalism. So I think we need to try to justify a radical agenda with the normative resources of liberalism rather than writing off liberalism. Since liberalism has always been the dominant ideology in the United States and is now globally hegemonic, such a project would have the great ideological advantage of appealing to values and principles that most people already endorse. All projects of egalitarian social transformation are going to face a combination of material, political, and ideological obstacles, but this strategy would at least reduce somewhat the dimensions of the last. One would be trying to win mass support for policies that—and the challenge will, of course, be to demonstrate this—are justifiable by majoritarian norms, once reconceived and put in conjunction with facts not always familiar to the majority. Material barriers (vested group interests) and political barriers (organizational difficulties) will of course remain. But they will constitute a general obstacle for all egalitarian political programs, and as such cannot be claimed to be peculiar problems for an emancipatory liberalism.

But the contention will be that such a liberalism cannot be developed. Why? Here are ten familiar objections, variants of internalism, and my replies to them.

Ten Reasons Why Liberalism Cannot Be Radicalized (And My Replies)

1. Liberalism Has an Asocial, Atomic Individualist Ontology

This is one of the oldest radical critiques of liberalism; it can be found in Marx’s derisive comments—for example, in the Grundrisse—about the “Robinsonades” of the social contract theory whose “golden age” (1650–1800) had long passed by the time he began his intellectual and political career:

The individual and isolated hunter or fisher who forms the starting-point with Smith and Ricardo belongs to the insipid illusions of the eighteenth century. They are Robinson Crusoe stories … no more based on such a naturalism than is Rousseau’s contrat social which makes naturally independent individuals come in contact and have (p.15) mutual intercourse by contract… . Man is in the most literal sense of the word a zoon politikon, not only a social animal, but an animal which can develop into an individual only in society. Production by individuals outside society … is as great an absurdity as the idea of the development of language without individuals living together and talking to one another.4

But several replies can be made to this indictment. To begin with, even if the accusation is true of contractarian liberalism, not all liberalisms are contractarian. Utilitarian liberalism rests on different theoretical foundations, as does the late nineteenth-century British liberalism of T. H. Green and his colleagues: a Hegelian, social liberalism.5 Closer to home, of course, we have John Dewey’s brand of liberalism. Moreover, even within the social contract tradition, resources exist for contesting the assumptions of the Hobbesian/Lockean version of the contract. Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origins of Inequality (1755) (nowhere cited by Marx) rethinks the “contract” to make it a contract entered into after the formation of society, and thus the creation of socialized human beings. So the ontology presupposed is explicitly a social one. In any case, the contemporary revival of contractarianism initiated by John Rawls’s 1971 A Theory of Justice makes the contract a thought-experiment, a “device of representation,” rather than a literal or even metaphorical anthropological account.6 The communitarian/contractarian debates of the 1980s onward recapitulated much of the “asocial” critique of contractarian liberalism (though usually without a radical edge). But as Rawls pointed out against Michael Sandel, for example, one needs to distinguish the figures in the thought-experiment from real human beings.7 And radicals should be wary about accepting a communitarian ontology and claims about the general good that deny or marginalize the dynamics of group domination in actual societies represented as “communities.” The great virtue of contractarian liberal individualism is the conceptual room it provides for hegemonic norms to be critically evaluated through the epistemic and moral distancing from Sittlichkeit that the contract, as an intellectual device, provides.

2. Liberalism Cannot Recognize Groups and Group Oppression in Its Ontology—I (Macro)

The second point needs to be logically distinguished from the first, since a theory could acknowledge the social shaping of individuals while denying that group oppression is central to that shaping. (So #1 is necessary, but not sufficient, for #2.) The Marxist critique, of course, was supposed to encapsulate both points: people were shaped by society and society (post-“primitive (p.16) communism”) was class dominated. The ontology was social and it was an ontology of class. Today radicals would demand a richer ontology that can accommodate the realities of gender and racial oppression also. But whatever candidates are put forward, the key claim is that a liberal framework cannot accommodate an ontology of groups in relations of domination and subordination. To the extent that liberalism recognizes social groups, these are basically conceived of as voluntary associations that one chooses to join or not join, which is obviously very different from, say, class, race, and gender memberships.

But this evasive ontology, which obfuscates the most central and obvious fact about all societies since humanity exited the hunting-and-gathering stage—that is, that they are characterized by oppressions of one kind or another—is not a definitional constituent of liberalism. Liberalism has certainly recognized some kinds of oppression: the absolutism it opposed from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, the Nazism and Stalinism it opposed in the twentieth century. Liberalism’s failure to systematically address structural oppression in supposedly liberal-democratic societies is a contingent artifact of the group perspectives and group interests privileged by those structures, not an intrinsic feature of liberalism’s conceptual apparatus.

In the preface to her recent Analyzing Oppression, Ann Cudd makes a striking point: that hers is the first book-length treatment of the subject in the analytic tradition.8 Philosophy, the discipline whose special mandate it is to illuminate justice and injustice for us, has had very little to say about injustice and oppression because of the social background of the majority of its thinkers. In political theory and political philosophy, the theorists who developed the dominant varieties of liberalism have come overwhelmingly from the hegemonic groups of the liberal social order (bourgeois white males). So it is really not surprising that, given this background, their socio-political and epistemic standpoint has tended to reproduce rather than challenge group privilege.

Consider Rawls, famously weak on gender and with next to nothing to say about race. Rawlsian “ideal theory,” which has dominated mainstream political philosophy for the last four decades, marginalizes such concerns not contingently but structurally. If your focus from the start is principles of distributive justice for a “well-ordered society,” then social oppression cannot be part of the picture, since by definition an oppressive society is not a well-ordered one. As Cudd points out, A Theory of Justice “leaves injustice virtually untheorized,” operating on the assumption “that injustice is merely the negation of justice.”9 But radically unjust societies—those characterized by major rather than minor deviations from ideality—will be different from just societies not merely morally but (p.17) also metaphysically. What Cudd calls “nonvoluntary social groups” will be central to their makeup.

Accordingly, Cudd contends that a conceptualization of “nonvoluntary social groups” must be central to any adequate account of social oppression: “without positing social groups as causally efficacious entities, we cannot explain oppression.” Contra the conventional wisdom in radical circles, however, she is insistent that the ontology of such groups can be explained “[using] current social science, in the form of cognitive psychology and modern economic theory, and situat[ing] itself in the Anglo-American tradition of liberal political philosophy.”10 Identifying “intentionalist” and “structuralist” approaches as the two broad categories of competing theorizations of social groups, she recommends as the best option a compatibilist position, holding that while all action is intentionally guided, many of the constraints within which we act are socially determined and beyond the control of the currently acting individual; to put a slogan on it, intentions dynamically interact within social structures… . My theory of nonvoluntary social groups fits the description of what Philip Pettit calls “holistic individualism,” which means that the social regularities associated with nonvoluntary social groups supervene on intentional states, and at the same time, group membership in these and voluntary social groups partly constitutes the intentional states of individuals.11

If Cudd is right, then, such a theorization can indeed be developed within a liberal framework, using the resources of analytic social and normative theory. But such a development of the theory is not merely permissible but should be seen as mandatory, given liberalism’s nominal commitment to individualism, egalitarianism, universalism, and meliorism. These values simply cannot be achieved unless the obstacles to their realization are identified and theorized. Social-democratic (left) liberalism, feminist liberalism, black liberalism all historically represent attempts to take these structural realities into account for the purposes of rethinking dominant liberalism.12 They are attempts to get right, to map accurately, the actual ontology of the societies for which liberalism is prescribing principles of justice. What Cudd’s book demonstrates is that it is the ignoring of this ontology of group domination that is the real betrayal of the liberal project. A well-ordered society will not have nonvoluntary social groups as part of its ontology. So the path to the “realistic utopia” Rawls is supposedly outlining would crucially require normative prescriptions for eliminating such groups. That no such guidelines are offered is undeniably an indictment of ideal-theory liberalism, which is thereby exposed as both epistemologically and ontologically inadequate. But that does not rule out a reconceptualized (p.18) liberalism, a non-ideal-theory liberalism that, starting from a different social metaphysic, requires a different normative strategy for theorizing justice.

3. Liberalism Cannot Recognize Groups and Group Oppression in Its Ontology—II (Micro)

But (it will be replied) liberalism suffers from a deeper theoretical inadequacy. Even if it may be conceded that liberal theory can recognize oppression at the macro-level, it will be argued that its individualism prevents it from recognizing how profoundly, at the micro-level, individuals are shaped by structures of social oppression. Class, race, and gender belongings penetrate deeply into the ontology of the individual in ways rendered opaque (it will be claimed) by liberalism’s foundational individualism.

But what those seeking to retrieve liberalism would point out is that we need to distinguish different senses of “individualism.” The individualism that is foundational to liberalism is a normative individualism (as in the Gray quote above), which makes individuals rather than social collectivities the locus of value. But that does not require any denial that individuals are shaped in their character (the “second nature” famously highlighted by left theory) by oppressive social forces and related group memberships. Once the first two criticisms have been refuted—that liberal individuals cannot be “social,” and that the involuntary group memberships central to the social in oppressive societies cannot be accommodated within a liberal framework—then this third criticism collapses also. One can without inconsistency affirm both the value of the individual and the importance of recognizing how the individual is socially molded, especially when the environing social structures are oppressive ones. As already noted, dominant liberalism tends to ignore or marginalize such constraints, assuming as its representative figures individuals not merely morally equal, but socially recognized as morally equal, and equi-powerful rather than group-differentiated into the privileged and the subordinated. But this misleading normative and descriptive picture is a function of a political agenda complicit with the status quo, not a necessary implication of liberalism’s core assumptions. A revisionist, radical liberalism would make the analysis of group oppression, the denial of equal standing to the majority of the population, and their impact on the individual’s ontology, a theoretical priority. Thus Cudd’s book, after explicating the ontology of involuntary groups, goes on to detail the various different ways—through violence, economic constraint, discrimination, group harassment, and the internalization of psychological oppression—that the subordinated are shaped by group domination.13 But nothing in her account is meant to imply either that they (p.19) thereby cease to be individuals or that their involuntary group memberships preclude a normative liberal condemnation of the injustice of their treatment.

4. Liberal Humanist Individualism Is Naïve about the Subject

A different kind of challenge is mounted by Foucault (though arguably originating in such earlier sources as the “anti-humanism” of Althusserian Marxism).14 Here, as John Christman points out, in contrast to the “thick” conception of the person advocated by communitarianism, in critique of liberalism, we get the theoretical recommendation that “the notion of a singular unified subject of any sort, however thin the conception, [must be] abandoned.”15 As Foucault writes:

How, under what conditions, and in what forms can something like a subject appear in the order of discourse? What place can it occupy in each type of discourse, what functions can it assume, and by obeying what rules? In short, it is a matter of depriving the subject (or its substitute) of its role as originator, and of analyzing the subject as a variable and complex function of discourse.16

The subject is not merely molded by power, but produced by power, and, in effect, vanishes.

I agree that liberalism cannot meet such a challenge, but I think the premise of the challenge should be rejected. Here I am in sympathy with Christman, who, reviewing various critiques of the classic liberal humanist conception of the self, argues for a socio-historical conception that concedes the absurdity of the notion of people springing from their own brow (“originators”) while nonetheless making a case for “degrees” of self-creation:

Selves should be seen as to a large extent formed by factors not under the control of those reflective agents themselves… . This will help accomplish two things: to provide grounds for the rejection of models of agency and citizenship that assume Herculean abilities to fashion ourselves out of whole cloth; and to force us to focus more carefully on what powers of self-shaping we therefore are left with… . The point must be that the role of the self’s control of the self (and the attendant social elements of both ‘selves’) will be circumscribed by the ways in which our lives are shaped for us and not by us.17

A commitment to humanism does not, as pointed out above, require the denial of the obvious fact that human beings—especially the (p.20) oppressed—are constrained by material structures and social restrictions in what they can accomplish, nor that, as products of particular epochs and group memberships, their consciousness will have been shaped by dominant concepts and norms. Marx emphasized long ago that though people make history, they do not make it under conditions of their own choosing, that agency is constrained by structure and circumstance. But, contra Althusser, this was never intended as a rejection of the claim that it is still people who ultimately assert their personhood in struggle.

And in my opinion, the retort applies to the Foucauldian version of the thesis also. To make the familiar left critiques: such an analysis not only deprives us of a normative basis for indicting structures of oppression, not only deprives the subject of agency, but is flagrantly inconsistent with the actual history of people’s resistance to the systems that have supposedly “produced” them as subjects. The anti-colonial struggle, the anti-Fascist and anti-Stalinist struggles, the civil rights struggles of white women, people of color, gays, the recent “Arab spring” all give the lie to such a diagnosis. Radical liberalism is capable of recognizing both the extent of our socialization by the existing oppressive social order and the ways in which, nonetheless, many people resist and struggle against this oppressive social order.

5. Liberalism’s Values (Independently of the Ontology Question) Are Themselves Problematic

Even if the ontological challenge can be beaten back, though, another front remains open. It will be argued that liberal humanist values are themselves problematic in nature and incapable of advancing a radical agenda. But the obvious reply is, Which values? And what exactly is the problem supposed to be: (a) that the values are intrinsically problematic? (b) that the values involved have historically been extended in an exclusionary discriminatory way? (c) that the values have been developed in a fashion that is predicated on the experience of the privileged? These are all different claims.

Start with the first. Admittedly, some values associated with the liberal tradition could be judged to be intrinsically problematic, such as the “possessive individualism” C. B. Macpherson famously attributed to Hobbes and Locke.18 But this is a value specific to right-wing liberalism, not liberalism in general (it does not appear on Gray’s list), and would be opposed by left-wing/social democratic liberalism. Such values as “freedom,” “equality” (moral egalitarianism), and “fraternity/sorority” classically emblematic of the liberal tradition have not usually been seen as problematic by radicals and have indeed been emblazoned on radical banners. Freedom from oppression, equal rights/equal pay/equal citizenship (“I AM A MAN”), (p.21) fraternity/sorority with the subordinated (“Am I not a man and a brother? Am I not a woman and a sister?”) have all served as values for progressive movements seeking social emancipation.

To be sure, it is a familiar point to radicals, if somewhat less so to the non-radical majority, that the population as a whole has not historically been recognized as deserving the protections of these norms, so that the opponents of emancipation have all too often themselves been liberals. Freedom has been construed as justifiably resting on the enslavement of some; equality has been restricted to those deemed worthy of it (i.e., those more equal than others); fraternity has been literal, an all-boys’ club. Domenico Losurdo’s recently translated Liberalism: A Counter-History provides a devastating exposé of “liberal thought [not] in its abstract purity, but liberalism, and hence the liberal movement and liberal society, in their concrete reality.” It is an illuminatingly sordid history of the ideology’s complicity with racial slavery, white working-class indentureship, colonialism and imperialism (“A ‘Master-Race Democracy’ on a Planetary Scale,” in one chapter’s title), and the conceptual connection between the Nazi “final solution” and Europe’s earlier extermination programs against indigenous peoples.19

Yet it is noteworthy that in his concluding pages, Losurdo still affirms the “merits and strong points of the intellectual tradition under examination.” His “counter-history” has been aimed at dispelling the “habitual hagiography” that surrounds liberalism, and the related “myth of the gradual, peaceful transition, on the basis of purely internal motivations and impulses, from liberalism to democracy, or from general enjoyment of negative liberty to an ever wider recognition of political rights.”20 In reality, he emphasizes, “the classics of the liberal tradition” were generally hostile to democracy; the “exclusion clauses” required “violent upheavals” to be overcome; progress was not linear but a matter of advances and retreats; external crisis often played a crucial role; and white working-class and black inclusion in the polity came at the cost of their participation in colonial wars against native peoples.21 Nonetheless, his final paragraph insists:

However difficult such an operation might be for those committed to overcoming liberalism’s exclusion clauses, to take up the legacy of this intellectual tradition is an absolutely unavoidable task… . [L]‌iberalism’s merits are too significant and too evident for it to be necessary to credit it with other, completely imaginary ones. Among the latter is the alleged spontaneous capacity for self-correction often attributed to it… . Only in opposition to [such] pervasive repressions and transfigurations is the book now ending presented as a “counter-history”: bidding farewell to hagiography is the precondition for landing on the firm ground of history.22

So for Losurdo one can accept the indictment of actual historic liberalism, and its failure to live up to its putative universalism, without going on to conclude either that liberalism must therefore be abandoned or that liberalism’s own internal dynamic will naturally correct itself. Rather, the appropriate conclusion is that liberalism can be retrieved, but that it will take political struggle to do so.

Finally, even when the “exclusion clauses” are formally overcome, their legacy may well remain in the form of values now nominally extended to everybody, but in reality articulated in such a fashion as to continue to reproduce group privilege—for example, a “freedom” that repudiates caste status but does not recognize illicit economic constraint as unfairly limiting liberty, or an “autonomy” that does not acknowledge the role of female caregiving in enabling human development, or a “justice” resolutely forward-looking that blocks issues of rectification of past injustices. But what such tendentious conceptual framings arguably call for is a critique and a rethinking of these values and principles in the light of these exclusions (as with left, feminist, and black liberalism). That does not refute their normative worth; it just underlines the necessity for taking the whole population into account in revising them and developing a blueprint of their internal architecture adequately sensitized to the differential social location and social history of such groups, particularly those traditionally oppressed.

6. Liberalism’s Enlightenment Origins Commit It to Seeing Moral Suasion and Rational Discourse as the Societal Prime Movers

Liberalism is often associated with a historical progressivism, but a belief in the possibility and desirability of meliorism (see Gray) certainly does not commit one to Whiggish teleologies. One can oppose conservative fatalism and pessimism in its different versions—Christian claims about original sin, Burkean distrust of abstract reason, biological determinism in its ever-changing and ever-renewed incarnations—without thinking that there is any inevitability about the triumph of progress and reason. A liberalism that is “radical” will necessarily need to draw on the left tradition’s demystified analysis of the centrality of group domination to the workings of the social order.23 As earlier noted (sections 2 and 3 above), a revisionist ontology that recognizes as key social players nonvoluntary social groups in structural relations of domination and subordination will perforce have a more realistic view of the (in)efficacy of moral suasion than an ontology of atomic individuals. (p.23)

Such a revisionist liberalism will acknowledge the role of hegemonic ideologies and vested group interests in the preservation of the status quo, and their refractoriness to appeals to reason and justice. Indeed, it will often be precisely in the names of a “reason” and “justice” shaped by the norms and perspectives of group privilege—of class, gender, and race—that egalitarian social change is resisted. As Losurdo makes clear, no immanent developmentalist moral dynamic drives liberalism’s evolution. It is not at all the case that an endorsement of democratized liberal norms implies any corollary belief that the democratic struggle for a more egalitarian social order is guaranteed to be successful. Progress is possible; defeat and rollback are also possible. In general, a radical liberalism should, in some sense, be “materialist,” recognizing the extent to which both people and the social dynamic are shaped by material forces and not over-estimating the causal role of rational argumentation and moral suasion on their own. Radical liberalism takes for granted that political and ideological struggle will be necessary to realize liberal values against the opposition of those who all too frequently think of themselves as the real liberals. Radical liberalism can be descriptively realist (realizing the centrality of interest-based politics) without being normatively realist (abandoning morality for realpolitik).

7. Liberalism Is Naïve in Assuming the Neutrality of the State and the Juridical System

Again, while such a claim may be true of dominant varieties of liberalism, it need not be true of all. (Note that nowhere in Gray’s characterization is any such assumption made.)

The neutrality of the juridico-political system is a liberal ideal, a norm to be striven for to reflect citizens’ equal moral status before the law and entitlement to equal protection of their legitimate interests. To represent it as a sociological generalization of liberal theory about actual political systems, including systems self-designated as liberal, would be to confuse the normative with the descriptive. Liberalism has certainly historically had no trouble in seeing the illicit influence of concentrated group power in the socio-political systems it opposed (see section #2). The original critique of “feudal” absolutism, the twentieth-century critique of “totalitarianism,” relied in part on the documentation and condemnation of the extent of legally backed state repression in curbing individual freedom. Liberalism’s blind spot has been its failure to document and condemn the enormity of the historic denial of equal rights to the majority of the population ruled by self-styled “liberal” states: the “absolutism” and “totalitarianism” directed against white women and white workers, and the nonwhite enslaved (p.24) and colonized. Patriarchal democracy, bourgeois democracy, Herrenvolk democracy have all been represented as “democracy” simpliciter, with no analysis of the mechanisms of structural subordination that have characterized such polities, or the ideological sleights-of-hand that have rationalized them. But to claim a necessary conceptual connection between such evasions and liberal assumptions is to confuse the contingent necessities of the discourse of hegemonic liberalism—aimed at preserving, whether by justifying or obfuscating, patriarchal, bourgeois, and racial power—with what is taken to be some kind of transworld essence of liberalism. In recent decades, a large body of literature has developed that investigates the impact of class, race, and gender dynamics in the actual functioning of the state and the legal system.24 Radical liberalism would draw on this body of literature in seeking to put in place the safeguards necessary for guaranteeing equal protection not merely on paper but in reality.

8. Liberalism Is Necessarily Anti-Socialist, So How “Radical” Could It Be?

“Socialism” is used in different senses. Assuming that a romanticized return to pre-industrial communal systems is not in the cards for a globalized world of seven-plus billion people, there are three main alternatives so far (two tried, one theorized about): state-commandist socialism, social democracy, market socialism. State-commandist socialism (a.k.a. “communism”) is indeed incompatible with liberalism but would seem to have been refuted as an attractive ideal by the history of the twentieth century.25 Social democracy is just left-liberalism, whether in Rawls’s version or in versions further left, like Brian Barry’s, more worried about the inequalities Rawls’s two principles of justice leave intact.26 Market socialism is yet to be implemented on a national level, but many of the hypothetical accounts of how it would work emphasize the importance of respecting liberal norms.27 In other words, market socialism’s putative superiority to capitalism is not defended by invoking distinctively socialist values but by showing how such uncontroversial and traditional liberal values as democracy, freedom, and self-realization are not going to be achievable for the majority under the present system (or through the appeal to more recent values like sustainability, generated by awareness of the impending ecological disaster, which the present order will make achievable for nobody!)28 Other possibilities are not ruled out, but their proponents would have to explain how their models have learned the lessons of the past in both (a) being economically viable and (b) respecting human rights, the common global moral currency of the postwar epoch, which is best developed in the liberal tradition. Criticism (p.25) of the existing order is not enough; one has to show how one’s proposed “socialist” alternative will be superior (and in more than a vague hand-waving kind of way).

9. The Discourse of Liberal Rights Cannot Accommodate Radical Redistribution and Structural Change

Marxism’s original critique of liberalism, apart from deriding its (imputed) social ontology, represented liberal rights—for example, in “On the Jewish Question”29—as a bourgeois concept. But that was more than a century and a half ago. Lockean rights-of-non-interference centered on private property, “negative” rights, are indeed deficient as an exclusivist characterization of people’s normative entitlements, but such a minimalist view has been contested by social democrats (some self-identifying as liberal) for more than a century. A significant literature now exists on “welfare” rights, “positive” rights, “social” rights, whose implementation would indeed require radical structural change. The legitimacy of these rights as “liberal” rights is, of course, denied by the political right. But that’s the whole point, with which I began—that liberalism is not a monolith but a set of competing interpretations and theorizations, fighting it out in a common arena.30 The US hostility to such rights is a manifestation of the historic success of conservatives in framing the normative agenda in this country, not a necessary corollary of liberalism as such. As earlier emphasized, liberalism must not be collapsed into neo-liberalism. Nor is it a refutation to point out that having such rights on paper does not guarantee their implementation, since this is just a variation of the already discussed imputation to liberalism of a necessarily idealist conception of the social dynamic (section #6), in which morality is a prime mover. But such a sociological claim is neither a foundational nor a derivative assumption of liberalism.

Moreover, in the specific case of the redress of racial injustice, one does not even need to appeal to such rights, since the situation of, for example, blacks in the United States is arguably the result of the historic and current violation of traditional negative rights (life, liberty, property), which are supposed to be the uncontroversial ones in the liberal tradition, as well as the legacy of such practices as manifest in illicitly accumulated wealth and opportunities. Here again the hegemony of Rawlsian “ideal theory” over the development of the mainstream political philosophy of the last forty years has had pernicious consequences, marginalizing such issues and putting the focus instead on principles of distributive justice for an ideal “well-ordered” society. But an emancipatory liberalism would be reoriented from (p.26) the start toward non-ideal theory and would correspondingly make rectificatory justice and the ending of social oppression its priority.31

10. American Liberalism in Particular Has Been so Shaped in Its Development by Race that Any Emancipatory Possibilities Have Been Foreclosed

Liberalism in general (both nationally and internationally) has been shaped by race, but that does not preclude reclaiming it.32 Moreover, it is precisely such shaping that motivates the imperative of recognizing the multiplicity of liberalisms, not merely for cataloging purposes but in order to frame them as theoretical objects whose dynamic requires investigation. The conflation of all liberalisms with their racialized versions obstructs seeing these ideologies as historically contingent varieties of liberalism, which could have developed otherwise. A Brechtian “defamiliarization” is necessary, a cognitive distancing that “denaturalizes” what is prone to appear as the essence of liberalism. Jennifer Pitts’s A Turn to Empire, for example, which is subtitled The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France, and Sankar Muthu’s Enlightenment against Empire, both seek to demarcate within liberalism the existence of anti- as well as pro-imperialist strains, thereby demonstrating that liberalism is not a monolith.33 Admittedly, other scholars have been more ambivalent about some of their supposed exemplars; see, for example, Losurdo, already cited, and John Hobson’s recent The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics, which develops a detailed and sophisticated taxonomy of varieties of Eurocentrism and imperialism that demonstrates the compatibility of racism, Eurocentrism, and anti-imperialism.34 (For instance, many European liberal theorists were anti-imperialist precisely because of their racism—their fears that the white race would degenerate as a result of miscegenation with inferior races and the deleterious consequences of prolonged residence in the unsuitable tropical climates of colonial outposts.) But the mere fact of such a range of positions illustrates that a liberalism neither Eurocentric nor imperialist is not a contradiction in terms.

In the United States in particular, as Rogers Smith has demonstrated, liberalism and racism have been intricately involved with one another from the nation’s inception, a relationship Smith conceptualizes in terms of conflicting “multiple traditions,” racism versus liberal universalism, and which I see as a conflict between “racial liberalism” and non-racial liberalism.35 My belief is that formally identifying “racial liberalism” as a particular evolutionary (and always evolving) ideological phenomenon better enables us to understand the role of race in writing and rewriting the most important political philosophy in the nation’s history, from the overtly racist liberalism (p.27) of the past to the nominally color-blind liberalism of the present. From the eighteenth- to nineteenth-century accommodation to racial slavery and aboriginal expropriation to the twentieth-century tainting of welfare and social democracy on this side of the Atlantic,36 race has refracted crucial terms, concepts, and values in liberal theory so as to remove any cognitive dissonance between the privileging of whites and the subordination of people of color. Correspondingly, the shaping of white moral psychology by race and the distinctive patterns of uptake of abstract liberal values (“equality,” “individualism”) in such a psychology then become legitimate objects of investigation for us.37 One begins from the assumption that these norms will be color-coded in their actual operationalization, so that any efficacious framing of an interracial political project will need to anticipate and correct for this differential understanding rather than being naively surprised by it. But such racialization (as popular interpretation and reception) is going to be a common problem for any American ideology with emancipatory pretensions. Liberalism is certainly not unique in that respect, as the history of the white American left and socialist movements illustrates. As Jack London famously put it at a meeting of the Socialist Party in San Francisco “when challenged by various members concerning his emphasis on the yellow peril”: “What the devil! I am first of all a white man and only then a Socialist!”38 Herrenvolk socialism existed no less than Herrenvolk liberalism.

#### Complicity of civil society and slavery proves the need for a strong re-distributionist federal state – the state’s need for legitimacy creates leverage for neo-abolitionism.

Robin **BLACKBURN** Sociology @ Essex **’17** in *Feminism, Capitalism, and Critique* eds. Bottici & Bargu p. 57-62

In the conclusion of her response to Dawson, Fraser argues that the state played a key role in promoting colonial slavery and the plantation system. It was the state, she explains, which validates expropriation and which is responsible for a “political subjectivation” (2016). While this may have been the case in other social regimes, the state played a surprisingly modest role in the running of plantation slavery in the Americas, from its seventeenth-century origins to its nineteenth-century climax. The colonial state did recognize plantation wealth, but it was the competitive Atlantic context which gave freelance merchants and bankers their chance and which they perfected with the “Second Slavery” of the nineteenth century (Tomich 2004; Johnson 2013; Baptist 2014). The colonial trading companies failed in the Americas. The plantation boom was the work of independent planters and traders, beginning as “interlopers,” practicing de facto free trade. These classic entrepreneurs carried millions of captives across the ocean. Traders, planters and factors learned from one another and devised many of their own laws in their own assemblies. The French colonial merchants insisted that they must have unfettered access to European markets and one of them - the merchant economist Thomas Le Gendre - invented the slogan laissez faire, laissez passer. The French royal authorities drew up the Code Noir, but colonial proprietors simply ignored any regulations they disliked. Racial slavery in the English American colonies was very much a product of civil society, not the state. John Locke was responsible in the 1690s for revising or approving colonial laws as director of the Southern department of the Board of Trade. But the great philosopher thought the colonial slaveholders were a valuable check on royal power so did nothing to weaken their position. This foundational moment saw a colonial institution - chattel slavery - accepted by the metropolis, not imposed by the metropolis on the colonies.

The US Constitution, in deference to planter wishes, provided for a minimal state with the lowest possible taxes (Einhorn 2008), with law and order being guaranteed by local militia and patrols not federal troops. The US Army numbered 18,000 in 1820, compared with over 400,000 state militia. And the Militia Act of 1792 explained that all “white men” were to be enrolled in it, an injunction that applied to the North as well as South. (The African American “pessimists” argue that the North/South “binary” on race is generally misleading.) The planters faced varied resistance but made their own security arrangements, which were quite effective down to 1860 - and again after 1877. Slaveholders everywhere in the Americas had a lively fear of meddling by metropolitan philanthropists and ignoramuses. In the United States in the 1850s, the Southern slaveholders were so alarmed by the prospect of a Republican president that they took the huge gamble of secession to avoid it. The slaveholders could maintain dominance within their own areas, but they had a horror of unreliable federal office-holders, of anti-slavery propaganda and of a fickle Northern public opinion. Fraser’s argument that the slaveholders needed the state because they needed “political subjectivation” would be very relevant here.

If we look at Jim Crow and the reconstruction of white supremacy in the US South, it showed similar ambivalence and was anchored in civil society not the federal state. The main Southern demand was for “states rights” and Southern autonomy. The “expropriation” and terrorization of the former slave were guaranteed by patrols and militia organized by the slaveholders themselves. In some parts of the South, US occupation saw a challenge to planter power in 1868-77 but almost immediately the planter militias and patrols morphed into white vigilante groups, which reflected local white power structures.

Frank Wilderson is right to locate the racial dynamic of domination and capitalism close to the ground level. The subtitle of his article is “Whither the Slave in Civil Society?” (Wilderson 2003). Slaveholders needed the state, and they needed allies, but they were not confident that they could rely on either in a crisis. Wilderson draws attention to the ubiquity of planter patrols and militias in slave societies. After the failure of Reconstruction, the disciplinary function belonged to the local state. In more recent times the National Guard, police and vigilante groups directly inherit the role of enforcer of the racial order.

Yet, Radical Reconstruction bequeathed more of a legacy of autonomy and resistance than the “pessimists” allow. The freedmen and -women had participated in Black Conventions and endorsed a Declaration of Rights and Wrongs. They fought against lynch mobs and, in an innovative move, campaigned for the “public right” of equal access to public accommodation and transport. This approach was to overcome the abstraction and passivity of some varieties of “rights-bearing.” African Americans created schools, colleges, choirs and churches where a black community could take shape (Scott 2006).

When Reconstruction collapsed with the withdrawal of federal forces from the South, it was replaced by a decentralized regime of terror, which combined elements of spontaneity with the backing of former Confederate officers. The willingness of the authorities in Washington, DC, went along with Southern lynching and segregation from a mixture of fear and fellow feeling. Intervening in the South would be expensive and unpopular. The initiative still lay with such civil society actors as planters, landlords, storekeepers and bankers.

Fraser writes that “the United States perpetuated its ‘internal colony’ by transforming recently emancipated slaves into debt peons through the share-cropping system” (Fraser 2016). The way this is phrased does not sufficiently acknowledge the role of the Southern elite, which had its own agenda that it was often able to impose on Washington. It was a junior partner nationally but exercised a monopoly of power in its own region. Moreover, its very existence rendered racism respectable throughout the Union. The North made huge concessions to the South because Northern Republicans feared the Southern elite and often shared their contemptuous views about blacks. Racism, like patriarchy, thrived because of its roots in civil society and the continuing weakness of the federal state. White supremacy was based on the facts on the ground, on armed bodies of white men.

Where Does Anti-Racism Come From?

In her fascinating concluding sketch, Fraser has little to say about the historic defeats inflicted on racism in the mid-twentieth century - the defeat of Nazi Germany, the rise and fall of Imperial Japan, the founding of the United Nations, the Chinese Revolution, the anti-colonial revolutions, the civil rights struggle in the United States and the downfall of apartheid. Racism stubbornly survives, and the successes and failures of capitalism generate new varieties of racial oppression. But nevertheless, white supremacy and other forms of institutional racism have been deeply discredited. Indeed, the glaring contradiction between racial regimes and their official demise contributes greatly to the “legitimacy crisis” of today’s still-racialized capitalism.

The word “racism” acquired negative and critical connotations only very recently. As a critical concept it dates from the twentieth century and was only widely adopted in the anti-colonial and anti-fascist movements. The defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan did much to discredit racism, an ideology and practice that imbued European colonialism, US segregation and South African apartheid (Cox 1949; Kovel 1970). W. E. B. Dubois, the NAACP and the Haarlem Renaissance helped to renew the tradition of black abolitionism and to transmit it to new generations. The emergent post-war world saw East and West competing for influence. According to the new human rights doctrine,white racists were enemies of progress because they denied the respect due to all members of the human race. The US tolerance of segregation and apartheid seriously weakened its international standing.

If we ask where the new anti-racist norms come from, then part of the answer would be, as Lynn Hunt has shown, the abolitionist and neo- abolitionist movements (Hunt 2007). They challenged racist doctrines and practices and fostered an alliance between anti-colonial and antiapartheid movements and the struggle for racial justice in the United States. The emergence of national liberation movements and the emergence of the “third world” directly inspired - and were inspired by - the indictment of racism found in the writings of W. E. B. Du Bois, Ruth Benedict, Oliver Cromwell Cox, Claude Levi-Strauss, Franz Fanon, Jean-Paul Sartre, Joel Kovel, and the work and the testimony of many other writers and activists. The rejection of Western racism and colonialism was an intellectual, cultural and political achievement of anti-colonial, anti-fascist, anti-apartheid and black liberation movements, each of which helped anti-racism to avoid false universalism and empty formalism. Western capitalism was nourished by a host of expropriations, but some currents of liberal and bourgeois thought and politics broke with colonial and racial paternalism and welcomed the UN General Declaration of Human Rights, the latter inspired by the neo-abolitionist NAACP.

While incomplete and flawed in various ways, the General Declaration furnished a key reference point for anti-racist mobilization. Attempts to portray the discourse of “human rights” as a purely bourgeois construction, as is sometimes claimed by both partisans and critics, are misguided. But the sorts of class struggle typically provoked by capitalist accumulation and appropriation - and most particularly by “expropriation” - often strive to combine anti-racist and anti-capitalist themes. Thomas Haskell claimed that “humanitarianism” was the result of horizons gradually enlarged by the spread of market relations (Bender 1992). There is a grain of truth in this, yet real advances arose at times of rupture and class struggle, and they reflected fear of markets as well as the broader connections they reveal. Anti-racism arose in the 1930s and registered few solid gains prior to the UN General Declaration of 1948. Prior to this, US New Dealers and European Liberals and Socialists were typically complicit with Southern or colonial racism. During the interwar period the international Communist movement was almost alone in campaigning against white racism and colonialism. The UN General Declaration arose from Eleanor Roosevelt’s response to the initiatives ofW. E. B. Du Bois and the Soviet delegation (Hunt 2007, Blackburn 2011).

Fraser powerfully advances our understanding of the ways in which capitalism generates inequality and exclusion, thereby fostering and feeding racialization. The impetus here derives from civil society. However, the state certainly furnishes guarantees, legitimacy and powers to these social relations, a fact that becomes very visible at times of general crisis, war and revolution. At such times the ruling order was divided and the oppressed and excluded could make their presence felt. The test of war and revolution generates a need for mobilizing appeals that could challenge oppression and gain wide acceptance. It furnishes points of rupture. However, vigilance is in order because state elites can be easily distracted and forces within civil society inimical to racial equality will undermine and falsify prior gains.

# 2NC

#### Debate is a game played by students who want to win. Debating about utopian imaginaries of plans enacted by the USFG effectively positions debaters and judges as budding social critics—without positioning debate as anything more than a game.

McGee and Romanelli, 97—Assistant Professor in Communication Studies at Texas Tech AND Director of Debate at Loyola University of Chicago (Brian and David, “Policy Debate as Fiction: In Defense of Utopian Fiat,” Contemporary Argumentation and Debate 18 (1997) 23-35, dml) [ableist language modifications denoted by brackets]

Snider argued several years ago that a suitable paradigm should address “something we can ACTUALLY DO” as opposed to something we can MAKE BELIEVE ABOUT” (“Fantasy as Reality” 14). A utopian literature metaphor is beneficial precisely because it is within the power of debaters to perform the desired action suggested by the metaphor, if not always to demonstrate that the desired action is politically feasible.

Instead of debaters playing to an audience of those who make public policy, debaters should understand themselves as budding social critics in search of an optimal practical and cultural politics. While few of us will ever hold a formal policy-making position, nearly all of us grow up with the social and political criticism of the newspaper editorial page, the high school civics class, and, at least in homes that do not ban the juxtaposition of food and politics, the lively dinner table conversation. We complain about high income taxes, declining state subsidies for public education, and crumbling interstate highways. We worry about the rising cost of health care and wonder if we will have access to high-quality medical assistance when we need it. Finally, we bemoan the decline of moral consensus, rising rates of divorce, drug use among high school students, and disturbing numbers of pregnant teen-agers. From childhood on, we are told that good citizenship demands that we educate ourselves on political matters and vote to protect the polis; the success of democracy allegedly demands no less. For those who accept this challenge instead of embracing the political alienation of Generation X and becoming devotees of Beavis and Butthead, social criticism is what good citizens do.

Debate differs from other species of social criticism because debate is a game played by students who want to win. However, conceiving of debate as a kind of social criticism has considerable merit. Social criticism is not restricted to a technocratic elite or group of elected officials. Moreover, social criticism is not necessarily idle or wholly deconstructive. Instead, such criticism necessarily is a prerequisite to any effort to create policy change, whether that criticism is articulated by an elected official or by a mother of six whose primary workplace is the home. When one challenges the status quo, one normally implies that a better alternative course of action exists. Given that intercollegiate debate frequently involves exchanges over a proposition of policy by student advocates who are relatively unlikely ever to debate before Congress, envisioning intercollegiate debate as a specialized extension of ordinary citizen inquiry and advocacy in the public sphere seems attractive. Thinking of debate as a variety of social criticism gives debate an added dimension of public relevance.

One way to understand the distinction between debate as policy-making and debate as social criticism is to examine Roger W. Cobb and Charles D. Elder’s agenda-building theory.5 Cobb and Elder are well known for their analytic split of the formal agenda for policy change, which includes legislation or other action proposed by policy makers with formal power (e.g., government bureaucrats, U.S. Senators), from the public agenda for policy change, which is composed of all those who work outside formal policy-making circles to exert influence on the formal agenda. Social movements, lobbyists, political action committees, mass media outlets, and public opinion polls all constitute the public agenda, which, in turn, has an effect on what issues come to the forefront on the formal agenda. From the agenda-building perspective, one cannot understand the making of public policy in the United States without comprehending the confluence of the formal and public agenda.

In intercollegiate debate, the policy-making metaphor has given primacy to formal agenda functions at the expense of the public agenda. Debaters are encouraged to bypass thinking about the public agenda in outlining policy alternatives; appeals for policy change frequently are made by debaters under the strange pretense that they and/or their judges are members of the formal agenda elite. Even arguments about the role of the public in framing public policy are typically issued by debaters as if those debaters were working within the confines of the formal agenda for their own, instrumental advantage. (For example, one thinks of various social movement “backlash” disadvantage arguments, which advocate a temporary policy paralysis in order to stir up public outrage and mobilize social movements whose leaders will demand the formal adoption of a presumably superior policy alternative.) The policy-making metaphor concentrates on the formal agenda to the near exclusion of the public agenda, as the focus of a Katsulas or a Dempsey on the “real-world” limitations for making policy indicates.

Debate as social criticism does not entail exclusion of formal agenda concerns from intercollegiate debate. The specified agent of action in typical policy resolutions makes ignoring the formal agenda of the United States government an impossibility. However, one need not be able to influence the formal agenda directly in order to discuss what it is that the United States government should do. Undergraduate debaters and their judges usually are far removed—both physically and functionally—from the arena of formal-agenda deliberation. What the disputation of student debaters most closely resembles, to the extent that it resembles any real-world analog, is public-agenda social criticism. What students are doing is something they really CAN do as students and ordinary citizens; they are working in their own modest way to shape the public agenda.

While “social criticism” is the best explanation for what debaters do, this essay goes a step further. The mode of criticism in which debaters operate is the production of utopian literature. Strictly speaking, debaters engage in the creation of fictions and the comparison of fictions to one another. How else does one explain the affirmative advocacy of a plan, a counterfactual world that, by definition, does not exist? Indeed, traditional inherency burdens demand that such plans be utopian, in the sense that current attitudes or structures make the immediate enactments of such plans unlikely in the “real world” of the formal agenda. Intercollegiate debate is utopian because plan and/or counterplan enactment is improbable. While one can distinguish between incremental and radical policy change proposals, the distinction makes no difference in the utopian practice of intercollegiate debate.

More importantly, intercollegiate debate is utopian in another sense. Policy change is considered because such change, it is hoped, will facilitate the pursuit of the good life. For decades, intercollegiate debaters have used fiat or the authority of the word “should” to propose radical changes in the social order, in addition to advocacy of the incremental policy changes typical of the U.S. formal agenda. This wide range of policy alternatives discussed in contemporary intercollegiate debate is the sign of a healthy public sphere, where thorough consideration of all policy alternatives is a possibility. Utopian fiction, in which the good place that is no place is envisioned, makes possible the instantiation of a rhetorical vision prerequisite to building that good place in our tiny corner of the universe. Even Lewis Mumford, a critic of utopian thought, concedes that we “can never reach the points of the compass; and so no doubt we shall never live in utopia; but without the magnetic needle we should not be able to travel intelligently at all” (Mumford 24-25).

An objection to this guiding metaphor is that it encourages debaters to do precisely that to which Snider would object, which is to “make believe” that utopia is possible. This objection misunderstands the argument. These students already are writers of utopian fiction from the moment they construct their first plan or counterplan text. Debaters who advocate policy change announce their commitment to changing the organization of society in pursuit of the good life, even though they have no formal power to call this counterfactual world into being. Any proposed change, no matter how small, is a repudiation of policy paralysis [limitations] and the maintenance of the status quo. As already practiced, debate revolves around utopian proposals, at least in the sense that debaters and judges lack the formal authority to enact their proposals. Even those negatives who defend the current social order frequently do so by pointing to the potential dystopic consequences of accepting such proposals for change.

Understanding debate as utopian literature would not eliminate references to the vagaries of making public policy, including debates over the advantageousness of plans and counterplans. As noted above, talking about public policy is not making public policy, and a retreat from the policy-making metaphor would have relatively little effect on the contemporary practice of intercollegiate debate.6 For example, while space constraints prevent a thorough discussion of this point, the utopian literature metaphor would not necessitate the removal of all constraints on fiat, although some utopian proposals will tax the imagination where formal-agenda policy change is concerned.

The utopian literature metaphor does not ineluctably divorce debate from the problems and concerns of ordinary people and everyday life. There will continue to be debates focused on incremental policy changes as steps along the path to utopia. What the utopian literature metaphor does is to position debaters, coaches, and judges as the unapologetic social critics that they are and have always been, without the confining influence of a guiding metaphor that limits their ability to search for the good life. Further, this metaphor does not encourage the debaters to carry the utopian literature metaphor to extremes by imagining that they are sitting in a corner and penning the next great American novel. The metaphor is useful because it orients debaters to their role as social critics, without the suggestion that debate is anything other than an educational game played by undergraduate students.

#### Abandonment of human survival and value itself capitulates to capitalist colonialism. Their critique of the human erases the struggles of those outside the global North who have never conceded to the reign of Man.

Drucilla **CORNELL** Poli Sci, Women’s Studies & Comparative Lit @ Rutgers AND Stephen **SEELY** PhD Candidate @ Rutgers **’16** *The Spirit of Revolution* p. 1-4

Following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union it would seem that the idea of revolution has been swept into the dustbin of history, or at least into the dustbin of the Euro-American academy. Even within feminist and queer theory, two of the academic discourses ostensibly most devoted to sweeping transformation, the word scarcely appears in most of the work written over the past three decades. Our purpose here is not to offer an extensive investigation into the reasons for this post-revolutionary “turn.” Certainly part of it is a general air of pessimism that has swept through critical theory in the face of the failures of the so-called Communist states to actualize the great socialist aspirations and the ruthlessness of advanced capitalism that has created inequalities of world historical proportions, let alone the never-ending war, horrific structural violence, and brutal suppression of revolutionary movements that plague our world today (see Cornell 2008). The Marxist dream of a revolution toward an emancipated humanity and a classless planetary society is, we are told even by supposedly leftist thinkers, a hopelessly romantic and impossible metanarrative that relies on bad pretensions to scientific truth and problematic assumptions of an originary “human nature.” Moreover, revolution, the story goes, is inextricably connected to a hubris of humanism that cannot survive the “death of Man” in late-twentieth century European philosophy, a hubris that sees Man as the maker of his own world and therefore as having the power to change it. Feminist and queer theory, of course, have long highlighted and critiqued the phallocentrism and heteronormativity inherent to all forms of humanism and, as such, for several decades now they too have largely relinquished revolution as a necessary part of overcoming Man. Unfortunately, however, such reports of the death of Man seem, paraphrasing Mark Twain, to have been greatly exaggerated. This is not, to be sure, for lack of trying. Indeed, there have been countless assaults on Man over the past centuries: from the attack on his false universalism by early feminists and abolitionists (Wollstonecraft 1992, Cugoano 1999) to Nietzsche’s (1968) blistering assault on the nihilism he brings, from to the late twentieth century critique of his metaphysical presuppositions (Derrida 1984, Foucault, 1994, Heidegger 2008a) to more recent feminist and de-colonial challenges to the violent exclusions he relies on for his perpetuation (Irigaray 1985, Spivak 1999, Wynter 2003, Fanon 2004). This death of Man rhetoric has taken on an especially apocalyptic tenor in light of what climate scientists have named the “Anthropocene,” that is, the geological epoch of the “human dominance of biological, chemical, and geological processes on Earth” (Crutzen & Schwägerl 2011). The immense threat posed by climate change, coupled with the limited ability of “traditional” frameworks in the humanities and sciences (including Marxism) to appropriately address it, has called for a fundamental reconsideration of the place of “the human” within nature and history and laid bare the profound vulnerability of Man (see Chakrabarty 2009). If centuries of violent exploitation of his many Others has not been strong enough cause for his deposing, perhaps his now-too-obvious destruction of the planet might be. That is, of course, if the planet doesn’t get him first. (As always, we hardly need to point out, Man will be the last casualty of his own destructive boomerang and, thus, we feminists should not revel too much in watching him wince in the face of his own impending doom.) This seismic shift in the geopolitical—better, cosmopolitical—scene has provoked some thinkers to call for a merciful end to **Man**. We cannot possibly hope to address the monumental problems facing us today, they suggest, with the “traditional” philosophy of Man—“Humanism.” As such, “posthumanist” theorists have sought to move beyond the many boundary projects of Humanism, which work to reconsolidate Man as the sovereign subject of rational mastery, and to reconceptualize our place in the material universe in a more egalitarian and sustainable way (Braidotti 2013). One can certainly see why posthumanism might be a palatable alternative to the old Humanism for many feminist and queer theorists, given feminism’s birth as a challenge to the “universal” philosophy of Man, and indeed, there is much recent work that seeks to use posthumanism as a way of freeing us from any lingering attachment to the humanist subject (Man) as crucial to feminist and queer politics and from an enduring human exceptionalism in relation to animals and other forms of matter. Often juxtaposed to the so-called linguistic turn (which is usually said to include both psychoanalysis and Foucauldian “discourse analysis” as residual Humanisms), these thinkers in feminist-queer science studies, “new” materialism, and affect theory, attempt to reconfigure humans as dynamic open systems embedded in a vital universe characterized by the constant flux of matter-energy, perpetual transformation, and unpredictable forms of entanglement (see Barad 2007, Giffney & Hird 2008, Coole & Frost 2010, Gregg & Seigworth 2010, Dolphijn & van der Tuin 2012). From this perspective, it might seem that by even thinking about revolutionary socialism as absolutely necessary for a cosmopolitical feminist and queer theory and politics, we are embracing an old-fashioned Humanist dream, or what Rosi Braidotti refers to as Marxism’s “humanistic arrogance of continuing to place Man at the centre of world history” (2013: 23). While we wholeheartedly affirm the end of Man and the rethinking of our relationships with the other forms of matter, both living and non, with which we share the universe, we do question the increasing effort put into debunking “the human” and “human agency” at a time when neo-colonial and neoliberal capitalism have perhaps never been more destructive to the vast majority of the world’s inhabitants (human and non). Why does it seem, in other words, that posthumanism is necessarily post-revolutionary? While the joyous vitality that seems to characterize much of this posthumanist theory and its celebration of our connectedness with the universe (including technology) would seem to put these thinkers very far afield from Martin Heidegger’s “pessimism” about our ensnarement in modern technoscientific rationality (2008b), in the end we are often left with something quite similar to Heidegger’s conviction that there is nothing humans can actively do to make things better without intensifying our ensarement and we must therefore patiently hope that Being (or the planet in this case) chooses to spare us in spite of our past sins. For posthumanism, any focus on specifically human agency (such as that involved in the struggle against capitalism and colonialism) always risks a reinstatement of the old humanist subject, effectively smuggling in the Man who fucked everything up in the first place through the back door. Thus many posthumanist critics are engaged in a hypervigilant search for Man in every form of theory and politics, and any trace of him must be sussed out and rejected in the name of “life itself” and the future of the planet. When not a call for a more ecologically sustainable way of living based on a reassessment of the integral linkages between all scales of existence, then, the most “political” (or, perhaps better put, polemical) of posthumanisms are typically directed at deflating the “humanistic arrogance” of other academics and political theories rather than at any forms of systemic violence such as capitalism, colonialism, racism, or phallocentrism. We are not the first, to be sure, to register uneasiness over the often-blithe repudiation of Man and his premature burial in much posthumanist theory, especially considering how spectacularly Man’s handiwork is presently on display. Claire Colebrook (2014a, 2014b), for example, has put the brakes on any celebratory posthumanism that would claim to have abdicated Man’s throne atop the great chain of being. According to Colebrook, posthumanism is a recuperative gesture which enables Man to continue surviving vampirically by appearing to be dead while appropriating his previously excluded Others as his now-proper domain. As she convincingly argues, we should not buy so easily into the sham of Man’s self-effacement. While making atonement for his past exclusion and exploitation of the rest of the universe (i.e., women, the colonized, nonhuman animals, “life itself,” the Earth), Man redeems himself while simultaneously annexing these prior exclusions. Thus, when posthumanists and feminists turn to something like “life itself” or to our interconnectedness with the material universe as a way of overcoming Man, and while they spend their efforts diligently hunting down Man in all his former guises, Man has made off with the “goods” once again. For Colebrook, then, posthumanism is actually an “ultrahumanism,” which simply takes the world as Man had always made it in his (Euro-American, Bourgeois, White) image and supposedly “subtracts” Man, leaving Man’s old world masquerading as a new “posthuman” one. As she puts it: “Humanism posits an elevated or exceptional ‘man’ to grant sense to existence, then when ‘man’ is negated or removed what is left is the human all too human tendency to see the world as one giant anthropomorphic self-organizing living body” (2014a: 164). Because it was always Man who had given the world its sense, pronouncing Man dead ironically allows him to live on stronger than before because the world continues on in his image while his former critics—feminists, for example—now content themselves with his “vacated” world and devote themselves to tracking him down only in his old clothes (which he of course discarded long ago). So far, so good. We agree that posthumanism is a bit too self-congratulatory in its self-conferred status as the undertaker of Man. We also agree that it is often politically distracting—despite its best intentions—and that while many of its theorists are busy having contests over which of quantum nonlocality or bacterial sex is “queerer” and castigating the ancien régime (i.e., Marxists and “poststructuralists”) for its humanist dementia, Man is laughing all the way to the bank. This point, however, is also where we part company with Colebrook. For Colebrook, while the urgent possibility of human extinction is not the occasion for posthumanism, neither is it the occasion for revolutionary struggle. To quote her: What if social political revolution among human beings were still to leave the relation between the human species and life in the same place? Today’s frequently cited Marxist cry—it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism—should be read as symptomatic. Should we not be more concerned with the world’s end than the relations among markets and individuals? The Marxist premise that we cannot save the world ecologically until capitalism is dealt with, should be questioned, and reversed: as long as we imagine life and the world to be primarily anthropogenic, or emerging from human meaning and history, we will not confront the disjunction between the human species (in all its modes) and the life that it regards as its own. A new mode of critique that would not be political would be required. Indeed, it is the political gesture, or the understanding of conflicts as ultimately intra-human, that needs to be questioned. One needs a hypo-Marxism or counter-Marxism whereby the very premise of Marxism—man as a laboring animal who furthers his own life—needs to be recognized as the limit of thinking. For what ‘we’ cannot accept is the obvious counter to this assumption: man is not an animal who furthers his own survival (2014a: 197-8). As such, Colebrook asks us not to imagine a more just world, but rather “what life would be like if one could abandon the fantasy of one’s own endurance….for beyond ‘man’ one cannot figure the good life but only contingent, fragile, insecure, and ephemeral lives” (2014b: 22). **Frankly, we have had quite enough of “contingent, fragile, insecure, and ephemeral lives.” Indeed, this sounds not like the imagination of living beyond Man, but rather like a meticulous description of the lives of the majority of the world under conditions of advanced capitalism right now.** Of course, her point here is that “Man” (and presumably capitalism) is an apotropaic charm that ensures (the fantasy of) survival for certain members of the human species—an immunological protection against the contingency, fragility, insecurity, and ephemerality inherent to our existence as animals in an indifferent universe. For Colebrook, Man has convinced himself through this fantasy that the Earth is his “home.” And it is precisely this fantasy, this protective bubble that Man bought himself at the expense of all his others, that is now being burst by the impending climatological catastrophe. Despite her astute critique, however, Colebrook ultimately leaves us in what is perhaps a worse position than the posthumanists: dispossessing ourselves of our arrogant fantasy of survival and giving ourselves back over to the volatility of the universe, since any idea of enduring (and certainly flourishing) involves the reinstatement of an anthropomorphic enframing of the world’s “inhuman” forces.

Meanwhile, back at the ranch…

• Approximately 95% of the world population (6.7 billion) lives on less than $10 a day and 3.14 billion live on less than $2.50 a day (Ravallion, Chen & Sangraula 2008).

• The richest eighty-five individuals (0.000001%) possess as much wealth as the poorest half of the world’s population (i.e. 3,500,000,000 people) (Oxfam 2014).

• Anywhere from five to twenty thousand Africans have died in the latest Ebola outbreak (S. Leone Ebola Outbreak 2014) and the average annual mortality rate from malaria is 650,000 (90% of which are from sub-Saharan Africa) (Centers for Disease Control 2014).

• Current animal extinction rates are one-thousand times higher than the Earth’s historical average and one-third of all animal species are now either threatened or endangered as a result of what has been called “Anthropocene defaunation” (Dirzo et al. 2014).

• One in fifteen black men in the U.S. is imprisoned (Pew 2008) and thirty percent of all U.S. black men will be imprisoned at least once in their lifetime (Sentencing Project 2013). Black men in the U.S. are twenty-one times more likely to be killed by a police officer than white men (Gabrielson et al. 2014).

• 780 million people live without access to clean water and 3.4 million die annually due to water and sanitation-related causes. Ninety-nine percent of these deaths occur in the global South. (Prüss-Üstün et al. 2008, WHO/UNICEF 2012)

• Approximately 21 million people are victims of forced labor and 1.2 million children are trafficked annually (International Labour Organization 2012).

It is unclear how, without any ideal of **collective survival or flourishing**, we might be able to begin to address these (and countless other) crises (see Cornell 2004). For us, it is not (as Colebrook perhaps rightfully characterizes certain Marxist positions) that the ecological disaster cannot be addressed until after we have ended capitalism, but rather, that the relentless pursuit of profit inherent to capitalism will never permit us to address issues of the climate and ecology in any substantive way because all attempts to do so must remain compatible with the dictates of surplus accumulation. The crises of advanced capital and of the climate (as well as the others to which we have referred) are fundamentally linked—a point not lost on billions in the global South. Furthermore, we refuse the “forced choice” (to borrow a phrase from Jacques Lacan) offered by Colebrook and other posthumanist theorists. For Lacan, a “forced choice” is a result of the “alienating or” that makes us see a choice when there really is not one. His example, quite pertinent here, is a thief’s threat: “Your money or your life!” Either way, the victim loses the money (Lacan 1981: 212). By implying that we must choose either to save life (our lives, endangered species’ lives or “life itself”) or to struggle against capitalism, these theorists have accepted the “alienating or” of advanced capitalism. We insist on both life (human and non) and an end to capitalism. And indeed this is precisely the position being taken by climate scientists and activists around the world who are explicitly linking climate politics to counter-capitalist movements (see Klein 2013, 2014). As geophysicist Brad Werner has suggested (in a lecture at the American Geophysical Union entitled “Is Earth Fucked? Dynamical Futility of Global Environmental Management and Possibilities for Sustainability via Direct Action Activism,”) the only “dynamic” in his statistical modeling that is cause for “hope” is “resistance [or, movements of] people or groups of people [who] adopt a certain set of dynamics that does not fit within the capitalist culture…[including] environmental direct action, resistance taken from outside the dominant culture, as in protests, blockades and sabotage by indigenous peoples, workers, anarchists and other activist groups” (quoted in Klein 2013). In on-the-ground movements against and serious scientific research into climatological catastrophe, in other words, there is neither a call to renounce old “Humanist” fantasies of agency or survival nor any pretense that capitalism must not be ended in order to “save” life and the planet. What there is, however, is the idea that collective human action can transform the situation. “Bad” redemptive vision? Of course it’s possible. But perhaps we ought to try it first before being so sure that embracing ephemerality and fragility is the best left for us. Surely we owe it to those who were forcibly made to subsidize (often with their lives) Man’s fantasy of survival over the last five centuries—those who do not need academics to help them divest themselves of their arrogant survival fantasies because they never had them in the first place, and those who bear the least responsibility for the destruction that they now face most imminently (while Man plans his next colonial vacation in the deep sea or in “outer” space). To us, all of this renunciation of survival and transformative possibility by Euro-American academics sounds a little too much like the older sibling who refuses to share his toy and then purposefully destroys it before being forced to hand it down: “Oh you want this? I never liked it anyway.” To be clear, we are not suggesting that either the posthumanist theorists or Colebrook do not know or care about the “obvious disparity between those who benefit economically from the processes leading to climate change and those who will have to pay for most of the environmental and social costs” (Mora et al. 2013). Nor are we engaged in a simple exercise in demystification in which we purport to reveal the workings of capital behind all of today’s contemporary problems to those who did not previously see it. We do wonder why, however, for many posthumanist thinkers the claim that the destructivity of Man has reached its pinnacle seems to necessarily involve a simultaneous refutation of revolutionary desires and possibilities rather than a more urgent call for collective action. It should, perhaps, at least give us pause when scientists are more forcefully expressing the political implications of their research and calling for collective responses than feminists and other political theorists (see Mora et al 2013; Klein 2013, 2014). And on that note, neither is our point here a doomsday jeremiad lamenting the lack of global political response at such a crucial moment; indeed, there is no dearth of collective struggles against neo-colonialism, advanced capitalism, and ecological destruction around the world today. In light of this, academics in the Euro-American humanities risk being more out of touch than ever.

#### Black feminist engagement with political and economic institutions is transformative

**Hill Collins, Sociology PhD, 90** (Patricia, PhD Sociology, Distinguished University Professor of Sociology @[University of Maryland, College Park](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Maryland,_College_Park).[[1]](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patricia_Hill_Collins#cite_note-1) She is also the former head of the Department of [African American Studies](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African_American_Studies) at the [University of Cincinnati](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Cincinnati), and the past President of the [American Sociological Association](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/American_Sociological_Association) Council. Collins was the 100th president of the ASA and the first African American woman to hold this position. Collins' work primarily concerns issues involving feminism and gender within the African-American community. She first came to national attention for her book [Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Feminist_Thought:_Knowledge,_Consciousness_and_the_Politics_of_Empowerment), originally published in 1990, “Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment.” Boston: UnwinHyman, 1990, pp. 221-238. http://media.pfeiffer.edu/lridener/courses/BLKFEM.HTML)

Western social and political thought contains two alternative approaches to ascertaining "truth." The first, reflected in positivist science, has long claimed that absolute truths exist and that the task of scholarship is to develop objective, unbiased tools of science to measure these truths. . . . Relativism, the second approach, has been forwarded as the antithesis of and inevitable outcome of rejecting a positivist science. From a relativist perspective all groups produce specialized thought and each group's thought is equally valid. No group can claim to have a better interpretation of the "truth" than another. In a sense, relativism represents the opposite of scientific ideologies of objectivity. As epistemological stances, both positivist science and relativismminimize the importance of specific location in influencing a group's knowledge claims, the power inequities among groups that produce subjugated knowledges, and the strengths and limitations of partial perspective. The existence of Black feminist thought suggests another alternative to the ostensibly objective norms of science and to relativism's claims that groups with competing knowledge claims are equal. . . . This approach to Afrocentric feminist thought allows African-American women to bring a Black women's standpoint to larger epistemological dialogues concerning the nature of the matrix of domination. Eventually such dialogues may get us to a point at which, claims Elsa Barkley Brown, "all people can learn to center in another experience, validate it, and judge it by its own standards without need of comparison or need to adopt that framework as their own." In such dialogues, "one has no need to 'decenter' anyone in order to center someone else; one has only to constantly, appropriately, 'pivot the center.' " Those ideas that are validated as true by African-American women, African-American men, Latina lesbians, Asian-American women, Puerto Rican men, and other groups with distinctive standpoints, with each group using the epistemological approaches growing from its unique standpoint, thus become the most "objective" truths. Each group speaks from its own standpoint and shares its own partial, situated knowledge. But because each group perceives its own truth as partial, its knowledge is unfinished. Each group becomes better able to consider other groups' standpoints without relinquishing the uniqueness of its own standpoint or suppressing other groups' partial perspectives. "What is always needed in the appreciation of art, or life," maintains Alice Walker, "is the larger perspective. Connections made, or at least attempted, where none existed before, the straining to encompass in one's glance at the varied world the common thread, the unifying theme through immense diversity. "Partiality and not universality is the condition of being heard; individuals and groups forwarding knowledge claims without owning their position are deemed less credible than those who do. Dialogue is critical to the success of this epistemological approach**,** the type of dialogue long extant in the Afrocentric call-and-response tradition whereby power dynamics are fluid, everyone has a voice, but everyone must listen and respond to other voices in order to be allowed to remain in the community. Sharing a common cause fosters dialogue and encourages groups to transcend their differences. . . . African-American women have been victimized by race, gender, and class oppression. But portraying Black women solely as passive, unfortunate recipients of racial and sexual abuse stifles notions that Black women can actively work to change our circumstances and bring about changes in our lives. Similarly, presenting African-American women solely as heroic figures who easily engage in resisting oppression on all fronts minimizes the very real costs of oppression and can foster the perception that Black women need no help because we can "take it." Black feminist thought's emphasis on the ongoing interplay between Black women's oppression and Black women's activism presents the matrix of domination as responsive to human agency. Such thought views the world as a dynamic place where the goal is not merely to survive or to fit in or to cope; rather, it becomes a place where we feel ownership and accountability. The **existence of Afrocentric feminist thought suggests** that **there is always** choice, and **power to act, no matter how bleak the situation may appear to be**. Viewing the world as one in the making raises the issue of individual responsibility for bringing about change. It also shows that while individual empowerment is key, **only collective action can effectively generate lasting social transformation of political and economic institutions.**

# 1NR

## Repressive Hypothesis K

### 2NC – O/V

#### Deterministic and linear narrative turns the case. Narrating blackness through the lens of biological racism and the chattel principle speaks the very language of liberal abolition the 1AC tries to critique.

Herman **BENNETT** History @ CUNY Graduate Center **’19** *African Kings and Black Slaves* p. 155-156

Why should such nuances matter to historians, of the African diaspora? If we imagine that the history of the early modern African diaspora signifies more than cultural identification, then discerning the earliest genealogies of power assumes considerable importance in the dialectics of subject and subjection that both accompanied and preceded the reigning narrative of economic and racial ascendance that governs the African-European encounter. Narrating colonial enslavement requires an· engagement with an earlier idiom of dominance than that associated with the plantation temporality of the eighteenth century. An earlier history of power, in fact, reroutes the narrative of the African diaspora beyond cultural identification and the formation of the individual. Students of the African-European encounter-whether historians of Africa, European expansion, Atlantic history, or the slave trade-display little nuance with regard to this historical process. In our hands, a secular conception of European expansion overshadows a more complex history featuring competing interests among theologians, merchants, and courtiers. Such histories project the idea of a monolithic Europe in which the making of the West, state formation, and the history of capital transpired well beyond the confines of the Atlantic and the African presence. Simply put, the Europe associated with the transatlantic slave trade represents a secular, singular, and omnipotent entity with a uniform political rationale. In view of this perspective, an earlier genealogy of Europe is lost; one in which natural law, dominion, and civil society extended to barbarians. In tracking this genealogy, we glean the pervasiveness of late modern (eighteenth- and nineteenth-century) representation of the enslavement process and slavery-a depiction that naturalizes the slave both as an economic and abject object subject to his or her master's whim.

It should be noted that contemporary framings of slavery and race as the enduring dilemma of Western culture bring into relief the ur-source of the problem-a liberal triumphal narrative of slavery and its decline. In view of the shifting dialectic between temporality and meaning, it seems reasonable to ponder how one might historicize the slave trade but also the relations of power that shaped it. In begging the question, my intent has resided in discerning how one might engender a more nuanced history of the early modern Atlantic slave trade, a history that transcends the liberal triumphalism of the nineteenth century that to this day frames the African-European encounter as a singular event-the slave trade.

A half-century after Philip Curtin's The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census transformed how scholars write about the history of the slave trade, a voluminous yet vibrant historiography on the trade in all of its facets has come into existence. As a body of work, the slave trade historiography has engendered a revolution in how we think about the African past, both as an autonomous social phenomenon and as a constituent element in the narrative of the West, including Atlantic studies. Specialization and the steady proliferation of subfields, including the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database and the Nigerian Hinterland Project, underscore the depth and sophistication defining the study of the slave trade. Indicative of the trade's historical and philosophical importance, writings on the slave trade memorialize the human tragedy. But as is often the case with romances and tragedies, they assume a transcendent quality when, in fact, the experience, event, or phenomenon embodied the contrary. Curtin confronted this phenomenon in trying to discern the slave trade's demographic realities. In The Atlantic Slave Trade he recounts trying to determine the actual number of Africans transported to the Americas only to find himself mired in a labyrinth of citations founded on circumstantial evidence, supposition, and inference but very little by way of facts. Even after the West defined the slave trade and slavery as its moral burden, conjecture rivaled facts in the realm of representation. As in other human tragedies, guilt, anger, and shame kept the scholarly burden of proof-facts-at bay. Since the publication of Philip Curtin's monumental study The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census, numbers, but not the logic of numeracy, animate the dominant historiographical trend in the study of the slave trade. Curtin, building on the mytho -numerical claims of earlier writers, focused ostensibly on trading demographics. In doing so, he chartered the trade's shifting nature through time and space. Subsequent scholars have extended and refined Curtin's considerable findings, but few have ventured beyond the parameters established by his monumental study, which itself operates in the wake of the abolitionists' logic. Scholars exceeding Curtin's conceptual scope, usually other Africanists and historians of Atlantic Africa, tended to analyze the structure of the trade, thereby expanding our knowledge of the African past, but such studies rarely have linked the slave trade and the new modality of power.

#### Desire as pre-existing instinct reproduces European folk racism – instinct and sublimation are treated as given causal mechanisms rather than social constructions.

Ann Laura **STOLER** Willy Brandt Distinguished University Professor of Anthropology and Historical Studies @ New School **’95** *Race and the Education of Desire* p. 167-168

If the founding premise of Foucault's analysis is to trace how sexual desire is incited by regulatory discourses, one might expect colonial studies, so influenced by him, to have embraced more of his critique than it has actually done. We have looked more to the regulation and release of desire than to its manufacture. We have hardly even registered the fact that the writing of colonial history has often been predicated on just the assumption that Foucault attacked; the premise that colonial power relations can be accounted for and explained as a sublimated expression of repressed desires in the West, of desires that resurface in moralizing missions, myths of the "wild woman," in a romance with the rural "primitive," or in other more violent, virile, substitute form.

In colonial historiography, questions of desire often occupy a curious place. While the regulation of sexuality has come center stage, Foucault's reworking of the repressive hypothesis and thus the cultural production of desire has not. Although sexual desire, as expressed, repressed, made illicit, misdirected, inherited, and otherwise controlled has underwritten European folk theories of race from the seventeenth to twentieth centuries, desire is often suspended as a pre-cultural instinct to which social controls are applied, a deus ex machina, given and unexplained**.** Much mainstream colonial history has preceded not from a Foucauldian premise that desire is a social construct, and sex a nineteenth-century invention, but from an implicitly Freudian one.9 While Freudian language has certainly permeated other branches of history and other disciplines, the specific and varied invocations of Freudian models in colonial studies­ and the effects of their often silent presence-have neither been fully acknowledged nor explored.

### 2NC – AT: Paradox

#### 3. Critique of colonial knowledge should reflect on the production of sentiment rather than the diagnosis of repression.

Ann Laura **STOLER** Willy Brandt Distinguished University Professor of Anthropology and Historical Studies @ New School **’10** *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* 2nd Edition p. 216-217

Students of colonialism have concentrated on certain stories of the colonial because we have bought in to colonial scripts themselves. Although we are now better prepared to argue that the categories of colonized and colonizer were never given, we have done less to identify the complicated affective landscape that these protean categories produced. When Foucault wrote that "all sentiments have a history," he offered an invitation with­ out providing a blueprint for the task. Identifying the "structures of feeling" in which race and colonial power were forged is a challenging project that is still being mapped. The sentiments of "false pride" (attributed to poor whites), of the "impudence" of mixed-blood children, or the compassion and display of sympathies so crucial to being white and middle-class were judgments of class status and racial expectation. They were ascriptions of casts of mind and racially loaded affective markers.

Discovering why colonial archives were written can only partially shape how they are later read. Our readings of colonial archives can recoup those sites in which common sense was crafted to understand the vulnerabilities of these imperial projects and the fears they engendered. In such a frame, nursemaids, children, kindergartens, and orphanages no longer seem out of place when they appear as the subjects of state commissions on race, when they are hushed up as state secrets that were both inside and outside colonial control.

We need to appreciate how colonial authority was fashioned, how cultural resources were allocated, and how the production of sentiments worked with and against the production of privilege, allocations of labor, and distributions of wealth. Refocusing on the cultural work that colonial states imagined they could do allows a richer sense of what shaped the colonial landscape and what was decidedly beyond its micromanagement. But people such as those above whose lives cut unfamiliar paths across the dis­ tinctions of rule suggest still other structures of feeling in formation, other sites of power to identify, a wider range of sources to consider, and, not least, other kinds of memories to call on and stories to tell.

### 2NC – AT: We Critique Binaristic

#### 2. Racial difference is not the product of an originary repressive power. Biopolitics produces race as an effect of normalization and rationalization.

Rey **CHOW** Andrew W. Mellon Distinguished Professor in the Humanities @ Duke **’21** *A Face Drawn in Sand* p. 99-103

In other words, rather than taking race through the route of the repressive hypothesis and equating it—as is often the case in the fields of knowledge driven by contemporary identity politics—with racism, which is understood as an injurious subjective experience, Foucault approaches race primarily as an outcome of the intensified, compulsory objectification, bureaucratization, and normalization of life, whose rise to epistemic power, as he tells us in The Order of Things, was signaled in part by a shift from the classical field of knowledge known as natural history to the modern science of life known as biology. If plants and animals used to be classified in natural history by their common visible traits, they are henceforth conceived synthetically as deep structures based in invisible relations of subordination and organization. Foucault’s vivacious narration of this epistemic shift, which, according to him, enabled biological segments to become correlated as parts of a (nontransparent) structure across an ensemble of species or genera, may be glimpsed in extended passages such as the following:

When we consider the organ in relation to its function, we see, there- fore, the emergence of “resemblances” where there is no “identical” element; a resemblance that is constituted by the transition of the function into evident invisibility. It matters little, a(er all, that gills and lungs may have a few variables of form, magnitude, or number in common: they resemble one another because they are two varieties of that non- existent, abstract, unreal, unassignable organ, absent from all describable species, yet present in the animal kingdom in its entirety, which serves for respiration in general. Thus there is a return in the analysis of living beings to Aristotelian analogies: the gills are to respiration in water what lungs are to respiration in air. True, such relations were perfectly well known in the Classical age; but they were used only to deter- mine functions; they were not used to establish the order of things within the space of nature. From Cuvier onward, function, defined according to its non-perceptible form as an effect to be attained, is to serve as a constant middle term and to make it possible to relate together totalities of elements without the slightest visible identity. What to classical eyes were merely differences juxtaposed with identities must now be ordered and conceived on the basis of a functional homogeneity which is their hidden foundation. When the Same and the Other both belong to a single space, there is natural history; something like biology becomes possible when this unity of level begins to break up, and when differences stand out against the background of an identity that is deeper and, as it were, more serious than that unity.)\* (OT, 8;7–;#, Foucault’s emphases)

As living things were increasingly understood as constituted by hidden animating principles—that is, by vital functions shared invisibly across species and organisms—a transcendental notion of life steadily assumed center stage in scientific and other discourses. Jeffrey T. Nealon’s elucidating account of this profound epistemic shift may be borrowed here as a summation of this point: “In the birth of biology the question of life unhinges itself from a practice of representation (the discourse is freed from what Foucault calls the ‘pure tabulation of things’ [OT, 252] in natural history’s grids) and attaches itself instead to a mode of speculation about this murky thing called life— now understood not as a visible manifestation of similitude but as the darkly hidden secret that connects living things.”)+ It is precisely in examining the “mode of speculation about this murky thing called life” that, as Foucault writes, “it became possible to replace natural his- tory with a ‘history’ of nature” (OT, 89#).

Because of this overarching emphasis on life as a historically mutating discourse threshold, race in Foucault’s work, like sexuality, requires a different kind of amplification. Foucault does not exactly conceptualize race as something with essential or positive features (epidermis, anatomical traits, individual or group markers, or geographical regions). Nor does he view the antagonisms around racialization simply in terms of repressive violence. Rather, in keeping with his interrogations of the will to knowledge in modern times, he writes about race as an epistemic fault line that erupts alongside major historical transitions—such as the transition from a society governed by the symbolics of blood and sovereignty as invested in the monarch to one administered through disciplinary institutions and finally to one managed through biopolitical net-works. This is how he describes the historical emergence of Nazi racism, for instance:

Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, the thematics of blood was sometimes called on to lend its entire historical weight toward revitalizing the type of political power that was exercised through the devices of sexuality. Racism took shape at this point (racism in its modern, “biologizing,” statist form): it was then that a whole politics of settlement (peuplement), family, marriage, education, social hierarchization, and property, accompanied by a long series of permanent interventions at the level of the body, conduct, health, and everyday life, received their color and their justification from the mythical concern with protecting the purity of the blood and ensuring the triumph of the race. Nazism was doubtless the most cunning and the most naïve (and the former because of the latter) combination of the fantasies of blood and the paroxysms of a disciplinary power. (HS, 2:276)

As Foucault underscores on another occasion, “What is new in the nineteenth century is the appearance of a racist biology, entirely centred around the concept of degeneracy.”), Modern antisemitism, he adds, began in that ideological form, whereby it was imperative to rid society of those elements that were deemed degenerate, unclean, and unhealthy. But Foucault goes further with a more provocative point about Nazi racism: for all their seemingly old-fashioned talk about preserving the purity of Aryan blood, he suggests, the Nazis actually operated on a modern premise of life that was characteristic of disciplinary and biopolitical society: the premise on which massacres and genocides are carried out as vital rather than as death events. Exterminations of entire populations are, from this perspective, performed for the progressive purpose of augmenting life (through the exaltation of a superior group) in an “indefinite extension of strength, vigor, health, and life” (HS, 2:28#), which Foucault calls “a dynamic racism, a racism of expansion” (HS, 2:28#). The seemingly ultimate act of negation—killing people—is thus subsumed under an eminently positive agenda, eugenics, with its implied intensification of micropowers over the social body, together with the promise of a better race and a better species to come. As Foucault comments in “Society Must Be Defended,” “The objective of the Nazi regime was . . . not really the destruction of other races.”)-

Interestingly, while dissecting the monstrosity of Nazism’s modernity in "e History of Sexuality, vol. 2, Foucault, in a memorably rare aside, compliments psychoanalysis on its comprehension of an older politics of life (and death) that is bound to law and prohibition (and thus, from that perspective, to the necessity of repression):

It is to the political credit of psychoanalysis—or at least, of what was most coherent in it—that it regarded with suspicion (and this from its inception, that is, from the moment it broke away from the neuropsychiatry of degenerescence) the irrevocably proliferating aspects which might be contained in these power mechanisms aimed at controlling and administering the everyday life of sexuality: whence the Freudian endeavor (out of reaction no doubt to the great surge of racism that was contemporary with it) to ground sexuality in the law—the law of alliance, tabooed consanguinity, and the Sovereign-Father, in short, to sur- round desire with all the trappings of the old order of power. It was owing to this that psychoanalysis was—in the main, with a few exceptions—in theoretical and practical opposition to fascism. (HS, 2:2#4)

Foucault is probably thinking here of Freud’s Totem and Taboo (2625), a work that speculates on the origins of human society by way of murder and sacrifice or that advances a theory of social formation as a phenomenon inseparable from transgressive originary violence. Although he goes on to call psychoanalysis’s way of handling the sexual a “historical ‘retro-version’” (HS, 2:2#4)—that is, obsolete—and although he criticizes the popularization of the repressive hypothesis as a type of belief (or of what, a(er his teacher Louis Althusser, may be called “ideology,” a fictitious relation to lived reality that generates real subjection).), Foucault does justice to Freud by acknowledging the latter’s grasp of the strategic historical place occupied by sexuality at the intersection of knowledge and power in modern Europe.)/

#### 3. Politics grounded in the repressive hypothesis gets trapped in the reaction-formation of sovereignty and self-mastery. Turns case.

Pheng **CHEAH** Rhetoric @ Berkeley **’11** “Crises of Money” in *Creolization of Theory* eds. Françoise Lionnet, Shu-mei Shih p. 84-93

The psychoanalytic concept of trauma has the benefit of extending this analytical grid to cover forms of injury and suffering beyond the processes of consciousness or, as we now say too glibly, "the subject." It can give intelligibility to forms of hurt that are registered or encrypted through psychical processes outside the order of conscious experience, perception, and representation. Nevertheless the question that remains to be explored is whether forms of power in contemporary globalization can adequately be understood as primarily psychical in their functioning.

In this chapter, I examine the creolization of the psychoanalytic concept of trauma as it becomes transposed in colonial space in the writings of Frantz Fanon. I outline some of the central presuppositions of Fanon's application of the concept of trauma to the critique of colonialism. I then consider how Fanon's creolization of the concept of trauma into an analytical principle for understanding colonial power and oppression must itself be radically questioned in contemporary globalization. The second section of the chapter proceeds by testing these presuppositions through an examination of a series of events in Asia that on the surface seem to lend themselves perfectly to the vocabulary of trauma: the financial crises that afflicted East and Southeast Asia that were triggered by the assault on the Thai baht by currency speculators, on May 14-15, 1997. I then conclude with a brief indication of some future directions for postcolonial cultural critique.

Let me place two caveats at the threshold. First, I am not questioning the usefulness of trauma as a category of clinical practice or meta-psychological theory. I am only concerned with the limits of that concept as it has been taken up in postcolonial cultural critique for understanding the operations of power in the contemporary world. Second, a comprehensive discussion of the causes and devastating consequences of the Asian financial crisis is beyond the scope of this chapter, and, indeed, beyond my abilities. When we practice cultural critique, the best we can do is to offer a grid of intelligibility for understanding a concrete situation in a certain political interest. There is an enormous body of political-economic analysis concerned with the financial crisis. I have no disciplinary expertise in political economy, but I can learn from this literature and use it to reevaluate and tinker with the basic presuppositions of postcolonial theory so that it can be less hubristic and more in touch with postindustrial global capitalism. Such a process of transformative transposition is in principle open-ended. A critic must always stop within the limits of what he or she believes to be "the current conjuncture." But that coupure is as determined as it is arbitrary. No theoretical analysis can be interminable.

Trauma in Postcolonial Cultural Critique:

Fanon's Creolization of Freud on Trauma The concept of trauma originates from the etiology of neurosis. In its earliest formulation by Freud in his collaborative work with Josef Breuer, trauma originates in the affect of fright that accompanies an accidental event or physical injury. When such a distressing affect is not adequately processed by the affected subject by means of responsive action, adequate representation, or verbalization (abreaction), it is converted into a repressed memory. The memory of the affect then becomes a psychical trauma and the cause behind the formation of various kinds of neurotic symptoms. In Freud's words, "a trauma would have to be defined as an accretion of excitation in the nervous system, which the latter has been unable to dispose of adequately by motor reaction" ("Extracts," 137). "Any impression which the nervous system has difficulty in disposing of by means of associative thinking or of motor reaction becomes a psychical trauma" (154). It is important to emphasize that the trauma is not the mere physical event but the memory of the psychical affect the event induces. In cases of trauma, the repressed memory of the affect becomes lodged or encrypted within the psyche and continues to act long after the passing of the physical event.' As Breuer and Freud put it, "The psychical trauma- or more precisely the memory of the trauma-acts [ wirkt]like a foreign body which long after its entry must continue to be regarded as an agent that is still operative [gegenwiirtig wirkendes Agens]" ("vM," 85; 6). The psychical trauma thus functions like a parasite that will continually weaken its host or, better yet, a spirit whose continuing effectivity will repeatedly undermine the self-control of the living body it has possessed.

For present purposes, two features of Freud's early understanding of trauma are important. First, even before his formulation of the concept of libido or sexual energy, Freud suggested in his individual case studies that trauma should be analyzed in terms of quantified excitations (Erregungen) that impinge on the nervous system and leave a residue or trace because they have not been discharged either through abreaction or thought activity: "We regard hysterical symptoms as the effects and residues of excitations which have impacted on [beeinfluflt] the nervous system as traumas. It is impossible any longer at this point to avoid introducing the idea of quantities (even though not measurable ones). We must regard the process as though a sum of excitation impinging on the nervous system is transformed into chronic symptoms in so far as it has not been employed for external action in proportion to its amount" ("Frau Emmy," 141; 86). These accumulating excitations are transformed or converted into chronic somatic symptoms, and where the transformation is incomplete, "some part at least of the affect that accompanies the trauma persists [ verbleibt] in consciousness as a component of the subject's state of feeling [Stimmung]" (142; 86-87). Second, Freud argues that trauma involves a radical decentering of the ego that causes it to cede the autonomy of its intentional actions. The psychical trauma occurs because the ego expels an idea that is in contradiction with itself, which it does by repressing it into the unconscious. The traumatic moment proper, then, is the one at which the contradiction forces itself upon the ego [der Widerspruch sich dem Ich aufdriingt] and at which the latter decides on the expulsion [ Verweisung] of the contradictory idea [Vorstellung]. That idea is not annihilated by an expulsion of this kind, but merely repressed into the unconscious. When this process occurs for the first time there comes into being a nucleus and centre of crystallization for the formation [Bildung] of a psychical group divorced from the ego-a group around which everything which would imply an acceptance of the contradictory idea subsequently collects. The splitting of consciousness in these cases of acquired hysteria is accordingly a deliberate and intentional one, at least often introduced by a volitional act. The actual outcome is something other than what the subject [das Individuum] intended: he wanted to do away with [aujheben] an idea, as though it had never appeared, but all he succeeds in doing is to isolate it psychically. ("MiB Lucy R.," 182; 123) In this intentional act of repression, the ego unwittingly undermines its own autonomy by splitting itself. It creates or forms a psychical abscess that is divorced from itself, and this abscess can be filled with other memories and associations that are linked to the contradictory idea it seeks to banish. The contradictory idea therefore becomes an other within the self that has a life of its own. We should therefore understand trauma as a form of radical heteronomy where the trace or mnemic residue of something that originates from outside the subject (the accident or physical injury) takes shape within the very inside of the subject as an alterity or otherness, an alien power that undermines its self-control.

This means that trauma is always already a matter of domination (Herrschajt) and power (Macht). It concerns domination of an a priori kind, domination that precedes any historical form of social or political domination, because it is always about the security and self-mastery-one might even say the sovereignty-of the ego, the protection of an interiority from anything that impacts on or falls on this inside from the outside. The more elaborate account of trauma in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1940) emphasizes once again its psychical character. It is not "direct damage to the molecular structure or even to the histological structure of the elements of the nervous system" but concerns effects produced on the mental apparatus, "the organ of the mind [ Seelenorgan] by the breach in the shield against stimuli [Reizschutzes] and by the problems that follow in its train." 2 What is important here is not just the excitation caused by the external stimulus but the ability of the mental apparatus to protect itself against such excitations through anticipation and defense mechanisms such as libidinal cathexes that can bind excitations. Trauma occurs when the ego's capacity for security is compromised, when the protective shield it erects against the outside world is penetrated. This is the first step of the ego's loss of self-mastery, when its system of defense begins to break down. "We describe as 'traumatic' any excitations from outside which are powerful [stark] enough to break through the protective shield .... The concept of trauma necessarily implies a connection of this kind with a breach in an otherwise efficacious barrier against stimuli [ wirksame Reizabhaltung]. Such an event as an external trauma is bound to provoke a disturbance on a large scale in the functioning of the organism's energy and to set in motion every possible defensive means [Abwehrmittel]" (JL, 29; 301).

Precisely because trauma is the breakdown of the psychical security system, it is connected to fright (Schreck) instead of mere fear (Furcht) or anxiety (Angst).3 Fright refers to a state of encountering danger without any prior preparation because such danger, like the pure event, comes upon one completely by surprise. The mental apparatus is here completely vulnerable because its defenses are not up. In contradistinction, anxiety, which is a state of expecting danger or preparing for it, can never lead to traumatic neurosis because "it protects its subject against fright and so against fright-neuroses" (JL, 10; 282). Indeed, preparedness for anxiety and the hypercathexis of the receptive system that accompanies it "represents the ultimate line of defense of the shield against stimuli [die letzte Linie des Reizschutzes darstellt]" (JL, 32; 303)·4

We cannot simply say that the vocabulary of security and protection and the imagery of a defensive position in war that permeates Freud's distinction between "systems that are unprepared and systems that are well prepared through being hypercathected" are merely metaphorical (JL, 32, 303). It may very well be that the phenomenon of security that is a crucial theme in the political philosophy of Hobbes, Spinoza, Rousseau, and Locke, among many others, is merely the projection or extension of the security of the mental apparatus-its defensive or protective mechanisms in relation to stimuli-in the realm of social-anthropological existence.5 One can under stand psychical security as a pre-positive form of security that precedes any historical form of social or political security and the loss of self-mastery and autonomy in traumatic neuroses as a form of pre-positive domination by another that can function as an opening and foothold for social and political domination. In other words, the security of an individual psyche's interiority in its interaction with the external world and its management of internal excitations is the basis for historical forms of sociality and political community. Conversely, psychical insecurity or trauma is also the basis for violence and domination qua the determinate negation of community and belonging. This is a theme that is radicalized in Lacan's theory of aggressivity as an original tendency of the ego's paranoiac structure (see Lacan 1977). Let us now turn to consider how Frantz Fanon deploys the concept of trauma for the political critique of colonial racist violence. In Black Skin, White Masks, the concept is modified in two related ways even as its governing motif, the protection of interiority, remains intact. On the one hand, Fanon finds Freud's concept of trauma illuminating because it locates the origins of neuroses in specific psychical traumas or pathogenic experiences (Erlebnisse) back to which symptoms can be traced through psychoanalytic treatment.6 On the other hand, Fanon suggests that psychoanalysis is only of limited usefulness for the analysis of colonial racism because its primary focus is on the individual. "Freud insisted that the individual factor be taken into account through psychoanalysis. He substituted for a phylogenetic theory the ontogenetic perspective. It will be seen that the black man's alienation is not an individual question. Beside phylogeny and ontogeny stands sociogeny" (BSWM, n). "For the black man .. . historical and economic realities come into the picture" (BSWM, 1611125). The psychical trauma caused by colonial racism therefore involves a twofold deformation of the classical concept of trauma. First, the traumatic experience of colonial racism (as emblematized by identity-fixing racial slurs or appellations such as "dirty nigger" or "look, a Negro," or racist images that circulate in popular culture) is registered by an individual who experiences it not as a unique individual but as a member of a larger group, the colonized black man. Second, the weakness or impotence of the individual's mental apparatus, its lack of preparation and inability to bind trauma-related excitations through hypercathexis, is caused by material sociopolitical circumstances, namely, the context of colonial domination, in which the black man is always already constituted as an inadequate or injured subject. In other words, the excessive excitation and the resulting trauma are induced not by an isolated accidental event or unexpected injury but by the formative impact of the social context of colonial domination on individual consciousness, especially the extreme exploitation, deprivation, and immiseration brought about by colonial violence and the decimation of traditional values and binding communal norms. In Fanon's words, "The arrival of the white man in Madagascar shattered not only [the Malagasy's] horizons but its psychological mechanisms .... An island like Madagascar, invaded overnight by 'pioneers of civilization,' even if those pioneers conducted themselves as well as they knew how, suffered the loss of its basic structure . . .. The landing of the white man on Madagascar inflicted injury without measure. The consequences of that irruption of Europeans onto Madagascar were not psychological alone, since, as every authority has observed, there are inner relationships between consciousness and the social context" (BSWM, 97).

We can call this kind of incessant quotidian trauma that characterizes colonialism "structural" or "systemic" trauma because.its unceasing or continuous character arises from the oppressive processes of a structure or system that is imposed on a subject, which is forced to inhabit that structure or system.7 The three terms Fanon deploys for the analysis of colonial trauma are "the collective unconscious," "collective catharsis," and the "historico-racial" or "racial-epidermal schema." In Fanon's reconstruction, the Jungian postulate of a collective unconscious refers to the immoral impulses and shameful desires of a civilization or society as a collective subject that have been repressed. If this collective unconscious is territorially situated in terms of a specific civilization, then in the European collective unconscious, the principle of evil is projected onto African people (BSWM, 190). With the onset of colonialism, the European collective unconscious and all its archetypes are imposed on the African, who therefore identifies with the white man and European civilization and repudiates his blackness as a signifier of evil and immorality.8 But because the black man in colonial society is repeatedly reminded of, and is compelled to recognize, his blackness, this ambiguity of being and repudiating blackness cannot be repressed. Instead it must be endured and suffered in daily conscious existence. This is an important component of the systemic character of colonial trauma. In Fanon's words, "the negro lives an ambiguity that is extraordinarily neurotic. .. . [He] recognizes that he is living an error" (BSWM, 192).

Unlike "normal" trauma, if one can say that, colonial trauma is not hidden, forgotten, or repressed.9 Instead, colonial trauma has subjugated the black person's very consciousness and colonized every facet of his daily existence such that he consciously lives and suffers his entire body as an open sore. This radical or hyperbolic neurosis is exacerbated by the fact that collective catharsis is not possible for the black person. Collective catharsis refers to a channel or outlet that enables the release of collective aggressive forces that have accumulated in children (nswM, 145). Comic books and adventure stories are cultural forms of media or mediation that enable catharsis through the child's identification with the protagonist, whose aggressive behavior is directed at the villain. But since the villain is always figured as black, and the black child identifies with the white protagonist and adopts his attitude and truths, the black child develops the same self-destructive and suicidal consciousness found in the systemic trauma of the black adult. Here, as in the case of the collective unconscious, the systematic circulation of colonial-racist cultural images, significations, and representations is the structural cause of quotidian suffering and victimage.

Indeed, such images and representations are part of the mechanism of individuation of the black person. They actively fabricate his individual body in all its sensuous corporeality by creating a "historico-racial schema," a "corporeal malediction" that obstructs the formation of a genuine corporeal schema through which a genuine, autonomous dialectical relation between body and world can take place (BSWM, m). In Fanon's poignant words, "the white man ... had woven me out of a thousand details, anecdotes, stories" (ns WM, m). Here too, the entire body of the black person, or more precisely, its image, is the immediate, real cause of traumatic suffering: "I took myself far off from my own presence, far indeed, and made myself an object. What else could it be for me but an amputation, an excision, a hemorrhage that spattered my whole body with black blood?" (nswM, 112).

The trauma associated with the colonial experience thus stretches the classical psychoanalytic concept in at least three ways. First, it is a systemic form of trauma that is incessant or planned. Instead of being generated by an isolated event of injury, the trauma issues from social, political, and economic structures. Second, the traumatic cause (blackness) is not repressed or forgotten. It is patently and obviously part of the realm of conscious per ception and is openly recognized. Third, since the traumatic cause is not repressed, the subordination of the ego to the trauma as an alterity is not intermittent or partial. The black man is completely dominated by the other, that is, the white man's image of the black body. These three traits of colonial trauma indicate that it is not amenable to a merely therapeutic resolution. In the colonial situation, the verbalization of trauma does not lead to the better management of excitations. Instead, the verbal recognition by the black person that he is black is a further deepening and exacerbation of the trauma. It depletes and eviscerates the subject further.

Indeed, Fanon goes a step further. He distinguishes mere psychical trauma from the real struggle for life under colonialism and characterizes the educative native intelligentsia's quest for psychical disalienation as almost self-indulgent in comparison with the plantation laborer's or dockworker's struggle for survival**.** "For the Negro who works on a sugar plantation in Le Robert, there is only one solution: to fight. He will embark on this struggle, and he will pursue it, not as the result of a Marxist or idealistic analysis but quite simply because he cannot conceive of life otherwise than in the form of a battle against exploitation, misery, and hunger" (BSWM, 224). Hence the only complete resolution to colonial trauma is the formation of a collective political subject (the radical popular nation) that will destroy through revolutionary action the material conditions that caused the trauma in the first place. In a passage from The Wretched of the Earth that echoes Marx's eschatological argument that the proletarian revolution is imperative not only for individuals "to achieve self-activity [Selbstbetiitigung], but, also, merely to safeguard their very existence," Fanon suggests that the imperative behind anticolonial revolution is the dignity of sheer corporeal survival (Marx and Engels 1932/1970, 57; 92). "For a colonized people, the most essential value, because it is the most meaningful, is first and foremost the land: the land, which must provide bread and, naturally, dignity. But this dignity has nothing to do with 'human' dignity. The colonized subject has never heard of such an ideal. All he has ever seen on his land is that he can be arrested, beaten, and starved with impunity; and no sermonizer on morals, no priest has ever stepped in to bear the blows in his place or share his bread" (Fanon 2004, 9).

At the same time, however, Fanon's insistence on the dignity of sheer life as the necessary outcome of his analysis of colonial trauma leaves the governing motif of the classical concept of trauma intact. For whether it is a matter of mere corporeal survival or being able to lead an emotionally healthy, bearable, and less unhappy life, what is always at stake is the security of the living self**,** the organism's ability to protect itself from physical or psychical distress that comes from the outside.10 The ultimate aim of Fanon's explication is to remove the various external impositions that have led to the evisceration of black consciousness: the collective unconscious, the racialepidermal schema, the various processes of unconscious socialization of the black person as an individual, but most important, the social, political, and economic conditions of European colonialism. Black Skin, White Masks is intended to be a mirror that enables the black person to recognize himself as a universal human being so that he can be returned to the path of a normal or undistorted dialectical relation to the world.11 The important point here is that this involves the constitution of a strong consciousness that can master and bind the physical and psychical excitations impacting on it. Fanon's project is essentially one of helping the subject regain its self-mastery, power, or sovereignty so that it can return to an autonomous, normal path of development, one free of any heteronomy or subordination to an other. The fundamental principle or value governing Fanon's project thus remains that of security: the reconsolidation and strengthening of an interior so that it can withstand or regulate any breaching from the outside, so that it can stem any excessive exposure to alterity. (Colonial) political domination or subjugation is traumatic because it causes the erosion and loss of the colonized subject's psychical self-mastery. Conversely, political and economic sovereignty or self-determination is the necessary condition for black consciousness to regain its self-mastery and health.